<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Growing Apart: The Impact of the Russian War in Ukraine on the Former Soviet Space</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87-114</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The full-scale war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, began under a false assumption regarding the underlying grand strategy. The ongoing conflict has presented difficult choices for the states in the former Soviet Union, who have approached it with a mix of rational calculation and emotional considerations, viewing it as a conflict between two once brotherly nations. While Russia continues to wield significant influence, and some states depend on it as a security guarantor, the general consensus among the ten states is that Russia’s power and influence are waning. Consequently, they anticipate that Russia will pay less attention to its regional partners, allocate fewer resources to them, and that close association with Russia would strain relations with other important actors, particularly in the West. Russia’s influence has led seven of the ten states to not fully align with either the West or Moscow. While multilateral cooperation through organizations like the CSTO and EAEU was not paramount due to the prevailing “hub and spoke” structure, these states now face a noticeable stalemate. Despite Russia’s lingering influence, fueled in part by economic disparities, a rapid “growing apart” occurs in the area of the former Soviet Union. Some actors are distancing and disengaging faster than ever, leading to a shifting geopolitical landscape.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coronavirus Pandemic and Reactions in the EU Accession Classes of 2004-2007</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37-47</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article presents the reaction of the East-central European (ECE) countries, members of the EU and NATO, to the Coronavirus pandemic. Understandably, there are major similarities as the pandemic&amp;mdash;a global challenge&amp;mdash;hit every state of the region, by and large, in the same way. The geographical location, size (absence of great powers) and historical traditions led to the exposure of these countries to the pandemic being closely aligned. The points of international reference of these small and medium-sized countries can be seen to align in different directions as to which other states they watch and often follow when deciding about their steps in such a global crisis. This article cannot be fully comprehensive and will, therefore, focus on the reactions of health and emergency services. It raises the question as to whether any similarities are deterministic or whether there are noticeable differences due to the variety of their political systems and current history.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Age of Post-Truth: State Influence and Strategic Communication - Contemporary Security Challenges on Europe’s Eastern Flank</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19-35</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;The role of strategic communication has changed in the context of Russia&amp;rsquo;s relations with its partners, including the West, the post-Soviet space and the Western Balkans since 2013 with the declaration of the close integration of communication with other means of Russian influence. Moscow has allocated more resources than ever and weakened the traditional western media superiority. However, it is not the media per se but its integration with the realization of strategic objectives that has represented the main differences compared to earlier times. It is not Russia&amp;rsquo;s primary intention to convince but to raise doubt in the messages of other actors and gain influence in societies and over governments. In the area of the former Soviet Union, strategic messaging is part of a continuum that includes the eventual use of military force. The West faces a dilemma as it must not undermine its own values and must preserve the freedom of speech and the press while Russia protects its media monopoly and has effectively eliminated the freedom of electronic media at home. The West has reacted belatedly and hesitantly as far as its strategic messaging, although it is gradually catching up with taking certain counter-measures not only nationally but also through its institutions.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arms Control Arrangements under the Aegis  of the OSCE: Is There a Better Way to Handle Compliance?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57-71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The CSCE-OSCE has strong legacy in conventional arms control both as far as limitations and reductions and constraints on military activities. Although the last two decades since 1999 did not add much to the arms control acquis and there was a “retreat” in arms control with the suspension of the CFE Treaty. It is Germany that keeps European conventional arms control on the agenda as part of security dialogue since the Harmel Report of 1967 and takes symbolic initiatives as a demonstration. Although compliance is not full and some activities demonstrate the intention to cheat, their level is more important as part of the communication of the main parties rather than of direct strategic significance.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Threats and Strengthening Resilience on Europe’s Eastern Flank</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Security Insights</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">March 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/secInsights/security_insights_16.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosovo 1999 and Crimea 2014: Similarities and Differences</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57-68</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Graeme P Herd</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pàl Dunay</style></author></authors><tertiary-authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Graeme P Herd</style></author></tertiary-authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Security, Great Powers and World Order</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century: Competing Visions of the World Order</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pàl Dunay</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">From Obsession to Oblivion: Reconceptualization of Security in NATO since 1990</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Springer</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New York</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">718</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record></records></xml>