<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oleksandr Polischuk</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ecosystem Platform for the Defence and Security Sector of Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">block chain</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">clusters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complex systems</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence ecosystem</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ecosystem approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security and defence sector</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-19</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;While success in current and future conflicts will increasingly be predicated by optimisation of high-tech solutions rather than military capabilities based on mass, the application of modern business approaches is of key importance for reforms aiming to adapt security and defence to the new realities. This article presents detailed analysis of ways to adapt the security and defence sector of Ukraine to Euro-Atlantic standards, taking into account Ukraine&amp;rsquo;s trajectory and growing interaction with the international security systems and the specific context shaped by the external aggression against Ukraine. Based on the analysis of existing legislation and review of theoretical sources, the author concludes that the present archaic, post-Soviet type security and defence sector of Ukraine is not adequate to the future complex challenges. Further, he applies the ecosystem approach to elaborate recommendations for the development of a modern model of national security and defence organisation based on functional integration of the capabilities of all main security and defence actors, emphasising the strategic importance of the integration of Ukraine&amp;rsquo;s security and defence sector into European and Euro-Atlantic security systems.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ralitsa Kovacheva</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Threats in Bulgarian Media</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid attacks</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">media</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">politics</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">333-348</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article presents the results of a recent study aimed at revealing how the term “hybrid threats” (or its synonyms “hybrid attacks,” “hybrid war,” etc.) is used in Bulgarian public discourse. 688 articles published by 188 media outlets were registered and processed by the method of content analysis. The results show that the term “hybrid threats” is mostly mentioned and not discussed in substance; it is often unclear what exactly the speakers mean by using the term “hybrid threats”; specific narratives are constructed, where the term “hybrid threats” is completely removed from its meaning by definition and loaded with different connotations.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">333</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maksym Shchoholiev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Violeta Tretynyk</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The System of Operative Determination of the Level of Tension in Society Based on Data from Social Networks</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">context</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">data aggregation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">keyword</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">social networks</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">social tension</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">TF-IDF</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">word2vec representation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">375-382</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The system presented in this article was developed for state structures with responsibilities for ensuring security and stability in the society. The main task of the system is to determine the impact of information stored on various Internet resources on society. It serves to assess the level of tension on the basis of comments of social networks’ users on certain news and posts. The system takes into account the number of news’ reposts and the average emotionality of comments on this news. The methods TF-IDF and word2vec are used for keyword determination from the text and their transformation into numerical values. The level of emotionality is defined by an artificial neural network. To get the resulting estimate, a data aggregation block is developed and used to reduce various independent quantitative and qualitative characteristics into one value.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">375</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Veronika Stoilova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Art of Achieving Political Goals without Use of Force: War by Non-Military Means</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">geopolitics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">global security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-military means</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">136-142</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nowadays, the boundaries between war and peace are increasingly blurred. Over the past few years we can observe the appearance of new terms in the field of international relations – ‘hybrid war,’ ‘hybrid conflicts’ or ‘hybrid threats.’ Despite the absence of a generally recognized definition of the concept, its characteristics are close to the definition of terrorism. Some security analysts indicate this type of conflict as a war, combining conventional methods with guerrilla, cyber and information warfare techniques (media and Internet) as well as with non-military actions, which run contrary to international law and aim to achieve specific policy goals.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mihail Naydenov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Building the Capacity of NATO’s Eastern European  Members to Fight Hybrid War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capacity building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">subversion</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45-58</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Russian Federation has been waging a hybrid war campaign against NATO and the EU for years. The Kremlin has so far skillfully managed to exploit the vulnerabilities of the West. The NATO Eastern flank members are particularly exposed to the Kremlin-orchestrated systematic subversion and this is a problem of growing significance to the Alliance as it is undermining its cohesion and is preventing the build-up of strong national security and defense systems of its Eastern European member states. In order to effectively remedy this dangerous situation, the Eastern flank NATO member states must immediately start implementing a coherent national institutional capacity building programs, supported by NATO and the EU, aimed at timely mitigation of existing vulnerabilities and building up long-lasting resilient national security structures able to tackle hybrid threats coming from any direction. To carry out this ambition, a number of capacity building steps are proposed.</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgii Pocheptsov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cognitive Attacks in Russian Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cognitive attack</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cognitive bias</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">fake news</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mass consciousness</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37-43</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A cognitive attack aims to change the interpretation of the situation by an individual and in mass consciousness. Cognitive attacks are actively using cognitive biases as automatic shortcuts for the mass consciousness. This article provides analysis of the following media instruments used by the Russian Federation: changing the concepts for describing the situation by adapting older negative images and myths for the current context, creating fake events and objects to help keeping the intended line of attack on the enemy; and organizing various protest actions in Ukraine tailored for Russian TV news.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ruslan Hryshchuk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Katerina Molodetska-Hrynhchuk</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Methodological Foundation of State’s Information Security in Social Networking Services in Conditions of Hybrid War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information security of the state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">social networking service</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61-79</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">At the present stage of the development of information technologies, social networking services have become a leading means of mass communication with a significant impact on all spheres of public activity. Thanks to its popularity and communication benefits, social networking services are used by leading nations to achieve their own geopolitical goals. Through information operations in social networking services, one can spread manifestations of hostility on national, religious, or ethnic grounds, and thus increase the level of social tension, dissatisfaction with the existing system of governance, etc. That may have further consequences in real social and political life, with the subsequent transition to chaotic social dynamic. Therefore, the provision of state information security in social networking services in the conditions of globalization of the information space and hybridization of military conflicts remains one of the most pressing problems not only for Ukraine, but globally. 

This article analyses the peculiarities of the use of social networking services during the hybrid war with the Russian Federation. It was established that the counterpart party carried out information operations using social bots, informational and information-psychological influence on the actors of virtual communities. In addition to these actions, operations involved actors with the task to enhance the impact of negatory material and destructive propaganda. The authors then elaborate methodological principles of providing information security of the state in social networking services by implementing procedures for detection, assessment and countering threats in the information space. Effectiveness of the proposed methodological principles is achieved by developing timely measures to identify and assess threats, using the natural peculiarities of the interaction of actors in social networking services for the synthesis of controlling influence and artificially managed transition to a definite stable state of information security of the state.</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oliver Fitton</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cyber Operations and Gray Zones: Challenges for NATO</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ambiguity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">gray zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109-119</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Gray Zone represents a space between peaceful state rivalries and war. Within this space actors have developed hybrid strategies to extend their influence. This concept of conflict is best illustrated by Russia’s actions in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Gray Zone doctrine leverages ambiguity to create an environment in which adversaries are unable to make strategic decisions in a timely and confident manner. Cyber Operations, because of the attribution problem, lend themselves to this kind of conflict. This article explores the interactions between the Gray Zone and cyber operations and considers questions which NATO must address in order to adapt.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oleksii Izhak</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Threats and Challenges of a Multipolar World: A Ukraine Crisis Case Study</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Multipolar world</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">polycentric world</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukrainian crisis</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32-44</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">As the post-cold-war unipolar system transforms into a polycentric one, it becomes more complex and less predictable. The new system may be crushed with less effort than needed to keep it on track. The polycentric international system, as it emerges, suffers from hybrid threats. They are difficult to identify and predict. Russia pioneered exploiting the new vulnerabilities to gain unilateral advantages. Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine was just a starting episode of her wider attempt to crush the whole world order. Responsible world powers have either to fix the vulnerabilities of the polycentric world, or to block malicious attempts to exploit it.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iryna Klymenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Torn Asunder from Within: Ukraine and the Lessons for Global Security</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">criminal business</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">illegal economy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">informational warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intervention</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">systemic corruption</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45-56</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia’s non-standard intervention in Ukraine was accomplished in four major areas—the economic system as a whole, the energy and security sectors, and information policy. The deliberate policy of the Kremlin has transformed Ukraine into economically fragile and institutionally weak nation. Due to efforts of former regime and Russian intelligence agencies, main Ukrainian government institutions were involved in semi-legal, semi-criminal transnational business scheme. Macro-financial vulnerability of Ukraine, in conjunction with a strained economic structure, proved to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for preparing and implementing hybrid aggression. The Ukrainian precedent might be replicated as a special operation to destroy statehood, whereby disruption is achieved through the escalation of internal political and economic challenges. One universal means of undermining statehood in an era of hybrid wars is to encourage corruption among holders of the highest office</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>