<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sean S. Costigan</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sovereign or Global Internet? Russia and China Press for Cybercrime Treaty: An Update</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cybercrime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberspace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sovereignty</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91-98</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Under the guise of combating cybercrime, two radically different visions of cyberspace compete for attention on the international stage: a free-flowing model of cyberspace that democracies have championed is now challenged by a so-called sovereign model. Counter-democratic initiatives to reframe cyberspace in strictly national terms are underway with the likely result of decreased cooperation and increased risks of conflict and cybercrime.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gervais Rufyikiri</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">African Union-Led Peacekeeping Operations: Constraints and Opportunities of Interagency Cooperation in the Experience of Burundi  and South Africa</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information flow</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peace enforcement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peace operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peacekeeping</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">48</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">137-159</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left:19.85pt;&quot;&gt;The multidimensionality of peacekeeping missions implies the involvement of many levels of actors fulfilling distinct functions and thus sharing responsibilities, risks and costs. This paper analyses the experiences of South African troops in Burundi and Burundian troops within AMISOM to understand the constraints and opportunities of inter-agency cooperation in the case of AU-led peacekeeping operations. Both examples show the importance of multilateralism in peacekeeping missions. The diversity of actors&amp;rsquo; experiences and capabilities, their cooperation, and the complementarity of their specific contributions are vital when dealing with the very complex and tangled challenges facing a conflict country. Several factors, including financial and military capacities, actors&amp;rsquo; own interests, domestic politics, policies, and standards, influence the level of trust and the nature of cooperation between actors and their positioning.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">137</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Timothy Parsons</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James J. Nolan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frank Crispino</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Multinational Cooperation and Intervention: Small Steps to Better Results</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intervention</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multinational</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">48</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">160-170</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left:19.85pt;&quot;&gt;Through the latter years of the twentieth century and early years of the twenty-first century, there have been a number of high-profile multinational interven&amp;shy;tions by the international community in countries deemed to be sufficiently un&amp;shy;stable to present a threat to global peace or, more controversially, to local pop&amp;shy;ulations. Beginning with the tardy but largely successful intervention in the Yu&amp;shy;goslav civil war in 1990 and culminating in the soon to conclude intervention in Afghanistan after the Al Qaeda attacks on the USA in 2001, there have also been military interventions in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011. The list is not exhaustive. There have been other interventions elsewhere, but these particular examples of military intervention mainly conducted by western powers provide illuminat&amp;shy;ing insights into the success and, sometimes, the failure of such multinational security responses to perceived international threats.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">160</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Giulia Ferraro</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Prospects for Improvement in Peacebuilding: The Choice for Cooperation and Coordination</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">coordination</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peacebuilding</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United Nations Support Mission in Libya</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">UNSMIL</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">48</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">171-183</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left:19.85pt;&quot;&gt;In this article, the author argues that there is a systematic tendency of some actors operating in the field of peace and security to resist cooperation and disregard the importance of coordination. Their inability to see the value of interdependence resulting from frailty and short-sightedness leads to unhealthy relationships and unsatisfactory outcomes. Through an analysis of the peacebuilding field, the article reflects on the central role played by cooperation and coordination. Focusing on the case of Libya, the author examines some cooperation and coordination strategies pursued by the United Nations support mission and highlights promising results that have recently been achieved thanks to its dedication and determination. The conclusion is that it is worth investing in cooperation and coordination in the peacebuilding field; however, as it stands today, fundamental changes are needed in the way cooperation is carried out while it remains desirable to reconsider how coordination is pursued.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">171</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sean S. Costigan</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sovereign or Global Internet? Russia and China Press for Cybercrime Treaty</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cybercrime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberspace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sovereignty</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9-13</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Under the guise of combating cybercrime, two radically different visions of cyberspace compete for attention on the international stage: a free-flowing model of cyberspace that democracies have championed is now challenged by a so-called sovereign model. Counter-democratic initiatives to reframe cyberspace in strictly national terms are underway with the likely result of decreased cooperation and increased risks of conflict and cybercrime.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jussi Simola</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comparative Research of Cybersecurity Information Sharing Models</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Early Warnings</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ECHO project</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">indicators</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information sharing</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Situational awareness</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">175-195</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Cyber threats are on the increase. Authorities need to respond to growing challenges by increasing cooperation. Information sharing or information exchange in the EU level and between the countries is a main facility when the objective is to prevent hybrid threats. Intensifying relationships with private sector companies has become very important function and operating model to authorities to provide cyber-safe atmosphere. The main purpose of this study is to find out separating and combining factors concerning cyber information sharing models. The aim is also to find out nation level factors, which affect the utilization of a common Early Warning system by the ECHO stakeholders.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Summary of findings&lt;/em&gt;: unclear allocation of responsibilities in national government departments prevents authorities from fighting together against cyber and physical threats. Cybersecurity responsibilities have been spread too widely. Operational work concerning cyber threat prevention between European public safety authorities should be more standardized, with more centralized management. When the purpose is to protect vital functions of society, public safety organizations in EU member states need proactive features in their information systems. An essential factor in information exchange is the place of registration of organizations or companies. Unclear standardization concerning cyber emergency procedures between authorities and organizations and lack of co-operation between cyber situation centres and cyber emergency response centres prevent common situational awareness.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">175</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nikola Saranov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cooperation Model for Establishing Secure Digital Transformation in Corporations: Overview of Regulatory Issues</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">digital transformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">legal framework</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">private sector</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">98-112</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Digital transformation is not only a one-time effort that a company wishes to go through, but an entirely new vision on the evolution of business processes in the context of inevitable movement to the information age. Having in mind the nature of this movement, organizations should work hand in hand with each other and together to cooperate with the governments worldwide in order to establish secure environment for developing and implementing new technologies and innovations. This paper is focused on the essence of such interactions and the challenges before the organizations and gives valuable examples and suggestions for ensuring on-site security, as well as the best practices which demonstrate how the business could impact the creation of cybersecurity norms locally and globally. Additionally, the paper reviews the most recognized regulations in the area of cybersecurity and industry best practices applicable to the demands of the digital transformation.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">98</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Velizar Shalamanov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pavel Anastasov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgi Tsvetkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence and Defense at the Eastern Flank of NATO and the EU: Readiness and Interoperability in the Context of Forward Presence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Balkans</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea region</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Flank</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">readiness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-42</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reflects the discussions during a September 2018 conference in Sofia, sponsored by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Its focus is on the defense and deterrence posture of NATO and the European Union in Eastern Europe. Special attention is given to the development of the Bucharest Initiative (B9) and its influence on the Western Balkans and Black Sea Region. The authors propose a Program for Readiness and Interoperability, oriented to the C4ISR area. This is based on the defense posture and in the context of the developments in NATO and the European Union for improved readiness and interoperability with partners that, together with enhanced cooperation in education and training for the de¬fined B9+ region, will act as instruments to implement this cooperation and improve the deterrence and defense capability on the Eastern Flank of NATO and the EU, while at the same time strengthening resilience to hybrid threats.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DIGILIENCE - A Platform for Digital Transformation,  Cyber Security and Resilience</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">artificial intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DIGILIENCE</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">digital transformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">emerging technologies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">human factors</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid influence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">industry 4.0</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information sharing</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intuitionist fuzzy logic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">social networks</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-10</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The ongoing digital transformation requires significant investments and innovation to provide security of cyberspace and variety of critical infrastructures and essential services that increasingly depend on the digital infrastructure, as well as to enhance the resilience of organizations, communities, industries, nations, and alliances in the face of malicious use of cyberspace.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This volume presents 28 of the papers, accepted for presentation at the DIGILIENCE 2019 conference, dealing with cyber information sharing and situational awareness, the benefits and challenges of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, the human factor, education and training for cyber security and resilience, the need to incorporate the cybersecurity efforts into the search for effective and efficient exploitation of information technologies, policies and solutions for security and resilience of Industry 4.0 and critical infrastructures, analysing and countering hybrid influence through social networks and more traditional media. The DIGILIENCE series of conferences will promote the sharing of knowledge and experience and facilitate the spread of good practice in IT governance, cyber security and resilience.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Khayal Iskandarov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Piotr Gawliczek</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO’s Role in Improving Professional Military Education with a Focus on the South Caucasus Countries</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DEEP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PME</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Professional Military Education</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South Caucasus</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer-Fall 2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35-44</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The presented article underlines the priority of education and considers the role of Professional Military Education (PME) in enhancing defense capabilities and preparing the military leaders who are able to make strategic decisions and solve complex problems. It emphasizes a PME as a cornerstone of the military build-up. The authors examine the main characteristics of PME and underscore its importance for increasing the interoperability between the NATO allies and the South Caucasus nations. Taking the broad meaning of interoperability into account, the authors attempted to bring to the fore the critical need for increasing the intellectual interoperability with outside expertise. Further, the authors point out the importance of the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) as a new system for improving PME and building better-integrated forces in the South Caucasus. At the same time, this article identifies factors that will lead towards the enhancement of the relations amongst the South Caucasus nations themselves. The goal is to consider how the South Caucasus countries can more effectively address the challenges in PME and to formulate suggestions and recommendations. Comparative analysis, synthesis, inductive, and deductive methods have been used to produce conclusive outcomes and recommendations for the countries in the region.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Khayal Iskandarov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gregory Simons</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Piotr Gawliczek</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The South Caucasus: Stage for a ‘New Great Game’ between NATO and Russia?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">frozen conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">great power competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer-Fall 2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-34</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The South Caucasus is one of the most important geostrategic regions between Europe and Asia, a playground for many regional and global actors with enduring interests. These interests have been clashing through the centuries. Each actor endeavors to impose its rules and tries to capitalize on the geostrategic benefits of the region. This article analyzes the main aspects, challenges, and prospects of cooperation between the countries in the South Caucasus and Russia and NATO. The authors describe the competition for power and influence in the region, the “Old Great Game,” the regional state of affairs, and possible effects of the Russian factor on the South Caucasus-NATO cooperation. They illustrate Russia’s security interests in the South Caucasus vis-à-vis NATO’s enlargement policy, outline the reasons for the Alliance’s reluctance to engage in the region actively, and current and future prospects of South Caucasus-NATO cooperation. NATO’s presence is said to counterbalance the Russian military presence in the region, but how is this managed without antagonizing the incumbent government in Moscow and what is its contribution to resolving the so-called “frozen conflicts” in order to maintain the security and prosperity of the South Caucasus? The combination of competition and confrontation has been designated as the “New Great Game,” with clear similarities and differences vis-à-vis the “Old Great Game.” The authors question whether a “New Great Game” currently exists and apply comparative analysis, synthesis, inductive, and deductive methods to come up with conclusive answers.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gergana Mitalova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive Institutional Approach to Developing Capabilities to Counter Hybrid Threats: Legal and Doctrinal Limitations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capability development</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">collaboration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">doctrinal limitations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">legal constraints</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127-135</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">There are few legal instruments addressing the issue of hybrid conflict and threats. Predominantly, they are laid down in international humanitarian law and are overlooked in the states’ legal systems. Nowadays, a fully new comprehensive institutional approach to the development of capabilities to counter hybrid threats is needed – an approach at multiple levels, multinational and interdisciplinary, intertwining the achievements known so far with up-to-date innovations.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leonid Polyakov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence Institution Building in Ukraine at Peace and at War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mobilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peacekeeping</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">professionalization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">92-108</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">There are two distinct periods in Defense Institution Building in Ukraine since gaining independence in 1991. A period of peace until February 2014, and the period of war with Russia in 2014-2018. In the pre-war period of 1991-2013, the economic problems, inconsistencies in national strategy and consequent neglect of national defense requirements led to unclear military strategies and declarative rather than substantial reforms of the Armed Forces. Ukraine was trying to compensate the impact of its economic weakness and policy inconsistencies on defense through active cooperation with NATO and participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the EU. However, in the spring of 2014, the response of Ukraine exposed serious weaknesses in all defense aspects except for the people’s will to defend the country. Responding to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the invasion to the South-Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine has mobilized, equipped, and trained a substantial military force of 250 000 active personnel and invested substantial resources in building effective military with agile professional active component supported by deployable ready reserve, jointly capable to deter possible aggression from Russia.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">92</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nebojsa Nikolic</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Obstacles in Inter-Organizational Cooperation and Hybrid Threats</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inter-organizational</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-41</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inter-organizational cooperation at both national and international level depends on many factors. Some can have negative influence and be perceived as obstacles to efficient inter-organizational cooperation. Obstacles could be caused by bureaucratic rivalries, parochial mentality, rigid organizational rules and procedures, inappropriate information, harmful leadership, etc. Due to a variety of hybrid threats, the logical response of states’ leaders should be directed to gathering information from all available sources in order to become resilient and respond adequately to hybrid threats. Identification of obstacles and evaluation of their influence may contribute to the ability to resolve problems, to avoid obstacles or, at least, to clarify needs and opportunities for improvement.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Elman Nasirov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Khayal Iskandarov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Prospects of Azerbaijan to Enhance Military Interoperability with NATO</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">exercise</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">training</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89-99</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">After the end of the Cold War, NATO recognized the importance of extending far beyond its traditional borders in order to maintain peace and stability throughout Europe. The incorporation of new members into the Alliance came to the fore. In the light of this approach, cooperation with partner nations became an important area for discussion. Ensuring that partner forces could work together effectively was one of the main objectives and this, in turn, highlighted the term ‘interoperability’ once again. Thus, the evolution of interoperability between NATO and partner nations after the demise of Cold War is considered in this essay, its importance is underscored, the levels of interoperability are introduced and the feasibility of Azerbaijan’s engagement in these levels is analyzed in this article. Different tools and mechanism that the Alliance has launched over the last decades are scrutinized and useful recommendations are considered for Azerbaijan to enhance its military interoperability with NATO. From this perspective of interoperability, different successful models have been outlined as examples for Azerbaijan to follow.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Elman Nasirov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Khayal Iskandarov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sadi Sadiyev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The South Caucasus: A playground between NATO and Russia?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">contribution</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">counterbalance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">frozen conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">membership</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-56</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this article, the challenges and prospects of cooperation between the South Caucasus countries and NATO have been analyzed. The geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the region for both NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia particularly) and reciprocal expectations of further cooperation with the Alliance have been considered. The regional state of affairs in the South Caucasus has been analyzed and the possible impacts of Russian influence on forging closer relations with NATO have been examined. The security environment after the Russo-Georgian war and its repercussions for the South Caucasus-NATO cooperation have been illustrated. NATO’s vested interest in the region to contribute to a European security system for the foreseeable future was brought to the fore. The reasons for the Alliance’s reluctance to actively engage in the region are examined. The recommendations are intended to counterbalance the Russian military presence in the region, without antagonizing the incumbent government in Moscow, and to eradicate the so-called “frozen conflicts” in order to maintain security and prosperity for the South Caucasus region as a whole.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Management Priorities of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria  in the 2013 Caretaker Government</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">accountability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">coordination</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transparency</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">December 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence governance principles, priorities, and tasks of minister Tagarev as member of Bulgaria’s Caretaker Government, appointed by President Rossen Plevneliev, and his team, aim to provide stability of the defence sector and military operations, open dialogue with the organizations active on defence policy issues, and enhanced cooperation and interaction with our Allies and national security sector organizations. These priorities were publicly announced on 20 March 2013.
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