<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pàl Dunay</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Growing Apart: The Impact of the Russian War in Ukraine on the Former Soviet Space</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Disintegration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">former Soviet Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Moldova</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia-Ukraine war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South Caucasus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87-114</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The full-scale war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, began under a false assumption regarding the underlying grand strategy. The ongoing conflict has presented difficult choices for the states in the former Soviet Union, who have approached it with a mix of rational calculation and emotional considerations, viewing it as a conflict between two once brotherly nations. While Russia continues to wield significant influence, and some states depend on it as a security guarantor, the general consensus among the ten states is that Russia’s power and influence are waning. Consequently, they anticipate that Russia will pay less attention to its regional partners, allocate fewer resources to them, and that close association with Russia would strain relations with other important actors, particularly in the West. Russia’s influence has led seven of the ten states to not fully align with either the West or Moscow. While multilateral cooperation through organizations like the CSTO and EAEU was not paramount due to the prevailing “hub and spoke” structure, these states now face a noticeable stalemate. Despite Russia’s lingering influence, fueled in part by economic disparities, a rapid “growing apart” occurs in the area of the former Soviet Union. Some actors are distancing and disengaging faster than ever, leading to a shifting geopolitical landscape.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lada Roslycky</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philipp Fluri</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Legal, Economic, and Regional Security Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense industrial complex</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">human rights</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">lustration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">sanctions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state sponsor of terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war economy</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-10</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">At the threshold of its third year, Russia's large-scale and brutal war against Ukraine continues to kill thousands, terrorize millions of Ukrainians, and disrupt international supply chains, affecting global energy and food markets. This is the second journal issue dedicated to the ongoing war. It dwells on the issue of lustration - a problem Ukraine did not effectively address during its post-communist transition, which in turn led to the perpetuation of the Kremlin's ideology and, thus, its continuous influence on Ukrainian politics and society. Two articles explore the rationale for including Russia in the U.S. Department of State's list of state sponsors of terrorism. While some European countries and the European Parliament have already declared Russia a terrorist state, the debate in the United States is influenced by numerous additional considerations, and the decision is still pending. The link between military expenditures, defense industrial investments, and the general economic development and stability in wartime is also examined in detail. The final two articles analyze Moscow's interests and strategy towards the post-Soviet states and the strategically important Black Sea region. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gregory Gleason</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kuralay Baizakova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COVID-19 in the Central Asian Region: National Responses and Regional Implications</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COVID-19</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic crisis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">101-114</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Soon after the first instance of COVID-19 in Central Asia was recorded in March 2020 in Kazakhstan, the government took immediate steps to introduce containment and mitigation measures. As cases of COVID-19 appeared soon after in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and later in Tajikistan, the governments swiftly responded, instituting emergency measures, empowering law enforcement and medical authorities to implement a broad range of counter-infection mitigation measures to protect public health. Cross-border travel restrictions were imposed. Lockdowns and sheltering-in-place restrictions were imposed in most major cities and curfews were enforced. Routine commercial air flights were cancelled or significantly reduced in international airports and many domestic airports. New levels of visa restrictions were implemented in all the Central Asian countries. The initial infection containment measures were highly successful in curtailing the early spread of Covid-19. But governments immediately confronted a broad range of social and economic difficulties brought on by Covid-19. The sudden interruption of typical earnings and livelihoods for many people, the disruption of commercial supply chains, the cratering of commodity prices, and, for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in particular, the loss of migrant labor opportunities and remittances, combined with other consequences of Covid-19 to produce a region-wide economic catastrophe. The pandemic called for immediate steps on the part of all the government of the region and focused attention on addressing the long-term social, economic, and even regional political implications.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">101</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kemel Toktomushev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Understanding Cross-Border Conflict in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">borders</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ferghana</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kyrgyzstan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tajikistan</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21-41</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Despite the prevalence of works on the ‘discourses of danger’ in the Ferghana Valley, which re-invented post-Soviet Central Asia as a site of intervention, the literature on the conflict potential in the cross-border areas of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is fairly limited. Yet, the number of small-scale clashes and tensions on the borders of the Batken and Isfara regions has been growing steadily. Accordingly, this work seeks to contribute to the understanding of the conflict escalations in the area and identify factors that aggravate tensions between the communities. In particular, this article focuses on four variables, which exacerbate tensions and hinder the restoration of a peaceful social fabric in the Batken-Isfara region: the unresolved legacies of the Soviet past, inefficient use of natural resources, militarization of borders, and lack of evidence-based policymaking.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Flemming Splidsboel Hansen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jihad in Russian</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Caucasus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Uighurs</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-86</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">While Russia’s military involvement in the war in Syria has received great attention, less focus has been directed at the foreign fighters from Russia and other post-Soviet states who have joined the Islamic State and other Jihadist groups. The emergence of these Jihadists has been a gradual process, which began in the 1990s, and it has now led to a situation where an estimated 7,000 Russians and 3,000 Central Asians are fighting in Syria. These figures present a challenge for the various states fighting the Jihadist groups, but they pose a much greater problem for the Russian and other national authorities, who will have to handle the fighters, when they return home.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Valeri Ratchev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO’s Partnership for Peace: Twenty Years Later (in Bulgarian)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">January 2014</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">24</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On 11 January 1994, on the U.S. initiative, the heads of NATO member states approved the Partnership for Peace (PfP). A month later, Bulgaria joined PfP crossing its first Rubicon on the road towards the trans-Atlantic alliance and community. PfP proved to be one of the best ideas in the field of security and defence since the end of the Cold War. PfP applied the concept of cooperative security in real politics, and became one of the most important means of gradually breaking down mental and physical barriers inherited by the Cold War. Twenty years later, the realities are very different both in NATO and the partner countries. Military cooperation, however, continues to be an important factor for international security and regional stability. PfP is now a culture of thinking and action. Its value remains high, and member countries and partners are jointly responsible to find ways and forms for its further development and modernization. The time has come for inspirational discussions, followed by timely and effective decisions and actions.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence and Security Sector Reform and Parliamentary Oversight</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civil society</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">November 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In the notes for a speech to the 84th Rose-Roth seminar of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on “Afghanistan, Regional Security and the Future of International Cooperation,” conducted in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 13-15 November 2013, the author outlines two reasons for failings of security sector reform efforts – inability to properly contextualize security sector reform initiatives and invalid assumptions regarding the power and shadow influence of some security organizations. He then identifies three features of successful reform designs, valid for every context: provide for political legitimacy of security and defence organizations and reform initiatives; emphasise integrity at least as much as effectiveness; involve civil society organizations.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>