<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare Revisited: A Battle of ‘Buzzwords’</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-28</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid warfare is the most common term used by commentators to describe the complexity and multifaceted character of contemporary warfare. Hybrid warfare refers to coercive methods of strategic competition that take place below the threshold of conventional military conflict and is usually applied to the blend of military and non-military methods of warfare employed by the West’s principal adversaries, Russia and China. The term hybrid warfare has evolved from an essentially military concept to one that potentially embraces all the instruments of state power. Hybrid warfare remains an ill-defined and contested term, and there are many other buzzwords, such as irregular warfare, hybrid threats, and gray zone aggression, that are used to describe the same phenomenon. This article examines the evolution of thinking on hybrid warfare and these related concepts. It highlights the challenges that scholars and practitioners have faced in trying to define and apply these terms in the policy environment in a manner that promotes common understanding and strategic coherence.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>12</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The COVID-19 Pandemic: A Preliminary Assessment of the Impact on Terrorism in Western States</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/occasional-papers/covid-19-pandemic-preliminary-assessment.</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marshall Center Occasional Paper</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">’Modern Guerrillas’ and the Defense of the Baltic States</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Small Wars Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/modern-guerrillas-and-defense-baltic-states</style></url></web-urls></urls><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sam Mullins</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Foreword</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Combating Transnational Terrorism</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Procon Ltd.</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vii-x</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">73-87</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The term hybrid warfare has been widely analyzed by scholars, policymakers and commentators since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. The topic has ceased to be a subject only studied by military strate-gists, but has entered the wider policy domain as a significant security challenge for the West. This article seeks to place the debate about hybrid warfare in a broader analytical and historical context and summarizes discussion to date on this and related strategic concepts. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine is a particular focus for discussion.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Role of the Security Forces in Combating Terrorism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Combating Transnational Terrorism</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Procon</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">131-148</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The conventional wisdom is that counter-terrorism (CT) involves a “whole of government” or “holistic” approach. Each government department plays a role in a comprehensive strategy that incorporates security measures, but also economic, legal, political and informational initiatives. While this is true, it is the security services that continue to play the lead, active role in CT, particularly at the operational and tactical levels. The security sector incorporates many different agencies and institutions, which can include the armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, border security, governmental oversight bodies, the judiciary and correctional systems, non-state security bodies, and civil society organizations. All of these agencies have a part to play in CT, but the focus of this chapter is on the main actors – the armed forces, the police and the intelligence services.
Although this chapter addresses the three elements separately, it is evident that contemporary CT operations have fostered interagency cooperation and coordination on an unprecedented scale, resulting in considerable overlap between the roles of the intelligence, law enforcement and the military. The previously well-defined roles of these services have largely disappeared in the last decades as CT operations have become more urgent, complex and transnational. The demands of contemporary CT have also resulted in significant changes to size, composition and roles of all of these agencies.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Talking to Terrorists</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Combating Transnational Terrorism</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Procon</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">181-198</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Legitimate governments do not talk to terrorists. This is the standard, public response of political leaders throughout the world when asked about the possibility of negotiations with violent non-state groups. President George W. Bush famously claimed that “No nation can negotiate with terrorists. For there is no way to make peace with those whose only goal is death.”  In 1979, British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher declared with typical irony: “I have never done business with terrorists until they become prime ministers.”  As this statement implies, despite the rhetoric, governments can and do talk to terrorists.
An oft-quoted RAND Corporation study on the reasons for the end of terrorist campaigns between 1968 and 2006 found that a transition to a non-violent political process took place in 43 percent of the 648 examples studied.  In most cases, this transition could not have taken place without a willingness on the part of governments to negotiate. At the time of writing, talks are taking place to end long-standing terrorist campaigns in the Philippines and Colombia. Successful engagement with terrorists has previously ended bloody armed conflicts in countries as diverse as South Africa, the UK (Northern Ireland), Indonesia (Aceh) and El Salvador. As conflict analyst Roger Mac Ginty pithily states: “The phrase ‘we shall never negotiate with terrorists’ lacks one obligatory word: ‘yet’.” 
This chapter examines the potential advantages and dangers of talking to terrorists and addresses practical and technical issues such as who to talk with and when and how to talk. It also identifies good and bad practice from the experience of dialogue with terrorist groups around the world. The final section addresses the prospects of talks in an era characterized by ideologically extreme, religiously motivated terrorists. The chapter deals with the option of talking to terrorists as part of a broader counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, where a government has a choice whether or not to open dialogue with a terrorist organization. It does not address the tactical level negotiations that are an essential element in the response to terrorist kidnapping and barricade hostage incidents. In these situations, government security forces usually have no choice but to talk to the terrorists involved in order to save civilian lives.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sam Mullins</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Steven R. Monaco</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism and Crime</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Combating Transnational Terrorism</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Procon</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67-84</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Most discussions of the so-called crime-terror nexus revolve around a very simple observation: terrorists and insurgents frequently engage in criminal activity as a source of revenue. There is no question that crime has been and continues to be a lucrative source of funding for all kinds of terrorists. However, there is still ongoing disagreement about the extent of overlap between the worlds of terrorism and organized crime (OC). Often there is a tendency to over-generalize from specific cases, to speculate or, at times, to overlook the available evidence. Confusion over the nature of the threat in turn acts as a barrier to developing more effective countermeasures. Based on a combination of the authors’ engagement with academic literature on the subject and operational experience, this chapter begins by examining the similarities and differences between terrorists and criminals including profiles, methods, systems of organization, and motives. In other words, the who, what, how and why of terrorism and OC. This is followed by a discussion of the crime-terror nexus and the concept of “convergence,” i.e. the relationships between terrorism and crime. The chapter then concludes with a brief discussion of implications for counter-terrorism (CT) and law enforcement (LE).</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sam Mullins</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism and Organized Crime</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">convergence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counter-terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crime-terror nexus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">law-enforcement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65-82</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article begins with an assessment of the similarities and differences between terrorists and criminals, including profiles, methods, systems of organization and motives. Notably, the article identifies seven categories of crimes committed by terrorists: 1) Inherent/violent, 2) Preparation/facilitation, 3) Funding, 4) Specialized terrorism offenses, 5) Vigilantism/public relations, 6) Miscellaneous/Spontaneous/Unrelated Offences, and 7) Previous criminal records. Next, the crime-terror nexus is discussed and four types of relationships between terrorists and criminals are identified: 1) Interaction, 2) Appropriation, 3) Assimilation, and 4) Transformation. The article concludes with a discussion of the concept of convergence between terrorism and organized crime, and implications for counter-terrorism and law-enforcement.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Selective Engagement with Islamist Terrorists: Exploring the Prospects</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Studies in Conflict &amp; Terrorism</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25–26</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Work in Progress: The United Kingdom’s Campaign Against Radicalization</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2006</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">73-91</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security and Private Military Companies: The Prospects  for Privatized ‘Battlegroups’</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2005</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">107-126</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>