<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mustafa Aydin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Turkey’s Caucasus Policies, 2000-2022</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Caucasus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">energy resources</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">geopolitics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interdependence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Turkey</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">79-90</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The emergence of newly independent states in the Caucasus at the end of the Cold War presented challenges to Turkey while enlarging its role. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the century-old Soviet/Russian threat, simultaneously creating a power vacuum on Turkey’s borders. While Turkey had traditionally avoided involvement in regional politics, it has since been drawn into the volatile new politics of the region. In this environment, Turkey became an important actor in the region due to its strong historical ties, the attraction of its geographic position linking the region to Europe, and its economic, political, and security relationships with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Over the past thirty years, Turkey has become one of the prominent players in a region where its involvement has again increased recently after the Second Karabakh War. Although its re-engagement with Armenia is progressing slowly, and geopolitical changes and economic and political conditions in the region are unlikely to stabilize for some years, it is evident that Turkey will continue to create new networks of interdependency between Ankara and the regional capitals.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ivan A. Babin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anton Chablin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aleksei Kazantsev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mohammed A. Khesham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yuri V. Vasiliyev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frederic Labarre</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Countering Radicalism in the North Caucasus</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Caucasus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civil society</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mass media</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">radicalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">religion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61-76</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 19.85pt; text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;This article is an abridged version of the proceedings of the PfP Consortium&amp;rsquo;s Conflict Studies Working Group (CSWG) workshop which took place in Berlin, 7-9 November 2016. The workshop, entitled &amp;ldquo;Countering Radical Islamism in the North Caucasus&amp;rdquo; welcomed representatives of Germany, Poland, Romania, Russia, including of course the North Caucasus. It was organized by the PfP Consortium at the behest of Ivan A. Babin, director of the Center for Scientific and Social Innovation (Stavropol, Russia) and Baron Udo von Massenbach, president of the German-American Business Association. Carmen Rijnoveanu presided the conference.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 19.85pt; text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;The workshop&amp;rsquo;s aim was to highlight the gravity of Islamic radicalization in the North Caucasus, and treat it as a symptom of wider geopolitical and social upheavals worldwide. In putting the accent on the scope of the challenge, our Russian guests were also stressing that the successful defeat of movements like DAESH requires East-West cooperation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 19.85pt; text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;This cooperation should help open dialogue between the great powers in our Ukraine and Syria-fueled &amp;ldquo;Cold War.&amp;rdquo; Urgency and cooperation are some of the themes that motivate each presentation in the workshop. This paper has collected presentations that were representative of its intent. They are presented here translated and edited, with the understanding that the opinions they represent are those of the authors only, and in no way reflect that of any government or organization. Each piece is identified by its proponent, and all the pieces are interspersed with short commentaries designed to bring unity to the whole document.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Flemming Splidsboel Hansen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jihad in Russian</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Caucasus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Uighurs</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-86</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">While Russia’s military involvement in the war in Syria has received great attention, less focus has been directed at the foreign fighters from Russia and other post-Soviet states who have joined the Islamic State and other Jihadist groups. The emergence of these Jihadists has been a gradual process, which began in the 1990s, and it has now led to a situation where an estimated 7,000 Russians and 3,000 Central Asians are fighting in Syria. These figures present a challenge for the various states fighting the Jihadist groups, but they pose a much greater problem for the Russian and other national authorities, who will have to handle the fighters, when they return home.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77</style></section></record></records></xml>