<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philipp Fluri</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Concept of Resilience: Security Implications and Implementation Challenges</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">concept</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disaster risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">maturity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peacebuilding</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">police force</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">postconflict reconstruction</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sendai Framework</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">stabilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">theory</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-12</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aiming for a more effective and efficient response to diverse and multidimensional threats, an increasing number of defense and security organizations, the United Nations, NATO, and the EU embrace the concept of resilience in their security strategies and policies. This article provides a brief overview of the concept, a sample of definitions used in policy documents, and the types of problems they seek to resolve. Then we introduce the reader to the 15 articles published in the Summer and Fall 2020 issues of Connections that present the evolution of the concept of resilience and its implementation by and within political, defense, and law enforcement organizations, as well as its anticipated contribution to cybersecurity, disaster preparedness, peacebuilding, post-conflict restoration and countering hybrid threats.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Salvatore Marco Pappalardo</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nikolai Stoianov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Logical Model for Multi-Sector Cyber Risk Management</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber risk assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">E-MAF</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ECHO project</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">essential services</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interdependencies</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13-26</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The increasing reliance on digital infrastructures makes whole sectors of the economy and public services vulnerable to attacks through cyberspace. Some progress has been made in understanding vulnerabilities and ways of reducing cyber risk at the sub-sectoral level. While the sectoral level remains a significant challenge, this study goes beyond, also addressing cyber risk resulting from the cross- and multi-sectoral interdependencies in a consistent logical model. The paper presents the scope of this logical model, outlines the problem of risk assessment, structured around the triplet &amp;ldquo;Threats &amp;ndash; Vulnerabilities &amp;ndash; Impact,&amp;rdquo; and the structuring of risk mitigation around types of risk reduction measures, the objective of decision-making on risk treatment, and the modalities of application. We provide examples of the implementation of the logical model, underlying the ECHO Multi-sector Assessment Framework, and conclude by emphasising the advantages the logical model and the framework provide.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Venelin Georgiev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Valeri Ratchev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Taxonomy of Essential Services</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Radioelectronic and Computer Systems</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">risk management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Uncertainty</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vulnerabilities</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">May 2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Radioelectronic and Computer Systems 6(58)</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sevastopol, Ukraine</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">191-196</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Communities, countries and alliances cannot be efficient in preparing to meet diverse threats to their security within traditional organizational stovepipes. The boundaries between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ threats are getting fuzzier, and the vulnerabilities of governments, businesses and communities feed on each other, while the comprehensive approach is gaining traction in ever more security fields. The implementation of the comprehensive approach poses a number of methodological challenges. While it clearly requires coordination of various capabilities of a multitude of actors, it is less apparent which is the suitable organising concept. This paper takes as a starting point the concept of ‘essential services’ and suggests a taxonomy, that would allow to treat threats, vulnerabilities and risk in a common comprehensive framework. The taxonomy has been developed with a specific purpose in mind, and thus refers to European Essential Services (EES). We nevertheless reason that it can be replicated to support decision making at other levels, e.g. in national security policy making and planning. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">58</style></issue></record></records></xml>