<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kiril Avramov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Rise of Russian PMCs – ‘Stealth’ Instrument for a ‘Sharp Power’</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mercenaries</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">plausible deniability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">private military companies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The reoccurring well-documented incidents involving personnel belonging to Russian private military companies (PMCs) in distant theaters, such as Syria and the Central African Republic, shed light and provide for additional understanding regarding the modus operandi of these ‘hybrid’ instruments of ‘plausible deniability’ frequently employed to supplement the global geopolitical ambitions of Kremlin. This article will argue that the recent ‘re-discovery’ of mercenary potential and its utility by the Russian political leadership stems from the results of initial experimentation with irregular private forces in the Balkan wars, later in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in augmenting regular forces on the ground and furthering political objectives, only to be exported as a tested working model in Syria and elsewhere. In essence, if the Balkan wars and Ukraine battlefields were initial testing grounds, then Syrian experimentation is the final experimentation with the model prior to its global export. The specificity of the regular armed forces and PMCs relational dynamics illustrates the very essence of the ‘hybrid’ nature of the Russian state where the grey zone between public policy and private endeavors remains blurred in search of global resurgence.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maja Touzari Greenwood</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State and al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ahrar al Sham</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al Qaeda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign fighters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jabhat al Nusra</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jabhat Fath al Sham</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87-97</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reviews important differences in how Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham perceive the role of the foreign fighter and outlines local dilemmas integrating foreign fighters entails for the three movements. It shows how, in addition to boosting fighting capacity, a high number of foreigners might also represent a crucial weakness.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lars Erslev Andersen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Mole and the Mallet: Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the ‘Thirty Years' War’ in the Middle East</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">al-Nusra</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">al-Qaida</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">War on Terror</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-24</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article investigates the developments of al-Qaida and The Islamic State in the context of the war on terror. The Iraq war 2003–2010, including the US Counterinsurgency strategy implemented in Iraq in 2007 onwards, together with the political developments in Iraq after the US withdrawal of combat troops at the end of 2011 is seen as the breeding ground for Islamic State in Iraq and thus for establishment of the Nusra Front (al-Qaida) in Syria. The chapter argues that without political developments based on reliable states in the Arab Middle East there is no solution in sight for ending the conflicts and wars in the region.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgi Tzvetkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Declared Withdrawal from Syria and Russia's Next Steps</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baltics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Crimea</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSTO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eurasian Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nagorno-Karabakh</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">34</style></number><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This report explores Kremlin&amp;#39;s next steps in using military and hybrid instruments after the declared withdrawal from Syria. The author outlines the following main options: (1)&amp;nbsp;return to Syria; (2) Ukraine, in an attempt to provide a land corridor to Crimea; (3) the Baltic States, where Latvia and&amp;nbsp;Estonia are most vulnerable to Russian influence; (4) &amp;quot;former friends&amp;quot; as Belarus and Kazakhstan; and (5) Turkey, through its potential involvement on the side of Azerbaijan in a renewed&amp;nbsp;conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;/bg/node/13827/&quot;&gt;full text&lt;/a&gt; of the report is in Bulgarian.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Thomas Labouche</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Has U.S. Leadership Been Revitalized Through Barack Obama’s Innovative Use of Force?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Afghanistan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Barack Obama</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">diplomacy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">doctrine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Egypt</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gaddafi</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iran</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Israel</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leadership</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libya</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Responsibility To Protect</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37-52</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>