<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David Matsaberidze</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Competing Strategies: The Russian Federation vs. the European Union and the United States through Georgia and Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53-66</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article analyzes the shaping and transformation of the post-Soviet security thinking of Georgia and Ukraine in the context of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in the near abroad, often designated as a legitimate sphere of Russian influence, and the competition between Russia and the EU and the US in the region. After the Rose Revolution of Georgia and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, these two countries’ independent/pro-Western orientation became the main issues securitized by the Russian Federation. Correspondingly, the preservation of territorial integrity became the top security issue for Georgia (since the early 1990s), and it became so for Ukraine after the Crimean occupation (March 2014) and the renewed armed hostilities across the entirety of Ukraine since February 2022. The changes in the internal politics of these countries were transposed into the international competition between Russia and the EU/US, expressed through the clash of “Sovereign Democracy” and “Color Revolution” paradigms for the future of post-Soviet states in the 2010s and transformed into active military measures in Ukraine since 2020s and through the so-called creeping annexation of Georgia since 2010s. Practically, these are the tools of maintaining the Russian influence on the one hand and opposing the Western values and power influence, supported firstly by the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership projects and secondly by granting candidate status to Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s military actions against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-2023), a response to the soft power applied by the West, aimed at the creation of buffer zones in the shape of “frozen conflicts,” which could be used as indirect leverage in the hands of the Russian Federation to block the Western aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare Revisited: A Battle of ‘Buzzwords’</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-28</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid warfare is the most common term used by commentators to describe the complexity and multifaceted character of contemporary warfare. Hybrid warfare refers to coercive methods of strategic competition that take place below the threshold of conventional military conflict and is usually applied to the blend of military and non-military methods of warfare employed by the West’s principal adversaries, Russia and China. The term hybrid warfare has evolved from an essentially military concept to one that potentially embraces all the instruments of state power. Hybrid warfare remains an ill-defined and contested term, and there are many other buzzwords, such as irregular warfare, hybrid threats, and gray zone aggression, that are used to describe the same phenomenon. This article examines the evolution of thinking on hybrid warfare and these related concepts. It highlights the challenges that scholars and practitioners have faced in trying to define and apply these terms in the policy environment in a manner that promotes common understanding and strategic coherence.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sarah Backman</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organising National Cybersecurity Centres</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cybersecurity management practices</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cybersecurity organisation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">digital development</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Finland</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Germany</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">national cybersecurity centre</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National cybersecurity management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">national cybersecurity strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Netherlands</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United Kingdom</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">July 2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9-26</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The emerging trend in practises of organising national cybersecurity management via national cybersecurity centres unifies preventive and reactive cybersecurity measures and moves towards an all-hazard approach. These centres constitute some of the most modern ways of organising national cybersecurity man&amp;not;agement and originate from a holistic view of cybersecurity. Based on the empirical examples from the UK, the US, Finland, Germany and The Netherlands, the paper identifies basic motivational aspects behind the creation of national cybersecurity centres, as well as common features, such as strategy documents, organisational frameworks, tasks and responsibilities. Moreover, this paper seeks to identify if the national cybersecurity centres appear to be successful. The paper finds that the national cybersecurity centres are given increasing amounts of resources, tasks, responsibilities and/or freedom of action by their governments. This implies that practices of organising national cybersecurity management in national cybersecurity centres has indeed been successful, and that the examined countries aim to further develop and empower them. The paper concludes in recommendations for organising national cybersecurity centres, drawing on the examples of the studied countries.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>