<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Resilience Assurance for Software-Based Space Systems with Online Patching: Two Cases</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dependability Engineering and Complex Systems</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">470</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">267-278</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Security Informed Safety Assessment of Industrial FPGA-Based Systems</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM 12</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">June 2014</style></date></pub-dates></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Honolulu, Hawaii</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Approach for Assessing Risk of Common Cause Failures in Critical Infrastructures</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">199-210</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper presents the technique for the critical infrastructure (CI) risk assessment based on Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), modified for multiple failures’ criticality assessment. The multiple failures (MFs) are significant contributors to risk in critical infrastructure. In spite of the low frequency of multiple failures’ occurrence, the severity of their consequences could lead directly to the CI’s accident and malfunctions. The influences of multiple failures should be taken into consideration as early as possible at the design stage. The paper presents classification of MFs, their root causes and coupling factors that stipulate the common susceptibility of systems to shared cause. The common cause failures (CCFs) are a subset of the dependant multiple failures. The qualitative procedure developed in the paper considers the consequences’ severity of CCFs on different I&amp;C system levels. The total severity of CCFs is presented as a sum of severities for each level. The results of FMECA for single independent failures are taken as initial data to perform FMECA for MFs</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Formalizing Power Grid Influence to Assess the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65-78</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">After the Fukushima nuclear accident the problem of safe interaction between a nuclear power plant and the power grid requires urgent attention. The Ukrainian power grid is the backbone for stable development of all dependent infrastructures. Nuclear power plants can be seen as elements interacting with the system for power distribution. There are five nuclear power plants (NPP) in Ukraine. The NPP safety depends on the reliability of its subsystems, components, etc., as well as on the safety levels of other power grid subsystems. There are various interdependencies among NPPs and the power grid, which impact the safety levels of both. The balance of these mutual influences is considered as a basis for the stability of any infrastructure. The change of influences could lead to violation of the balance, that in turn may lead to a change in the subsystem’s state. This paper presents an approach for formalization of different types of influences between dependent infrastructures. This approach supports the analysis of the behaviour of infrastructure subsystems and the prediction of their safety levels, considering the change of states. Two metrics are proposed to evaluate the influences: linguistic and numerical. The influence formalization enhances the understanding of risk proliferation and the assurance of NPP safety.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>