<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Judith Reid</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Against Negative Strategic Communications</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">culture</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hofstede</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">propaganda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic communications</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">52-60</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strategic messaging is ever more important in the age of explosive social media, and not all information on the Internet is benign. Negative information campaigns were used by Hitler in the Austrian Anschluss, and more recently by Vladimir Putin in the annexation of Crimea and the conflicts in Donetsk and Luhansk. Similarly, seeds of public dissent and discord have been entering through Russian trolls and bots into American social media.
Central and Eastern European countries are particularly vulnerable to negative messaging from Russia, or even from terrorist groups. This article delves into cultural paradigms of the US, Russia and numerous Central and Eastern European societies to uncover cultural areas of vulnerability to outside influences; how the cultural underpinnings of power, competition, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation and indulgence can highlight openings to negative influences. It concludes with ideas for nations to guard against unwanted information attacks.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">William Chim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia’s Digital Awakening</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-17</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been unprecedented in its embrace of modern technology for the execution of its foreign policy and intelligence operation. This article examines Russia&amp;rsquo;s relationship to the internet and computer technology, beginning with the early 1990s and detailing the growth of technology&amp;rsquo;s popularity with the Russian public and Russian government up through 2017. Particular attention is paid to the skill with which Russia&amp;rsquo;s illiberal political institutions and security services exploit the &amp;lsquo;wild west&amp;rsquo; nature of the internet and the manipulable nature of modern technology and media, as well as how and why the West and U.S. failed to anticipate Russia&amp;rsquo;s rise as a digital superpower and continue to fail to counter its dominance.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Valeri Ratchev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO’s Partnership for Peace: Twenty Years Later (in Bulgarian)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">January 2014</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">24</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On 11 January 1994, on the U.S. initiative, the heads of NATO member states approved the Partnership for Peace (PfP). A month later, Bulgaria joined PfP crossing its first Rubicon on the road towards the trans-Atlantic alliance and community. PfP proved to be one of the best ideas in the field of security and defence since the end of the Cold War. PfP applied the concept of cooperative security in real politics, and became one of the most important means of gradually breaking down mental and physical barriers inherited by the Cold War. Twenty years later, the realities are very different both in NATO and the partner countries. Military cooperation, however, continues to be an important factor for international security and regional stability. PfP is now a culture of thinking and action. Its value remains high, and member countries and partners are jointly responsible to find ways and forms for its further development and modernization. The time has come for inspirational discussions, followed by timely and effective decisions and actions.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>