<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Declaration of the Russian State as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Pros, Cons, and Realities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">aggression</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">genocide</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state sponsor of terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, ignited discussions about ways to curb Russia’s ambitions in reshaping the post-WWII world order. This article critically examines the ongoing dialogue surrounding the potential designation of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. We will delve into both the arguments in favor and against this move while also exploring the current political outcomes of this contentious debate. Previously, we conducted a comparative analysis of the criteria for including countries in the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and the activities of the Russian Federation. This article outlines the potential repercussions of such a designation, including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items, and various financial and other restrictions. Sanctions penalizing countries and individuals for engaging in trade with designated states are of particular significance. The Russian Federation has already been recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/ regime in Ukraine and the EU; hence, the main emphasis will be on the United States. This is due to the fact that resolutions from other states are often symbolic gestures with limited consequences, whereas inclusion in the U.S. Department of State’s list can have a profound impact on Russia.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Designation of the Russian Federation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Meeting the “Club of Villains” Criteria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">aggression</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state sponsor of terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-46</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article analyzes the primary reasons for designating the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The issue gained prominence with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022—the largest and deadliest armed conflict in Europe since World War II—challenging the unity of the Collective West and the global security system. The vision of a peaceful and prosperous European space from Lisbon to Vladivostok has been permanently shattered.
To achieve its geopolitical objectives, Russia has been involved in numerous armed conflicts since 1991, such as in Georgia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and now Ukraine, orchestrated operations on the soil of other states, and supported terrorist organizations. Aspiring to be a superpower in the aftermath of the USSR, Russia has utilized hybrid warfare instruments for decades to undermine democracies globally and maintain influence over former Soviet republics. Some of its actions can be classified as terrorism, support for terrorism, ethnocide, or genocide.
This article explores the criteria for including countries in the US list of state sponsors of terrorism and compares them with the activities of the Russian Federation. It provides evidence that Russia qualifies for inclusion in the list, although the US still hesitates to designate it as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/regime.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Larysa Kompantseva</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Political Analysis or Fortune-Telling by Crystal-Ball? Western Think Tanks' Challenges with Forecasting Putin's War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">big data</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">content analysis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">escalation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">political analysis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9-28</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article analyzes major western think tanks’ forecasts, experts’ opinions, and US and UK media content regarding the future of Ukraine-Russia relationships in the year preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Though the Russian-Ukrainian war has been ongoing since the occupation of Crimea and quasi-republics (“Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics”) were established in 2014, not many political analysts foresaw the coming of the bloodiest and most devastating war since WWII. At the same time, Big Data content analysis of US and UK media demonstrated the presence of markers of an approaching full-scale invasion. Correct-based estimation of the likelihood of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s willingness and ability to protect its sovereignty, was crucial for shaping the appropriate response of the Collective West.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></section></record></records></xml>