<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare Revisited: A Battle of ‘Buzzwords’</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-28</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid warfare is the most common term used by commentators to describe the complexity and multifaceted character of contemporary warfare. Hybrid warfare refers to coercive methods of strategic competition that take place below the threshold of conventional military conflict and is usually applied to the blend of military and non-military methods of warfare employed by the West’s principal adversaries, Russia and China. The term hybrid warfare has evolved from an essentially military concept to one that potentially embraces all the instruments of state power. Hybrid warfare remains an ill-defined and contested term, and there are many other buzzwords, such as irregular warfare, hybrid threats, and gray zone aggression, that are used to describe the same phenomenon. This article examines the evolution of thinking on hybrid warfare and these related concepts. It highlights the challenges that scholars and practitioners have faced in trying to define and apply these terms in the policy environment in a manner that promotes common understanding and strategic coherence.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ron Matthews</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Case for an Economic NATO</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic coercion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic diplomacy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">geoeconomic threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">geoeconomics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-39</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the need for liberal democracies to respond to the growth of economic bullying, coercion, gunboat diplomacy, and geoeconomic pressure undertaken by Russia and China. The political call for an economic NATO-type international organization is growing louder following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resultant constraints imposed on food and energy supply, and China’s bullying of the tiny NATO and EU state, Lithuania. This article chronicles examples of Russian and Chinese economic sanctions and the impact of China’s geoeconomic diplomacy before identifying and explaining actual and potential western policy responses, especially the establishment of an Economic NATO.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ho Ting (Bosco) Hung</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Distorting Your Perception of Russia’s Aggression: How Can We Combat Information Warfare?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">digital citizenship</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">propaganda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia-Ukraine war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-101</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Despite the brutality of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, support or sympathy toward Russia is shown by some actors on the international stage. This could be attributed to the multi-facet information warfare conducted by Russia and its strategic partner China. However, the analysis of information warfare during the current war remains scattered. This article, therefore, adopts a documentary analysis of relevant documents and media sources to conceptualize the forms of information warfare used by these two countries to contribute to future studies. It then proceeds to discuss that the Russia-Ukraine war implies a growing use of information warfare in present and future wars under digitalization. Facing a growing threat posed to people’s cognitive understanding, the democratic community has to be aware of this increasingly dangerous military strategy and develop corresponding solutions. This article suggests that different societal stakeholders must collaborate to develop comprehensive education and thus strengthen digital citizenship. This is vital to nurturing people into critical and responsible citizens, thus equipping themselves with the resilience needed to combat information warfare.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andras Hugyik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leadership Theories and Defense Reform in the People’s Republic of China</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">army</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">combined operation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">development</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">leadership theories</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mission-oriented leadership</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">socialism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic deterrence</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-44</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is currently a hybrid social system that ideologically has retained the core values of the Marxist doctrine, which, unlike its predecessors, can adapt and innovate in response to changing circumstances. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and public administration underwent a series of deep reforms that enabled them to become a facilitator rather than a hindrance to development. The meritocratic leader selection system known as “selection and election,” consistent with the Confucian tradition and adopting some western leadership principles, played a significant role.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also considering the application of Western leadership principles not typically associated with the military. However, no evidence exists that the PLA systematically seeks to apply these concepts. The PLA is likely to complete defense reform and enhance the combat capabilities of its strategic and new types of forces, establishing a high level of strategic deterrence and complex systems for conducting joint combined operations. Towards that end, PLA applies Western non-military leadership principles and a mission-oriented leadership model, considering Chinese specificity.
Based on indirect Chinese, Russian, American, and Hungarian sources, the article presents contemporary Chinese socialism, analyzes the impact of political, social, economic, and defense reforms and the significance of leadership on China’s development, describes Western and Chinese leadership theories, and outlines China’s development prospects.
On the future of the PRC, the author states that, unlike other communist parties that gained power with foreign help, the CCP is indigenous and has national roots. Therefore, it is unlikely to collapse due to mass discontent. More likely, the Party will continue to transform the country and itself in the coming years and continue its rule. It is conceivable, however, that this transformation will eventually lead to a top-down revolution that will gradually break down the foundations of socialism.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anna Kovalenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Neo-Authoritarianism and Leadership: Outcomes for Modern Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">authoritarianism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democracy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ideology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mentality</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mobilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">political regimes</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">politicization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Putin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105-120</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the notions of authoritarianism and neo-authoritarianism as well as their features in terms of ideology, mentality, mobilization, and politicization of a population, state control, level of political pluralism, and leadership style. Incorporating evidence from reviews, surveys, and scientific research, the study identifies the main difference between the regimes and opposition to democracy, providing samples throughout history with different characteristics, causes, and backgrounds. It presents a vision of authoritarianism as an intermediate stop on the path of a particular state to democracy or totalitarianism. Finally, this article reflects upon Ukraine’s future in the European paradigm and contrasts it with Russia. Ukraine is at a crossroads and must continue to carefully navigate toward the institutionalized democracy it has begun to establish.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hilton L. Root</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How Networks of Social Cooperation Scale  into Civilizations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">comparative development</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Networks</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">political economy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">structural transformation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-29</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article analyzes structure and function in the network design of historical regimes of China and Western Europe to build a theory for the development of societies and states from endogenous mechanisms of social change. It shows how their respective network structures evolved independently but share a global property: both are small worlds, meaning that any node in the network can reach any other node by a small number of steps. Probing the variations in network topologies and their role in diffusion and scaling, the author accounts for differences in formal institutions, interpersonal trust, cultural norms, and moral protocols. Network structure as an independent variable moves the discussion of the divergence of East and West beyond the conventional, centralized China versus decentralized Europe debate. It allows us to identify an overlooked driver of structural change in the polity, helping to discern better what sets the development of world civilizations apart.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Flemming Splidsboel Hansen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China, Russia, and the Foreign Policy of the SCO</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cohesion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">India</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iran</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kazakhstan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kyrgyzstan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modalities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mongolia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">observer status</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pakistan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shanghai Cooperation Organization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tajikistan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Uzbekistan</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">95-102</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>