<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bozhidar Ivanov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Contemporary Challenges for Bulgaria in the Changing Black Sea Security Environment</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A2/AD</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-35</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The author presents the results of a study on the evolving security environment in the Black sea region. The focus is on Russia’s Black Sea security policy and the ways in which it combines kinetic and non-kinetic instruments in its hybrid strategy. The militarization of Crimea, in particular, led to the positioning of assertive Russia as the dominant military power in the Black Sea, with all the consequent negative repercussions for littoral and other states in the region. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Declaration of the Russian State as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Pros, Cons, and Realities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">aggression</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">genocide</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state sponsor of terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, ignited discussions about ways to curb Russia’s ambitions in reshaping the post-WWII world order. This article critically examines the ongoing dialogue surrounding the potential designation of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. We will delve into both the arguments in favor and against this move while also exploring the current political outcomes of this contentious debate. Previously, we conducted a comparative analysis of the criteria for including countries in the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and the activities of the Russian Federation. This article outlines the potential repercussions of such a designation, including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items, and various financial and other restrictions. Sanctions penalizing countries and individuals for engaging in trade with designated states are of particular significance. The Russian Federation has already been recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/ regime in Ukraine and the EU; hence, the main emphasis will be on the United States. This is due to the fact that resolutions from other states are often symbolic gestures with limited consequences, whereas inclusion in the U.S. Department of State’s list can have a profound impact on Russia.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Designation of the Russian Federation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Meeting the “Club of Villains” Criteria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">aggression</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state sponsor of terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-46</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article analyzes the primary reasons for designating the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The issue gained prominence with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022—the largest and deadliest armed conflict in Europe since World War II—challenging the unity of the Collective West and the global security system. The vision of a peaceful and prosperous European space from Lisbon to Vladivostok has been permanently shattered.
To achieve its geopolitical objectives, Russia has been involved in numerous armed conflicts since 1991, such as in Georgia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and now Ukraine, orchestrated operations on the soil of other states, and supported terrorist organizations. Aspiring to be a superpower in the aftermath of the USSR, Russia has utilized hybrid warfare instruments for decades to undermine democracies globally and maintain influence over former Soviet republics. Some of its actions can be classified as terrorism, support for terrorism, ethnocide, or genocide.
This article explores the criteria for including countries in the US list of state sponsors of terrorism and compares them with the activities of the Russian Federation. It provides evidence that Russia qualifies for inclusion in the list, although the US still hesitates to designate it as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/regime.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mirosław Banasik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Changing Security Paradigm. New Roles for New Actors – The Russian Approach</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threats</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">31-43</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The success of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea attest to the fact that the hybrid warfare constitutes an effective tool for achieving political objectives. This article evaluates the nature of hybrid warfare based on theoretical publications on the art of war and doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation, and characterizes the practical dimensions of hybrid warfare. It can be concluded on that basis that hybrid warfare and organized crime constitute real threats to European safety and security. International organizations such as NATO and the European Union so far have not drawn up neither the strategy nor effective tools for countering these phenomena.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mariusz Fryc</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">From Wales to Warsaw and Beyond: NATO’s Strategic Adaptation to the Russian Resurgence on Europe’s Eastern Flank</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45-65</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The term hybrid warfare has been widely analyzed by scholars, policymakers and commentators since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. The topic has ceased to be a subject only studied by military strategists, but has entered the wider policy domain as a significant security challenge for the West. This article seeks to place the debate about hybrid warfare in a broader analytical and historical context and summarizes discussion to date on this and related strategic concepts. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine is a particular focus for discussion.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">73-87</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The term hybrid warfare has been widely analyzed by scholars, policymakers and commentators since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. The topic has ceased to be a subject only studied by military strate-gists, but has entered the wider policy domain as a significant security challenge for the West. This article seeks to place the debate about hybrid warfare in a broader analytical and historical context and summarizes discussion to date on this and related strategic concepts. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine is a particular focus for discussion.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Zofia Studzińska</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How Russia, Step by Step, Wants to Regain an Imperial Role in the Global and European Security System</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">imperial role</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">parastate</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">separatists.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sphere of influence</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21-41</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia has been an empire for centuries. After the fall of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, many countries saw a chance to build a new world order and a new international and European security system. But for Moscow, the last 15 years were simply an aberration to be rectified rather than the new reality. Currently, we are witnessing the Russian Federation attempt to rebuild its sphere of influence and restore its borders to what they were during the time of the Cold War. The first sign of Russia testing this plan was the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. After a poor reaction from the West, Moscow decided to pursue another confrontation, this time going much further, challenging the limits of the possible – the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, ongoing from April 2014. With the lack of a strong response from the Western countries, one can assume that Russia is on its way to rebuilding its imperial position and will continue to grasp for control of other territories.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record></records></xml>