<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence and Security Sector Reform and Parliamentary Oversight</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">November 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In the notes for a speech to the 84th Rose-Roth seminar of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on “Afghanistan, Regional Security and the Future of International Cooperation,” conducted in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 13-15 November 2013, the author outlines two reasons for failings of security sector reform efforts – inability to properly contextualize security sector reform initiatives and invalid assumptions regarding the power and shadow influence of some security organizations. He then identifies three features of successful reform designs, valid for every context: provide for political legitimacy of security and defence organizations and reform initiatives; emphasise integrity at least as much as effectiveness; involve civil society organizations.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>