<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rosław Jeżewski</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cross-domain Coercion as Russia’s Endeavor to Weaken the Eastern Flank of NATO: A Latvian Case Study</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">corrupt government</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cross-domain coercion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Flank</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic footprint</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvian resistance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cross-domain coercion is tangible on NATO’s Eastern flank and characterized by the use of derogatory propaganda, fake news, financial assets in the Latvian banking system, Russian-based organized crime, and various military elements. This study on cross-domain coercion, however, concentrates also on the cohesion of the Latvian population, existing gaps within society, and its susceptibility to being exploited by Russia. To acquire data for this study, the author conducted interviews with representatives of the Eastern flank countries and performed an extensive literature review. To determine the root causes of vertical division in the society, the “5 WHYs” method was used. This research has proved that the presence of a Russian minority and the Russian-based organized crime minority can be a good base to create unrest and that Russia is able to influence the internal policy of a country when the Russian economic footprint exceeds 12 % of GDP. The demographics and the cohesion (including vertical and horizontal divisions) of the society are factors determining the resistance of Latvia. The triumph of the populist parties during the October 2018 parliamentary elections reflect the trend that the nation is tired of the corrupt and ineffective government rather than that it is drifting towards Russia. In a broader scope, it is expected that cross-domain coercion will increase and Russia will test the cohesion of NATO.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andis Kudors</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transformation of Security and Intelligence Services in Latvia</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">checks and balances</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">counter-intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">post-communist transition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian-Ukrainian conflict</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer-Fall 2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105-124</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article examines in detail the process of setting up the security services of Latvia in the period prior to and after gaining full independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The author emphasizes that a successful transition towards a consolidated democracy requires decisive and quick actions in selecting personnel with intelligence experience under the totalitarian regime, yet loyal to the national ideals and the principles of democracy, the need for a clear legislative framework, and comprehensive democratic control of the services along parliamentary, government, judicial, prosecution, and financing venues.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philip Spassov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vesselin Petkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvia: Capabilities, Organisations, Policies, and Legislation in crisis management and disaster response</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">centralisation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil protection</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disaster preparedness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disaster response</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ministry of Interior</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State Fire and Rescue Service</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">June 2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">125</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvia is a Parliamentary republic where the President is the Head of State. The President is elected by the Parliament (Saeima). The Government, or the Cabinet of Ministers, is appointed by the President, approved by the Parliament and led by the Prime Minister. There is no regional government level as territorially Latvia is divided into 109 rural municipalities and 9 cities under state jurisdiction. These two main types of municipalities are led by municipal council.

The National Security Concept is a strategic document based on analysis of national threat stating principles for prevention of threats, priorities and measures, which must be taken into account when executing new political planning documents, legislative enactments and action plans in the area of national security. The priorities determined in the Concept provide the basis for the development of the National Security Plan by the Cabinet of Ministers.

As in the other Baltic Region States the organisational structure is centralised, i.e. coordinated and mostly organised by the central national civil protection authority, as is the case with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Additionally, the use of private rescue services is low in the Baltic Countries. 

The Prime Minister has the responsibility for the continuous function of the operation of the crisis management system and for the implementation of the related tasks and obligations. The State Fire and Rescue Service, an organisation directly subordinated to the Ministry of Interior, plans, coordinates, leads and controls the civil protection operations. The State Fire and Rescue Service has significant responsibility for crisis management at national level.

At local level the municipal authorities are responsible for establishing and managing the Civil Protection Commission of the municipalities and cities. The Commission coordinates civil protection measures in crisis situations in their respective administrative territories.

The civil protection framework of Latvia foresees the involvement of military forces in support of civil authorities during peacetime emergencies. Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the cooperation with the European Union as it implements and coordinates the state external security policy. Cross-border and international collaboration is also organised through the Monitoring and Information Centre operated by the European Commission.

The systems for training in the field of civil protection are quite different in the Baltic region; however they share some basic features. Education in civil protection and rescue has a legal foundation in all of the Baltic Region countries. Basic and advanced education at the national level is standardised through the use of certificates, as well as the development of educational and training curricula. All of the Baltic region states have specialised schools and colleges which carry out education in civil protection and rescue area. 

Potential niche capability that could be filled by Latvia and represent interest to EU crisis management structures is the development of single crisis information systems. The Latvian civil security institutions are looking to improve cooperation in the field of crisis management as they are exploiting new ways for cooperation for the creation of a unified national information system.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>