<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iosif Androulidakis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andriy Kovalenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Imeca-Based Technique for Security Assessment of Private Communications: Technology and Training</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">availability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">communication</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">confidentiality</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IMECA</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PBX</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threat</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99-120</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nowadays, almost everywhere, there are a huge number of privately owned telephone exchanges that serve the communication needs of a private or public entity making connections among internal telephones and linking them to other users in the public telephone network. Such communications cover most vital infrastructures, including hospitals, ministries, police, army, banks, public bodies/authorities, companies, industries and so on. The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness in regards to security and privacy threats present in private communications, helping both users and vendors safeguard their systems.
This article provides an introduction to private branch exchanges (PBXs) and private communications, and a review of relevant threats and vulnerabilities. Finally, one possible approach to assessment of private communications security is presented, along with appropriate taxonomies. Such approach relies on performing gap analysis and is based on the IMECA technique.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anatoliy Gorbenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olga Tarasyuk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Alexander Romanovsky</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intrusion-Avoidance via System Diversity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">diversity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intrusion avoidance.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">154-158</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paper discusses a generic intrusion-avoidance architecture allowing the system architects to decrease the risk of intrusions. The architecture employs software diversity at various system levels and dynamically reconfigures the deployment environment to avoid intrusions. This solution reduces the so-called system’s days-of-risk which is a period of an increased security risk between the time when a vulnerability is publicly disclosed to the time when a patch is available to fix it. To select the less vulnerable system configuration we propose metrics estimating security risks by accounting a number of not-fixed vulnerabilities and their severity.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>