<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intelligence and Security Services Reform and Oversight in Ukraine – An Interim Report</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51-59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Though Ukraine was among the first successor states of the Soviet Union to create a legal framework for the activities of its intelligence and security community, said framework addressed inherited and unreformed structures. Subsequent reform plans have not led to the success desired by Ukraine’s international partners and, we must assume, a majority of the Ukrainian voters and taxpayers. Among the reform demands is also the credible subordination to parliamentary oversight, which, though stipulated by law, has effectively been neutralized by reference to subordination to the President in the same law. Who would want to be controlled by an ever-undecided parliament if a personalized oversight by the President and the expert committee of the National Security and Defence Council is the possible alternative? As a consequence, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) remains subject to much criticism – for the corruption of some of its representatives, for overlapping mandates with other security institutions, and for lack of control other than by itself and the changing presidents and their administrations.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence Institution Building in Ukraine at Peace and at War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">92-108</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">There are two distinct periods in Defense Institution Building in Ukraine since gaining independence in 1991. A period of peace until February 2014, and the period of war with Russia in 2014-2018. In the pre-war period of 1991-2013, the economic problems, inconsistencies in national strategy and consequent neglect of national defense requirements led to unclear military strategies and declarative rather than substantial reforms of the Armed Forces. Ukraine was trying to compensate the impact of its economic weakness and policy inconsistencies on defense through active cooperation with NATO and participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the EU. However, in the spring of 2014, the response of Ukraine exposed serious weaknesses in all defense aspects except for the people’s will to defend the country. Responding to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the invasion to the South-Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine has mobilized, equipped, and trained a substantial military force of 250 000 active personnel and invested substantial resources in building effective military with agile professional active component supported by deployable ready reserve, jointly capable to deter possible aggression from Russia.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">92</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On Integrity of Intelligence in Countries of Eastern Europe</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">30</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55-63</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the evolution of intelligence and counterintelli¬gence services in selected Eastern European countries, formerly part of the Soviet Union, in the two decades of independence. It emphasises transitional influences, the high level of secrecy and the lack of effective parliamentary oversight. In this environment, a common feature of the transition process is the general lack of integrity. Not surprisingly, instead of serving as a guardian against corrupt practices in government, they turn into a major conduit of political and economic corruption.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leonid Polyakov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James Greene</style></author></authors><tertiary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></tertiary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Role of Government</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A Compendium of Best Practices</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Geneva</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221-237</style></pages><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-92-9222-114-0</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chapter 17 of the NATO-DCAF Building Integrity Compendium. The boxes in the chapter were contributed by its authors with the exception of Box 17.1, contributed by Todor Tagarev and Boxes 17.4, 17.6 contributed by Maciej Wnuk</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Challenge of Transforming Ukrainian Armed Forces: How Science Supports Armed Forces’ Development</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">27-31</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The First Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine examines the chal­lenges of transformation at three levels—conceptual, planning/programming, and implementation of force development programmes—and the main challenges that require scientific support from research organisations in the Ukrainian defence es­tablishment.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leonid Polyakov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Various contributions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pro suverennuyu demokratiyu</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%"> 2007</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Evropa</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Moscow</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leonid Polyakov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Analytical Overview of Democratic Oversight and Governance of the Defence and Security Sector in Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DCAF Working Papers</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">January 2005</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">152</style></number><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Five paradoxes of Russian conservatism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Otechestvenniye zapiski</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></date></pub-dates></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.strana-oz.ru/2004/2/pyat-paradoksov-rossiyskogo-konservatizma</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>