<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maja Touzari Greenwood</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State and al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ahrar al Sham</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al Qaeda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign fighters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jabhat al Nusra</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jabhat Fath al Sham</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87-97</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reviews important differences in how Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham perceive the role of the foreign fighter and outlines local dilemmas integrating foreign fighters entails for the three movements. It shows how, in addition to boosting fighting capacity, a high number of foreigners might also represent a crucial weakness.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cüneyt Gürer</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Presenting a Strategic Model to Understand Spillover Effects of ISIS Terrorism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign fighters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ISIS</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">spillover effects</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41-57</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Understanding the nature and the extent of the future threat from ISIS has been a key question for scholars, policy makers and security professionals since ISIS started losing significant grounds in Syria and Iraq. This article analyses ISIS terrorism and its possible spillover effects from a regional security perspective by presenting a strategic model to develop options for the policy makers. A strategic understanding, supported by a model that has been designed to capture all possible variables and their interaction which each other, is necessary to understand the future direction of the threat. Many scholars agree that the threat is not only about the organizational structure of ISIS but also its ideological aspect, therefore the model presented here connects the facts and the ideology with variables at three different levels: regional political level; ISIS and its organizational structure; and individual level variables. The model was designed to capture changes with relevant data thus providing a strategic data-driven understanding of the threat. 
Regional political developments and how ISIS reacts to those developments are the main concerns at the first two levels of analysis. Foreign fighters and other sympathizers are the most important subjects of the study at the individual level with the assumption that the future threat will diffuse through foreign fighters and self-radicalized lone actors.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Almakan Orozobekova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Mobilization and Recruitment of Foreign Fighters: The Case of Islamic State, 2012–2014</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign fighters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">France</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutional (top-down) and bottom-up (individual) recruitment/mobilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Saudi Arabia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">the United Kingdom</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tunisia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">83-100</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines how foreign fighters were recruited and mobilized for Islamic State in 2012-2014. Institutional and individual approaches to this phenomenon form the basis of understanding the mechanisms used for the mobilization and recruitment of foreign fighters. The former refers to a terrorist institution that plays a key role in the recruitment of individuals (top-down/institutional), and the latter refers to the self-radicalization process that foreign fighters undergo (bottom-up/ individual). In particular, the research focuses on an analysis of Islamic State and the recruitment/mobilization of sixteen foreign fighters from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, France, and the United Kingdom. The analysis shows that both top-down and bottom-up concepts are important but that the extent to which each is used depends on the profiles of the country in question. The study concludes by demonstrating the comparative value of top-down and bottom-up approaches in terms of understanding contemporary terrorist recruitment and providing policy recommendations.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">83</style></section></record></records></xml>