<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Glen Segell</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Selective Leadership Expectations in a Multinational Force Context Examined through NATO Training</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">commissioned officer</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leadership</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO School Oberammergau</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-commissioned officer</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">North Atlantic Treaty Organization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">training</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-23</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Military personnel with leadership roles may be expected to require some additional specialist training to be more effective in the NATO context, given its multinational environment. That includes the command of forces not necessarily from their own country. To describe and evaluate such leadership expectations, this article examines NATO training and uncovers the expectations defined by the training. The analysis of five courses offered by the NATO School Oberammergau helps determine these expectations in the specific areas for specific ranks and the value-added of the training and its content. For example, non-commissioned officers with ranks OR-4/OR-5 are expected to lead in interoperability, OR-6/OR-7 in rules of engagement, combating trafficking in human beings and tackling organized crime, and OR-8/OR-9 in international ethics and law of armed conflict. Commissioned officers with ranks OF-4/OF-9 are expected to lead in integrity-building and anti-corruption activities. Between 2015 and 2021, there have been a total of 1 555 trainees on these five courses that, given their ranks, could mean that they would be leading over 85 000 subordinates in deployment.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Glen Segell</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Infogate Influences on Reforms of South Africa’s Intelligence Services</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Apartheid</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cold War</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democratization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Infogate</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence reforms</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence sector reforms</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South Africa</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61-74</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The hypothesis is that intelligence reform and intelligence sector reform result from traumatic catalyst rather than gradual evolution, reactionary rather than proactive, and not soon or quickly. The threat environment, an emergency, a necessity, e.g., democratization, gross failure, and scandals, are causes for reforms. The case is South African intelligence services. South Africa is significant due to diverse and constantly changing operational environments: the Cold War, decolonization of Africa, apartheid, post-Cold war, and post-Apartheid democratization. From the first non-military intelligence agency created in 1968, the Bureau of State Security, it was clear the nature of intelligence was such that the balance between secrecy, transparency, and accountability would always be a fine one to strike. The relationship between the political echelons, e.g., the Prime Minister and the Bureau’s Director, was too close and so allowed misuse of state funds. The uncovering of the abuse of state funds, the Infogate scandal, had an influence on subsequent reforms, including those for democratization to abolish apartheid and introduce a “one-man, one-vote democracy,” achieved in 1994. Reforms through legislation, jurisdictions, restructuring, micro-managing intelligence, merging apartheid and opposition intelligence services, and creating post-apartheid intelligence services are examined in this article. The experience teaches us that errors can be avoided by not making uncoordinated, piecemeal changes; every reform is unique and rarely easy; operationalizing legislative mandates of transformation is more difficult than anticipated. The reform process starts with reflecting the envisaged ideal situation, yet the outcome is not always as expected and thus requires more reforms.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61</style></section></record></records></xml>