<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David Matsaberidze</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Competing Strategies: The Russian Federation vs. the European Union and the United States through Georgia and Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53-66</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article analyzes the shaping and transformation of the post-Soviet security thinking of Georgia and Ukraine in the context of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in the near abroad, often designated as a legitimate sphere of Russian influence, and the competition between Russia and the EU and the US in the region. After the Rose Revolution of Georgia and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, these two countries’ independent/pro-Western orientation became the main issues securitized by the Russian Federation. Correspondingly, the preservation of territorial integrity became the top security issue for Georgia (since the early 1990s), and it became so for Ukraine after the Crimean occupation (March 2014) and the renewed armed hostilities across the entirety of Ukraine since February 2022. The changes in the internal politics of these countries were transposed into the international competition between Russia and the EU/US, expressed through the clash of “Sovereign Democracy” and “Color Revolution” paradigms for the future of post-Soviet states in the 2010s and transformed into active military measures in Ukraine since 2020s and through the so-called creeping annexation of Georgia since 2010s. Practically, these are the tools of maintaining the Russian influence on the one hand and opposing the Western values and power influence, supported firstly by the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership projects and secondly by granting candidate status to Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s military actions against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-2023), a response to the soft power applied by the West, aimed at the creation of buffer zones in the shape of “frozen conflicts,” which could be used as indirect leverage in the hands of the Russian Federation to block the Western aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iryna Lysychkina</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olha Lysychkina</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Women, Peace, and Security Dimensions of the War in Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">gender</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peace and security agenda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">post-war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">refugees</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">UN SCR 1325</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">women</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2023</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43-56</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The ongoing war in Ukraine has evident devastating consequences. It is an urgent reminder of the relevance of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security, which calls for the meaningful inclusion of women in all areas of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. This paper highlights the involvement of Ukrainian women in the war, emphasizing their roles across politics, defense, and humanitarian response. The authors examine some critical issues to stimulate and support women’s active position in peace-building and conflict resolution in the Ukrainian context.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Declaration of the Russian State as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Pros, Cons, and Realities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">aggression</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">genocide</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state sponsor of terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, ignited discussions about ways to curb Russia’s ambitions in reshaping the post-WWII world order. This article critically examines the ongoing dialogue surrounding the potential designation of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. We will delve into both the arguments in favor and against this move while also exploring the current political outcomes of this contentious debate. Previously, we conducted a comparative analysis of the criteria for including countries in the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and the activities of the Russian Federation. This article outlines the potential repercussions of such a designation, including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items, and various financial and other restrictions. Sanctions penalizing countries and individuals for engaging in trade with designated states are of particular significance. The Russian Federation has already been recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/ regime in Ukraine and the EU; hence, the main emphasis will be on the United States. This is due to the fact that resolutions from other states are often symbolic gestures with limited consequences, whereas inclusion in the U.S. Department of State’s list can have a profound impact on Russia.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Designation of the Russian Federation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Meeting the “Club of Villains” Criteria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">aggression</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state sponsor of terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-46</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article analyzes the primary reasons for designating the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The issue gained prominence with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022—the largest and deadliest armed conflict in Europe since World War II—challenging the unity of the Collective West and the global security system. The vision of a peaceful and prosperous European space from Lisbon to Vladivostok has been permanently shattered.
To achieve its geopolitical objectives, Russia has been involved in numerous armed conflicts since 1991, such as in Georgia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and now Ukraine, orchestrated operations on the soil of other states, and supported terrorist organizations. Aspiring to be a superpower in the aftermath of the USSR, Russia has utilized hybrid warfare instruments for decades to undermine democracies globally and maintain influence over former Soviet republics. Some of its actions can be classified as terrorism, support for terrorism, ethnocide, or genocide.
This article explores the criteria for including countries in the US list of state sponsors of terrorism and compares them with the activities of the Russian Federation. It provides evidence that Russia qualifies for inclusion in the list, although the US still hesitates to designate it as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/regime.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maryna Starodubska</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Excessive Brotherly Love? - 'Fraternity' of Russians and Ukrainians as a Russian Propaganda Narrative</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cross-cultural comparison</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">fraternal people</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">values</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article aims to show, using evidence from cross-cultural studies, that the peoples of Ukraine and Russia differ significantly on the individualism-collectivism dimension that lies at the heart of national identity. It argues that the idea of Russian and Ukrainian fraternity is, in fact, a myth, based perhaps on some limited cultural accidentals or overly-broad categorizations of temperament and not on fundamental ideologies that undergird the society. Illusions of the fraternity are a product of propaganda based on a range of narratives about the countries (including Ukraine) Russia considers its “area of influence” and has been unsuccessfully trying to return under its control. Understanding the motivations of Russia, a state with a legacy of authoritarianism and consistently strong ideological opposition to democratic values, is key to making sense of such narratives and the logic behind them. Cross-cultural studies provide insights for a broader understanding of inherent differences between Russian and Ukrainian peoples. Approximately 50 percent of the variation in national cultural orientations is unique to the country and is rooted in the lasting differences in historic developmental trajectories. Of particular interest is the relationship between individualism and collectivism in Russian and Ukrainian cultures and its respective impact on the institutions, as these dimensions are among the most distinctive for cultural variation. The author argues that one can discern clear distinctions in cultures by observing the distinct evolution and varying importance of institutions.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pàl Dunay</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Growing Apart: The Impact of the Russian War in Ukraine on the Former Soviet Space</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Disintegration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">former Soviet Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Moldova</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia-Ukraine war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South Caucasus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87-114</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The full-scale war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, began under a false assumption regarding the underlying grand strategy. The ongoing conflict has presented difficult choices for the states in the former Soviet Union, who have approached it with a mix of rational calculation and emotional considerations, viewing it as a conflict between two once brotherly nations. While Russia continues to wield significant influence, and some states depend on it as a security guarantor, the general consensus among the ten states is that Russia’s power and influence are waning. Consequently, they anticipate that Russia will pay less attention to its regional partners, allocate fewer resources to them, and that close association with Russia would strain relations with other important actors, particularly in the West. Russia’s influence has led seven of the ten states to not fully align with either the West or Moscow. While multilateral cooperation through organizations like the CSTO and EAEU was not paramount due to the prevailing “hub and spoke” structure, these states now face a noticeable stalemate. Despite Russia’s lingering influence, fueled in part by economic disparities, a rapid “growing apart” occurs in the area of the former Soviet Union. Some actors are distancing and disengaging faster than ever, leading to a shifting geopolitical landscape.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Serhii Salkutsan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al Stolberg</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Impact of War on the Ukraine Military Education System: Moving Forward in War and Peace</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Education</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National Defense University</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PME</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Professional Military Education</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67-76</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Ukraine’s subsequent and ongoing combat successes have proven that agile, adaptive leaders can triumph against a better-equipped enemy. The foundational educational reforms within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, begun in 2018, have paid incalculable dividends. This article examines Ukraine’s Professional Military Education (system) before and during the war and proposes a policy to continue to prioritize training and education now and in the future.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Selen Baldıran</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dinçer Bayer</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hüseyin Gençer</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Importance of the 1936 Montreux Convention for the Black Sea Security: A Close Look into Russia-NATO Controversy on the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict in 2022</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Montreux Convention</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia’s Intervention</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-23</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia’s intervention in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, once again brought into view the current variety of risks to Black Sea security. Lengthy diplomatic and political negotiations and statements made by NATO and primarily US authorities before Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine were not enough to deter Russia’s military action. It is considered that NATO’s reactions to deter Russia from operations in Ukraine have been insufficient due to NATO’s weakness in naval power projection capability to the Black Sea due to the Montreux Convention’s restrictions. Montreux Convention is recognized as the main international agreement that provides barriers to an efficient naval deployment from external sources to the Black Sea. This article examines the effects of the Montreux Convention on regional security within the framework of the historical background and the situations that threatened regional security in the past and reveals the importance of this convention for Black Sea security in the future.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John M. Quinn</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lessons for NATO to Be Learned from Putin's War in Ukraine: Global Health Engagement, Interoperability, and Lethality</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">GHE</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Global Health Engagement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">health security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lethality</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">medical readiness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military medicine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">103-118</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Russian invasion of Ukraine exacts a heavy death toll of preventable morbidity and mortality of warfighters and vulnerable civilian communities. Global Health Engagement (GHE) with partner forces across the entire continuum of care, from the point of injury/wounding to rehabilitation, promote interoperability, medical readiness, and lethality. Owing to Russia’s recent tactical and combat movements in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and elsewhere in Europe, GHE activities offered by NATO and unilaterally by member states must increase. Multi-domain attacks by Russia, China, and other malicious actors exacerbate global health security risks and war-related injuries and illnesses. NATO-led GHE activities for warfighting in Ukraine can support foreign policy interests with targeted application and, in return, yield maximum benefits to NATO and member states. Medical readiness, interoperability, and lethality can be achieved through a coordinated effort across all medical actors to standardize the medical evacuation chain, conduct transparent deployment of mobile medical units, and increase access to damage control resuscitation and surgery through echelons of care. Sharing lessons learned helps Ukraine, as well as NATO and its member states. These main themes of effort will reduce preventable morbidity and mortality in support of warfighting and state sovereignty.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">103</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anna Kovalenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Neo-Authoritarianism and Leadership: Outcomes for Modern Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">authoritarianism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democracy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ideology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mentality</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mobilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">political regimes</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">politicization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Putin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105-120</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the notions of authoritarianism and neo-authoritarianism as well as their features in terms of ideology, mentality, mobilization, and politicization of a population, state control, level of political pluralism, and leadership style. Incorporating evidence from reviews, surveys, and scientific research, the study identifies the main difference between the regimes and opposition to democracy, providing samples throughout history with different characteristics, causes, and backgrounds. It presents a vision of authoritarianism as an intermediate stop on the path of a particular state to democracy or totalitarianism. Finally, this article reflects upon Ukraine’s future in the European paradigm and contrasts it with Russia. Ukraine is at a crossroads and must continue to carefully navigate toward the institutionalized democracy it has begun to establish.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Larysa Kompantseva</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Political Analysis or Fortune-Telling by Crystal-Ball? Western Think Tanks' Challenges with Forecasting Putin's War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">big data</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">content analysis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">escalation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">political analysis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9-28</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article analyzes major western think tanks’ forecasts, experts’ opinions, and US and UK media content regarding the future of Ukraine-Russia relationships in the year preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Though the Russian-Ukrainian war has been ongoing since the occupation of Crimea and quasi-republics (“Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics”) were established in 2014, not many political analysts foresaw the coming of the bloodiest and most devastating war since WWII. At the same time, Big Data content analysis of US and UK media demonstrated the presence of markers of an approaching full-scale invasion. Correct-based estimation of the likelihood of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s willingness and ability to protect its sovereignty, was crucial for shaping the appropriate response of the Collective West.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Erik Fagergren</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia's Gambit to Redefine the Current World Order</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Crimea</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Donbas</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">great power</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National Security Strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">President Putin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">special military operation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">world order</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-46</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has made iterative changes to its National Security Strategy (NSS) to bolster its position in the world. The initial intent of the NSS was to provide aspirational foreign policy goals and ambitions the Kremlin could work towards. In 2021, President Putin viewed Russia to be in a position to change the Kremlin’s status in the world and decided to take action. In addition to publishing the 2021 NSS, President Putin also penned a personal history essay about Russia and Ukraine. President Putin’s article provides the Kremlin with a narrative to garner popular domestic support and superficial justification for Russia’s actions against Ukraine. The ultimate goal of the NSS is to reestablish the Cold War world order. President Putin is using Ukraine as a means to reassert Russia’s position in the world while at the same time attempting to discredit the Euro-Atlantic rules-based order.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leonid Polyakov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence Institution Building in Ukraine at Peace and at War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mobilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peacekeeping</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">professionalization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">92-108</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">There are two distinct periods in Defense Institution Building in Ukraine since gaining independence in 1991. A period of peace until February 2014, and the period of war with Russia in 2014-2018. In the pre-war period of 1991-2013, the economic problems, inconsistencies in national strategy and consequent neglect of national defense requirements led to unclear military strategies and declarative rather than substantial reforms of the Armed Forces. Ukraine was trying to compensate the impact of its economic weakness and policy inconsistencies on defense through active cooperation with NATO and participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the EU. However, in the spring of 2014, the response of Ukraine exposed serious weaknesses in all defense aspects except for the people’s will to defend the country. Responding to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the invasion to the South-Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine has mobilized, equipped, and trained a substantial military force of 250 000 active personnel and invested substantial resources in building effective military with agile professional active component supported by deployable ready reserve, jointly capable to deter possible aggression from Russia.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">92</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pierre Jolicoeur</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Education Enhancement Program in Ukraine: The Limits of NATO’s Education Program</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DEEP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Education Enhancement Program</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PME</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Professional Military Education</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109-119</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) is a NATO initiative dating back ten years. It aims at fostering intellectual operability and officer professional military education (PME) to render NATO Partners and potential members capable of joining forces with NATO nations if need be, and to develop the practices and methods to ensure their own security. The Ukraine portion of the program is the most significant. Administered by NATO and the Partnership for Peace Consortium, overseen by strong American and Polish interests, it is a manifestation of what the Alliance can do as a measure of assistance and reassurance to Ukraine. The DEEP is a tool to demonstrate NATO’s credibility and deterrence potential outside of Art. 5. This article speaks of the absorption challenges created by the multiplicity of events, and argues that the objective of creating self-sufficient and interoperable forces is impeded by the current conflict in the Donbas.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Alexandra C. Chinchilla</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paul Poast</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building from Above? Lessons from the Baltic Experience</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baltic Battalion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DIB</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61-71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense institution building seeks to create the means and mechanisms that enable effective capability aggregation within NATO. Can external assistance with DIB help states become suitable NATO members? We discuss the post-Cold War experience of the Baltic States to understand the role of external assistance in defense institution building and how this can enable a state to gain NATO membership. We then consider whether lessons in the Baltic experience are applicable to Georgia and Ukraine.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Malina Kaszuba</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia and Ukraine in the Kremlin’s Policy</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">post-Soviet space</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43-59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Russian Federation believes that the post-Soviet region is strategically important and considers it to be the exclusive zone of its influence. Each of the former republics occupies a specific place in its foreign and security policy. In the following article the author has made an attempt to determine the place of Georgia and Ukraine in the aforementioned policy. It was made by analyzing Moscow’s policy towards them, including actions that clearly enabled the implementation of a strategic political turn towards the West, which for the Kremlin would mean a gradual loss of influence in the area of the former USSR.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maksym Bugriy</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine’s Security Sector Reform: Is Ukraine Taking Western Advice?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity theory</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cynefin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DCAF</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">72-91</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The ongoing Western support to Ukraine’s security sector reform requires the assessment of the reform success. This article considers whether Ukraine’s reform is achieving effectiveness, efficiency, and democratic governance objectives. The author uses a theoretical framework of complexity theory applied to the change management research in organizational studies. The application of this framework is appealing from the perspective of complex and chaotic organizational contexts, in which the security sector can stimulate the emergence of ‘strange attractors’ for system’s adaptability. The findings suggest that Ukraine is building a shared vision following up on chaotic-framed Security Sector Reform acceleration since 2014. The gap between increased confidence in the volunteers and the army and declining confidence in general government institutions, economic burden, and Western cohesion issues constitute the risks that Ukraine’s Europeanization faces.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">72</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence-Industrial Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Best Practices of Ethics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">code of ethics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence industry</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence procurement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35</style></number><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In a presentation to the conference on “Security Sector Governance: Defence Production, Sales and Acquisitions” in Kyiv, Ukraine, the author aims to raise the awareness among Ukrainian stakeholders on existing policies, standards, and good practices in corporate ethics of defence companies. The paper outlines key considerations in establishing defence-industrial cooperation across borders and the principles of business ethics. Then it provides examples from the most recent “Company Index” of Transparency International and concludes by emphasising ethical behaviour as a key pre-condition for solid defence industrial cooperation.
</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yuriy Danyk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tamara Maliarchuk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chad Briggs</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid War: High-tech, Information and Cyber Conflicts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">innovative warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-24</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the advanced technological, information and cyber components of hybrid war and the introduction of suggested countermeasures to counter information and cyber threats and attacks. The main hypothesis of the authors is that revolutionary development and rapid implementation of technologies in innovative ways in all spheres of life facilitate and shape the basis for the transformation of theoretical and practical paradigms of war and conflict. The focus of the article is on the hybrid nature of modern conflict.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Joshua P. Mulford</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Non-State Actors in the Russo-Ukrainian War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Crimea</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Non-state actors</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russo-Ukrainian war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89-107</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The current war in Ukraine has highlighted the fact that in this new age of warfare non-state actors play a larger role than ever before. The influence of the media, think tanks and academia, religious groups, organized crime, war militias, NGOs and GONGOs, and the Ukrainian diaspora is pervasive. Kremlin-controlled media coverage of the war in Eastern Ukraine, including the downing of the MH-17 jet, is offset by the newer grassroots pro-Ukrainian media outlets such as Ukraine Today. Think tanks and academia focused on Ukraine and Russia are also battling for visibility in the government and among the populous. The impact of religious groups on the Ukrainian conflict is best featured in the Russian Orthodox Church’s rationalizing the invasion of Crimea as Russia’s divine right. The Ukrainian church, a subset of the ROC, has broken off and played a proactive role in assisting the war effort by pro-Ukrainian militias. The almost concurrent rise of militias and organized crime in Ukraine pose as a precarious issue for the future of the country. As the government is incapable of regaining sovereignty of its territory, stand-alone militias have risen to fight the Russian invasion in Eastern Ukraine. Organized crime has capitalized on the instability of the region, and with the annexation of Crimea, a new system of black market activities has been opened. The outside world is taking an interest in the Ukrainian plight, as well as in the form of NGO support, and in the case of Russia, GONGOs to promote policies in line with their agendas. The Ukrainian diaspora has also fought to influence policy making towards Ukraine, forming committees and sending supplies to the front line. It is unclear how much influence these non-state actors will have in the future of Ukraine, but it is quite certain that they each play a significant role in the way the conflict is perceived.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Europe and the Balkans during the Strategic Transformation of the European Union: Implications for Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">corruption</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">efficiency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU integration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multinational cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">12.2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Academy of Sciences and Head of the Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper includes speaking notes for the session on “Central-Eastern Europe’s Positioning and Perspectives of the European Union’s Transformation” of the conference “The EU, Central and Eastern Europe and Ukraine: Transformation, Prognosis and Perspectives,” conducted on 16 November 2012 in Kyiv, Ukraine. It addresses selected issues of the current status of the EU in the persisting financial and economic crisis, respective developments in Bulgaria and other countries in South Eastern Europe, and possible implications for Ukraine, with focus on security policies and governance.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Europe and the Balkans during the Strategic Transformation of the European Union: Implications for Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">corruption</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">efficiency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU integration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multinational cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">November 2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paper includes speaking notes for the session on “Central-Eastern Europe’s Positioning and Perspectives of the European Union’s Transformation” of the conference “The EU, Central and Eastern Europe and Ukraine: Transformation, Prognosis and Perspectives,” conducted on 16 November 2012 in Kyiv, Ukraine. It addresses selected issues of the current status of the EU in the persisting financial and economic crisis, respective developments in Bulgaria and other countries in South Eastern Europe, and possible implications for Ukraine, with focus on security policies and governance.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>