<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olayinka Ajala</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interorganizational Cooperation and the Fight against Terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">balance of threat theory</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boko Haram</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chad</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counterterrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">MNJTF</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nigeria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">48</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97-114</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left:19.85pt;&quot;&gt;The transnational nature of security threats in the 21st Century are such that interorganizational cooperation is necessary to effectively combat these threats. This article explores a key organization, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), charged with curtailing the threat posed by terrorism in certain parts of the Sahel and West Africa. Using the theoretical framework of Walt&amp;rsquo;s balance of threat and a combination of data obtained from ACLED and expert interviews, the article argues that the MNJTF has not been successful in achieving its mandate. This could be attributed to five lapses in the restructuring of the organization in 2015 to combat terrorism. The article concludes that for interorganizational security cooperation to be successful, the allies must equally acknowledge that they face the same existential threats which will make them commit to the demands of the organisation.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Manni Crone</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State’s Incursion into North Africa and Sahel: A Threat to al-Qaeda?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boko Haram</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libya</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">North Africa</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sahel</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sinai Province</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63-76</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article examines Islamic State’s expansion into North Africa and Sahel and the subsequent rivalry between Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb − the regional Al Qaeda group. Although IS managed to establish a province in Libya from 2014 through 2016, its presence in North Africa and Sahel (Libya, Sinai, Nigeria) is fragile. AQIM in contrast has a longstanding presence in the region, which appears to be much more consolidated. The rivalry between IS and AQ in this region has incited AQ splinter-groups to unite around AQIM, and in 2016 these groups stepped up their attacks on Western targets.
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