<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Roland Kelemen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian Hybrid War on the European Union's Cybersecurity Policies and Regulations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cognitive warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2023 </style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75-90</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">While Russia transitioned from hybrid to conventional warfare in Ukraine, NATO recognized cyberspace as another domain where allied response can be invoked. The European Union also decided to enhance the cybersecurity capabilities of the organization and its member states, making social resilience a priority area. It is recognized that the security of cyberspace and related systems is not just an economic issue but one that affects the whole society, necessitating a more complex strategy and regulation. The EU has taken steps to mitigate the cyber risks associated with hybrid warfare, enhancing network and cognitive security. However, offensive cyber operations could increasingly lead to open armed conflict. During existing conflicts, some cyber operations may undermine public confidence and further escalate the situation. The EU and its Member States must pay closer attention to escalation dynamics in their legislation and practices. It is crucial to scrutinize cyber policies, set specific targets and deadlines, and regularly update them. This will require stakeholders to find the appropriate regulatory levels and align national regulations, practices, and standards.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Dobias</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare and the Need for Intermediate Force Capabilities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">human effects</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-9</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;NATO is faced with adversaries undertaking acts of aggression that deliberately stay below the lethal force threshold or aim to trigger a lethal response from NATO and incur costs to the Alliance such as undesired escalation, risks of collateral damage, including civilian casualties, or negative narratives. Ex&lt;span style=&quot;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;&quot;&gt;a&lt;/span&gt;mples of these activities range from dangerous aerial and maritime approaches, fomenting unrest and using refugees as a weapon, and even use of force short of lethal to intimidate opponents. Currently, the NATO responses are often limited to two extremes of mere presence or applying lethal force, thus ceding the initiative to the adversary. This issue contains a set of articles exploring intermediate force capabilities (e.g., non-lethal weapons, cyber, information operations, electromagnetic warfare, and strategic capabilities such as stability policing and use of special operation forces) and how they can address current NATO dilemma when operating below the threshold of lethal force.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chad Briggs</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yuriy Danyk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tamara Maliarchuk</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Security Aspects of Hybrid War, COVID-19 Pandemic and Cyber-Social Vulnerabilities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cognitive hacking</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COVID-19</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber technologies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber-social vulnerabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberattack</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">e-learning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">emotional warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information trauma</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-72</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">While developments in cyber technologies have advanced the propagation and reach of hybrid warfare, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated many vulnerabilities and critical dependencies. This article explores the fundamental aims and strategies of hybrid warfare in terms of psychological underpinnings and technological reach and links to emerging issues of disinformation, cybercrime, fake news, information trauma, and the influence of new modes of education on national security and state resilience.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andras Hugyik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Best Practices in the Application of the Concept of Resilience: Building Hybrid Warfare and Cybersecurity Capabilities in the Hungarian Defense Forces</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hungary</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security policy</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-38</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In its Global Strategy for foreign and security policy, the EU applies resilience as a comprehensive concept of internal and external security. In parallel, at the 2016 Summit in Warsaw, Allied leaders decided to boost NATO's resilience to the full spectrum of threats. Each NATO member needs to be resilient to a major shock caused by a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, a hybrid, or an armed attack. Hybrid warfare, including cyberattacks, is recognized as a significant security challenge. The National Security Strategy of Hungary, adopted in 2020, confirms that the primary international framework of Hungary's security and defense policy is NATO and EU membership and highlights the need to enhance the country's resilience against hybrid attacks. This article provides an analysis of the application of the concept of resilience in the Hungarian defense sector. It introduces the development of the resilience of the Hungarian Defense Forces against hybrid threats, including their cyber component, while generating options for the decision-makers regarding the military and information instruments of national power. The author identifies potential hybrid threats against Hungary, a possible cyberattack scenario, and lines of effort to achieve a feasible level of resilience to such threats. He takes account of the political and military environment, as well as wider national issues in view of hybrid threats and main features and dilemmas of cyber warfare, thus aiming to facilitate the application of the concept of resilience in Hungary.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yavor Raychev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cyberwar in Russian and USA Military-Political Thought: A Comparative View</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia-NATO relations</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">349-361</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper I argue that there are huge differences in the concepts of cyberwar in Russian and American politico-military thought. Cyberwar is a part of modern hybrid war. In the American views, the latter was coined to describe certain new forms of warfare, above all in the Middle East. It is based on analysis of the experience of various terrorist and jihadist groupings acting in the area. In the Russian tradition, before the disintegration of USSR &amp;ldquo;hybrid war&amp;rdquo; (although different terms were used) referred rather to political and information operations. In this century, the Russian concept was developed in a close relation with coloured revolutions, the Arab spring, the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the perception that the country is permanently attacked by the US and their Euro-Atlantic allies. Here, the Russian and the US concepts are compared by origin, conceptual basis, scope, nature, time to be waged, tools, relations with other fields, how are they organized and who are the cyber actors. Fundamental differences are established, and this is one of the reasons for certain ineffectiveness of the West in meeting the challenges of modern Russian hybrid war in general and cyberwar in particular.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">349</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stefan Hadjitodorov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Martin Sokolov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power: Hybrid Dimensions of Russia-Bulgaria Relations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">soft power</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-20</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In order to effectively counter hybrid warfare, it is necessary to understand it. However, certain aspects of hybrid warfare are often confused with traditional soft power. This article aims to highlight the differences between the two by analyzing the relationship between Bulgaria and Russia. The latter enjoys considerable opportunities to exercise soft power, but often must accompany them with hybrid means. Yet, labeling everything as hybrid warfare becomes detrimental to the topic itself. Moreover, it runs the risk of ascribing greater power to the Kremlin which may not truly be the case. The aim of the authors is to expose the threats, opportunities, and limits of Russian influence in Bulgaria and the possible outcomes.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yantsislav Yanakiev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Petko Dimov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Daniel Bachvarov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Conceptualizing the Role of Societal Resilience in Countering Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil-Military Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disaster response</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interagency cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk reduction</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Social Resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Societal Resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-89</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">No single tool is available to counter the diversity and complexity of hybrid threats, examined by the authors as a as a military strategy that blends conventional war-fare, irregular warfare, and cyber warfare. The concept of hybrid warfare is used to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battlespace requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response. Reflecting on recent NATO policies and documents, this article looks into the importance of strengthening societal resilience, understood as the ability of a state, organization or society to absorb and recover from a shock.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nebojsa Nikolic</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connecting Conflict Concepts: Hybrid Warfare and Warden’s Rings</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">decision making</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">system approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">unrestricted warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warden’s rings</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21-34</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article explores connections among existing descriptive concepts of conflict. The focus is on connecting the “five rings” concept of John Warden and hybrid threats in a wider sense. The motivation is three-fold: firstly, to explore, compare and complement old and new concepts; secondly, to contribute to the systematization of numerous modes of security violation; and thirdly, to propose some basics for the creation of a tool for optimal choice of hybrid activities and countermeasures. Contemporary security violations are complex, not always visible, hard to detect, hard to be attributed and very different by nature and characteristics. Systemic analyses of indicated attempts of hybrid security violations through the prism of Warden’s rings contribute to better perception and recognition of the real purpose of hybrid attack and even indicate possible initiators. For the defender’s side, this approach is useful to analyse and recognize own vulnerabilities, which is a good starting point to prepare defences and countermeasures. For a hybrid attacker, this approach offers good tool for optimal choice of appropriate options from the spectrum of hybrid warfare tools.
</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arnold C. Dupuy</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cyber-Energy Infrastructure Vulnerabilities in the Hybrid Warfare Environment: Some DoD Mitigation Efforts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber-energy nexus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interagency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">joint mission assurance assessments</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-linear warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">operational energy context</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">163-174</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The energy sector has long been recognized as critical infrastructure, particularly vulnerable to external penetration and manipulation by hostile elements. The cyber-energy nexus was chosen as the case study for this article. It highlights the growing vulnerabilities of the energy infrastructure to cyber threats and aims to move forward dialogue, mainly from the perspective of the US Department of Defense (DoD), on protecting DoD energy infrastructure from a variety of hybrid tools.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oleg Manko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yurii Mikhieiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Based on the Analysis of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">media</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-20</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">There is no generally accepted definition of ‘Hybrid Warfare.’ Often, authors used the term depending on the particular context and the issue at stake. This article reviews the variety of views on the definition of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare,’ suggests an up-to-date interpretation of the concept, and identifies key characteristics of conflicts involving this type of warfare.
It has been found that an information-psychological element forms the basis of ‘hybrid warfare’ with the aim to influence primarily public consciousness, rather than the armed forces or State’s infrastructure. Moreover, it has been identified that the indicated threats are of ambiguous nature, and thus it is difficult to single out, detect and identify them in order to organize an appropriate response. The authors note that the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ has originated in the realm of special forces’ operations in geopolitical terms by integrating the experience of severe confrontations threatening international security, combating terrorism and extremism of state and non-state actors.
Along with the features of ‘hybrid warfare,’ the authors elaborate on its components and types, i.e. information warfare, cyber warfare, asymmetric warfare, task force hostilities, terrorist activities, urban guerrilla warfare, signs of humanitarian war, signs of ethnic conflict, trade war, etc. It has been proved that information operations’ planning is a significant component of the inter-agency approach to the decision-making under conditions of a new type of war – ‘hybrid’ war.
</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carol Atkinson</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare and Societal Resilience: Implications for Democratic Governance</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democratic governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">surveillance</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63-76</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This article examines the changing nature of warfare and the implications for democratic governance. The first section describes &amp;ldquo;hybrid warfare&amp;rdquo; &amp;ndash; the central concept used by NATO to characterize modern war. It looks at the evolution of the concept, how it is defined, and some disputes over its ability to accurately capture the essence of modern war. In NATO, the concept of &amp;ldquo;hybrid warfare&amp;rdquo; is used to analyze and characterize Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea; however, the Russian military thinks a bit differently about modern warfare and does not use the term to characterize its own actions. Thus, in the second section, the article examines the difference in Russian military thinking from that of the West. One of the main differences is the role and nature of cyber operations. Cyber operations, especially influence campaigns that include propaganda, disinformation, and &amp;ldquo;winning hearts and minds,&amp;rdquo; are key &amp;lsquo;irregular&amp;rsquo; components of hybrid warfare that seek decision through influencing the beliefs, values, and collective identity of the opponent&amp;rsquo;s population. Finally, in its third section, the article argues that the ability of any democratic country to counter hybrid threats, in large part, depends on the willingness of its citizens to support government policies that ultimately undermine the basic freedoms that define what it means to be a democratic country. The author suggests that democratic governance is being undermined by the policies that democratic countries, with the support of their citizens, institute in order to combat hybrid threats, particularly cyber threats.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Krassen Daskalov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare and the Challenge It Poses to the Psychological Resilience Training in the Bulgarian Military</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">training programme</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">197-205</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article provides an overview of hybrid warfare and psychological resilience, and the related challenges faced by individuals, communities and societal security in regard to the psychological effects of hybrid threats. Since the concept of psychological resilience is new and almost unknown in Bulgaria, and even less so in the Bulgarian military, the article introduces the reader to the concept of psychological resilience. It then suggests a model of developing resilience training in the Bulgarian armed forces.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Research Topics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interdisciplinary research</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multidisciplinary studies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">nonlinearity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">289-300</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article elaborates on four emerging research topics, considered of key importance for the understanding of and finding effective countermeasures to hybrid threats: (1) exploring the interlinked dynamics of a conflict developing in parallel in the physical world and on social networks; (2) analysing the expanding involvement of private actors who serve as proxies for an assertive state; (3) exploring the vulnerabilities of national security systems to hybrid influence and finding effective countermeasures; and (4) designing an architecture that allows to study the problem of hybrid threats holistically by providing interoperability among domain-specific or cross-domain models, or ‘use cases,’ and the respective data. All these require multi- and interdisciplinary research and consistent accumulation, verification and sharing of data, case studies and models.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bistra Vassileva</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Moti Zwilling</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare Similation-based Learning: Challenges and Opportunities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">applied competences</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation-based learning</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">220-234</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In the past few years, the body of knowledge on hybrid warfare grew considerably, as did its importance both in practice and in academia. This article provides a current overview of the existing body of the literature in the field of simulation-based learning and the hybrid warfare issues of key importance. The authors present here an original framework related to simulation-based learning environment which provides students or trainees the opportunity to acquire knowledge and skills to deal with different situations in hybrid warfare impacting both the private and the public sector. Research questions driving this study are as follows: First, to identify key topics of hybrid warfare which should be taken as mandatory topics during the training sessions; second, to evaluate the possibilities to apply simulation-based learning to hybrid warfare issues, and, third, to propose a methodological framework of simulation-based learning environment about key hybrid warfare topics and related technological issues.

</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marcin Kozieł</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO’s Defense Institution Building in the Age of Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capacity building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DIB</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39-51</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building (DIB) plays a crucial role in NATO’s “Projecting Stability” agenda by assisting Partners in developing their defense and security sectors, thereby increasing not only their security, but also that of the Euro-Atlantic region. At the same time, the current security environment is defined by complex and diffuse threats coming from both state and non-state actors, where the adversary aims at incapacitating the state. For this reason, increasing the resilience of the defense and security institutions against the hybrid threats in particular is key – a reality which should inform adaptation of the NATO’s DIB instruments. 
This article discusses a number of key implications of the hybrid warfare for NATO’s DIB policies and processes, emphasizing that capacity building should aim to help the state institutions increase their ability to recognize and respond to hybrid warfare and, if necessary, to sustain the functioning of the state and its institutions under hybrid warfare conditions.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nebojsa Nikolic</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Obstacles in Inter-Organizational Cooperation and Hybrid Threats</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inter-organizational</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-41</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inter-organizational cooperation at both national and international level depends on many factors. Some can have negative influence and be perceived as obstacles to efficient inter-organizational cooperation. Obstacles could be caused by bureaucratic rivalries, parochial mentality, rigid organizational rules and procedures, inappropriate information, harmful leadership, etc. Due to a variety of hybrid threats, the logical response of states’ leaders should be directed to gathering information from all available sources in order to become resilient and respond adequately to hybrid threats. Identification of obstacles and evaluation of their influence may contribute to the ability to resolve problems, to avoid obstacles or, at least, to clarify needs and opportunities for improvement.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kiril Avramov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Rise of Russian PMCs – ‘Stealth’ Instrument for a ‘Sharp Power’</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mercenaries</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">plausible deniability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">private military companies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The reoccurring well-documented incidents involving personnel belonging to Russian private military companies (PMCs) in distant theaters, such as Syria and the Central African Republic, shed light and provide for additional understanding regarding the modus operandi of these ‘hybrid’ instruments of ‘plausible deniability’ frequently employed to supplement the global geopolitical ambitions of Kremlin. This article will argue that the recent ‘re-discovery’ of mercenary potential and its utility by the Russian political leadership stems from the results of initial experimentation with irregular private forces in the Balkan wars, later in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in augmenting regular forces on the ground and furthering political objectives, only to be exported as a tested working model in Syria and elsewhere. In essence, if the Balkan wars and Ukraine battlefields were initial testing grounds, then Syrian experimentation is the final experimentation with the model prior to its global export. The specificity of the regular armed forces and PMCs relational dynamics illustrates the very essence of the ‘hybrid’ nature of the Russian state where the grey zone between public policy and private endeavors remains blurred in search of global resurgence.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gergana Yordanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sovereign Debt as Emerging Challenge of Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">financial security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">sovereign debt</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">183-194</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The current dynamic security environment is shaped by various hybrid threats and risks of a military and non-military character. Emerging challenges in the public sector deficit covered via sovereign debt financing are increasingly open for hybrid influence. Diverse deficit budget financing resources, variable geo-economics poles and military oppositions convert the debt leverage to an effective manoeuvre for geostrategic actions against financial systems’ stability. This article accepts and elaborates on the thesis that sovereign debt underwriting could be seen as a hybrid threat to the state’s security..
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yuriy Danyk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tamara Maliarchuk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chad Briggs</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid War: High-tech, Information and Cyber Conflicts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">innovative warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-24</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the advanced technological, information and cyber components of hybrid war and the introduction of suggested countermeasures to counter information and cyber threats and attacks. The main hypothesis of the authors is that revolutionary development and rapid implementation of technologies in innovative ways in all spheres of life facilitate and shape the basis for the transformation of theoretical and practical paradigms of war and conflict. The focus of the article is on the hybrid nature of modern conflict.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Steve Abrams</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">active measures</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">agent of influence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">deception operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">KGB</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Siloviki</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">subversion</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-31</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper investigates the role of Soviet-style “active measures” as an element of modern Russian “political warfare.” These techniques were commonly used during the Soviet-era, encompassing a broad range of influence activities, including: covert media placement, forgery, agents of influence, “friendship” societies, front organizations, and more. Today, in Putin’s Russia, these active measures are once again in use, updated for digitally interconnected “global information space.” The paper begins with an introduction to active measures, then discusses their role in Soviet foreign policy and the attempts by the American “Active Measures Working Group” to counter them. The paper then describes how the Soviet active measures playbook has been updated for the modern era, using three case studies as examples. The paper concludes with a discussion on strategy, reproducing a number of recommendations from key publications.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mirosław Banasik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Changing Security Paradigm. New Roles for New Actors – The Russian Approach</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threats</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">31-43</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The success of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea attest to the fact that the hybrid warfare constitutes an effective tool for achieving political objectives. This article evaluates the nature of hybrid warfare based on theoretical publications on the art of war and doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation, and characterizes the practical dimensions of hybrid warfare. It can be concluded on that basis that hybrid warfare and organized crime constitute real threats to European safety and security. International organizations such as NATO and the European Union so far have not drawn up neither the strategy nor effective tools for countering these phenomena.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record></records></xml>