<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David Matsaberidze</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Competing Strategies: The Russian Federation vs. the European Union and the United States through Georgia and Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53-66</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article analyzes the shaping and transformation of the post-Soviet security thinking of Georgia and Ukraine in the context of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in the near abroad, often designated as a legitimate sphere of Russian influence, and the competition between Russia and the EU and the US in the region. After the Rose Revolution of Georgia and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, these two countries’ independent/pro-Western orientation became the main issues securitized by the Russian Federation. Correspondingly, the preservation of territorial integrity became the top security issue for Georgia (since the early 1990s), and it became so for Ukraine after the Crimean occupation (March 2014) and the renewed armed hostilities across the entirety of Ukraine since February 2022. The changes in the internal politics of these countries were transposed into the international competition between Russia and the EU/US, expressed through the clash of “Sovereign Democracy” and “Color Revolution” paradigms for the future of post-Soviet states in the 2010s and transformed into active military measures in Ukraine since 2020s and through the so-called creeping annexation of Georgia since 2010s. Practically, these are the tools of maintaining the Russian influence on the one hand and opposing the Western values and power influence, supported firstly by the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership projects and secondly by granting candidate status to Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s military actions against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-2023), a response to the soft power applied by the West, aimed at the creation of buffer zones in the shape of “frozen conflicts,” which could be used as indirect leverage in the hands of the Russian Federation to block the Western aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pàl Dunay</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arms Control Arrangements under the Aegis  of the OSCE: Is There a Better Way to Handle Compliance?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">arms control</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CFE</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">compliance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSBMs</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military exercises</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Open Skies Treaty</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">verification</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57-71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The CSCE-OSCE has strong legacy in conventional arms control both as far as limitations and reductions and constraints on military activities. Although the last two decades since 1999 did not add much to the arms control acquis and there was a “retreat” in arms control with the suspension of the CFE Treaty. It is Germany that keeps European conventional arms control on the agenda as part of security dialogue since the Harmel Report of 1967 and takes symbolic initiatives as a demonstration. Although compliance is not full and some activities demonstrate the intention to cheat, their level is more important as part of the communication of the main parties rather than of direct strategic significance.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mariusz Fryc</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">From Wales to Warsaw and Beyond: NATO’s Strategic Adaptation to the Russian Resurgence on Europe’s Eastern Flank</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45-65</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The term hybrid warfare has been widely analyzed by scholars, policymakers and commentators since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. The topic has ceased to be a subject only studied by military strategists, but has entered the wider policy domain as a significant security challenge for the West. This article seeks to place the debate about hybrid warfare in a broader analytical and historical context and summarizes discussion to date on this and related strategic concepts. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine is a particular focus for discussion.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record></records></xml>