<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heirs of Abu Bakr: On the Ideology and Conception of History in al-Qaeda and Islamic State</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abu Bakr</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al-Qaeda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">caliphate</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ideology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-36</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article investigates references to early Muslim history by al-Qaeda and Islamic State, and notes a remarkable difference. While al-Qaeda has traditionally referred to the battles of the early Muslims during the time of the prophet Muhammad, the Islamic State centers its references on the successor to the prophet, the caliph Abu Bakr. Hence, Al-Qaeda, in line with Sayyed Qutb’s notion of a “Qur’anic program,” evokes a mythical past as if it is relived today. The Islamic State, in turn, takes a somewhat more pragmatic line, arguing that events today, like those of the earliest caliphs, are merely the outcomes of human decisions in a post-prophetic and post-Qur’anic age.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maja Touzari Greenwood</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State and al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ahrar al Sham</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al Qaeda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign fighters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jabhat al Nusra</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jabhat Fath al Sham</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87-97</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reviews important differences in how Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham perceive the role of the foreign fighter and outlines local dilemmas integrating foreign fighters entails for the three movements. It shows how, in addition to boosting fighting capacity, a high number of foreigners might also represent a crucial weakness.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maria-Louise Clausen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State in Yemen – A Rival to al-Qaeda?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">AQAP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arab Spring</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">sectarianism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yemen</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">50-62</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Yemeni state has all but collapsed as the political transition that followed the popular protests in 2011 has been derailed. This has left Yemen without a functioning central government and thus provided a ripe context for the expansion of both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State in Yemen. This article focuses on the balance of power between AQAP and Islamic State in Yemen. Yemen is an interesting case of the international competition between al-Qaeda and Islamic State as the branch of al-Qaeda in Yemen, AQAP, is one of the strongest. The article argues that AQAP has sought to establish stronger local ties by enmeshing itself with the still strong tribal structures in Yemen whereas IS has sought to carve out a place for itself in Yemen by challenging AQAP on its religious zealousness, particularly by deepening sectarian divisions in Yemen.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">50</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Manni Crone</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State’s Incursion into North Africa and Sahel: A Threat to al-Qaeda?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boko Haram</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libya</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">North Africa</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sahel</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sinai Province</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63-76</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article examines Islamic State’s expansion into North Africa and Sahel and the subsequent rivalry between Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb − the regional Al Qaeda group. Although IS managed to establish a province in Libya from 2014 through 2016, its presence in North Africa and Sahel (Libya, Sinai, Nigeria) is fragile. AQIM in contrast has a longstanding presence in the region, which appears to be much more consolidated. The rivalry between IS and AQ in this region has incited AQ splinter-groups to unite around AQIM, and in 2016 these groups stepped up their attacks on Western targets.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andrea Sjøberg Aasgaard</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Migrants, Housewives, Warriors or Sex Slaves: AQ’s and the Islamic State’s Perspectives on Women</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">AQ</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">house wives</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">migrants</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">sex slaves</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">warriors</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">women</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99-111</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why do young Muslim women from the whole world join the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, despite the fact that the group is notorious for conducting terrible sexual violations against women? Through comparing how al-Qaeda (AQ) and IS are positioning women in their ideological literature, this article sheds light on IS’ appeal to women. This is interesting, as AQ in a historical perspective only attracted a handful of European women to physically join the group. The comparison highlights that AQ and IS position women in different ways: as housewives, migrants, warriors and sex slaves. Both groups’ ideologies agree that a woman’s primarily role is to be a housewife and mother, and exclude in principle women from the battlefield. However, only IS is emphasizing that Muslim women have a right and duty to migrate to its territory. Through using ideological arguments in its literature, IS convinces its supporters that it is a religious duty to enslave women the group defines as idolaters. For this reason, IS’ brutality against non-Muslim women will not discourage its female supporters from joining the group.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lars Erslev Andersen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Mole and the Mallet: Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the ‘Thirty Years' War’ in the Middle East</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">al-Nusra</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">al-Qaida</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">War on Terror</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-24</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article investigates the developments of al-Qaida and The Islamic State in the context of the war on terror. The Iraq war 2003–2010, including the US Counterinsurgency strategy implemented in Iraq in 2007 onwards, together with the political developments in Iraq after the US withdrawal of combat troops at the end of 2011 is seen as the breeding ground for Islamic State in Iraq and thus for establishment of the Nusra Front (al-Qaida) in Syria. The chapter argues that without political developments based on reliable states in the Arab Middle East there is no solution in sight for ending the conflicts and wars in the region.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Almakan Orozobekova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Mobilization and Recruitment of Foreign Fighters: The Case of Islamic State, 2012–2014</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign fighters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">France</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutional (top-down) and bottom-up (individual) recruitment/mobilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Saudi Arabia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">the United Kingdom</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tunisia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">83-100</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines how foreign fighters were recruited and mobilized for Islamic State in 2012-2014. Institutional and individual approaches to this phenomenon form the basis of understanding the mechanisms used for the mobilization and recruitment of foreign fighters. The former refers to a terrorist institution that plays a key role in the recruitment of individuals (top-down/institutional), and the latter refers to the self-radicalization process that foreign fighters undergo (bottom-up/ individual). In particular, the research focuses on an analysis of Islamic State and the recruitment/mobilization of sixteen foreign fighters from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, France, and the United Kingdom. The analysis shows that both top-down and bottom-up concepts are important but that the extent to which each is used depends on the profiles of the country in question. The study concludes by demonstrating the comparative value of top-down and bottom-up approaches in terms of understanding contemporary terrorist recruitment and providing policy recommendations.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">83</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abdul Basir Yosufi</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">counterinsurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">insurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ISIS</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">sectarian conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">US intervention</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91-110</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This research paper examines the extent to which both the United States (US) intervention in 2003 and sectarian conflict in Iraq and the region contributed to the rise and consolidation of the Islamic State (IS). It is argued that the US intervention contributed to the rise of IS by creating a strategic cause for mobilization of insurgency while insufficient counterinsurgency resources and doctrine, and the lack of a post-war plan enabled the insurgency to consolidate. Although the US adapted its strategy and deployed additional resources as part of the “surge,” which succeeded in weakening of the insurgents significantly, the premature withdrawal of US troops allowed for a revival of the insurgency which eventually evolved into IS. The sectarian conflict in Iraq and the region further contributed to the rise and consolidation of IS by helping in prolif-eration of the group’s underlying ideology, increasing funding opportunities for the insurgents and driving the Sunni communities to support the Islamic State
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