<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maja Touzari Greenwood</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State and al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ahrar al Sham</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al Qaeda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign fighters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jabhat al Nusra</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jabhat Fath al Sham</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87-97</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reviews important differences in how Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham perceive the role of the foreign fighter and outlines local dilemmas integrating foreign fighters entails for the three movements. It shows how, in addition to boosting fighting capacity, a high number of foreigners might also represent a crucial weakness.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lars Erslev Andersen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Mole and the Mallet: Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the ‘Thirty Years' War’ in the Middle East</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">al-Nusra</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">al-Qaida</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">War on Terror</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-24</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article investigates the developments of al-Qaida and The Islamic State in the context of the war on terror. The Iraq war 2003–2010, including the US Counterinsurgency strategy implemented in Iraq in 2007 onwards, together with the political developments in Iraq after the US withdrawal of combat troops at the end of 2011 is seen as the breeding ground for Islamic State in Iraq and thus for establishment of the Nusra Front (al-Qaida) in Syria. The chapter argues that without political developments based on reliable states in the Arab Middle East there is no solution in sight for ending the conflicts and wars in the region.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abdul Basir Yosufi</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">counterinsurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">insurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ISIS</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">sectarian conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">US intervention</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91-110</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This research paper examines the extent to which both the United States (US) intervention in 2003 and sectarian conflict in Iraq and the region contributed to the rise and consolidation of the Islamic State (IS). It is argued that the US intervention contributed to the rise of IS by creating a strategic cause for mobilization of insurgency while insufficient counterinsurgency resources and doctrine, and the lack of a post-war plan enabled the insurgency to consolidate. Although the US adapted its strategy and deployed additional resources as part of the “surge,” which succeeded in weakening of the insurgents significantly, the premature withdrawal of US troops allowed for a revival of the insurgency which eventually evolved into IS. The sectarian conflict in Iraq and the region further contributed to the rise and consolidation of IS by helping in prolif-eration of the group’s underlying ideology, increasing funding opportunities for the insurgents and driving the Sunni communities to support the Islamic State
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Thomas Labouche</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Has U.S. Leadership Been Revitalized Through Barack Obama’s Innovative Use of Force?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Afghanistan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Barack Obama</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">diplomacy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">doctrine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Egypt</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gaddafi</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iran</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Israel</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leadership</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libya</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Responsibility To Protect</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37-52</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Michaela C. Hertkorn</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">After the Re-election of President Bush: An Outlook on Transatlantic Relations from a German Perspective; or, Why German-U.S. Relations Still Matter to the Transatlantic Alliance</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Athena Papers</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ESDP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nation-building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO training mission</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO Transformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peace-building</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Garmisch-Partenkirchen</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">85</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This analysis of transatlantic relations (with particular attention to the issue of Iraq) over the past several years will be a helpful step toward understanding on how willing U.S. allies may support U.S. policy in the larger Middle East, as well as in the continued project of nation-building in Iraq. To understand where transatlantic relations may be headed after the re-election of President Bush in November 2004, two years after the beginning of the war in Iraq, and more than three years after the events of September 11, 2001, the following issues are taken into consideration: the core challenges for the process of NATO transformation; how different EU member states conceptualize the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP); and how these different views of what the transatlantic Alliance have affected, among others, intra-European relations and Germany’s recent foreign policy.  These issues in question are even more important given the last round of NATO and EU enlargement in 2004, a process that increased the number of countries that will be members of both organizations. These new member states are perhaps more likely to continue to be more supportive of a strong U.S. leadership role, both globally and within Europe.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>