<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John Nelson</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Developing a NATO Intermediate Force Capabilities Concept</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Concept Development &amp; Experimentation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Electronic Warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Non-Lethal Directed Energy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67-84</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;NATO faces a military problem: adversaries are undertaking acts of aggression that deliberately stay below the lethal force threshold or that ensure a lethal response from NATO incurring costs&amp;mdash;undesired escalation, risks of collateral damage including civilian casualties, negative narratives, and other adverse strategic or political outcomes&amp;mdash;to the Alliance. Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC)&amp;mdash;active means (non-lethal weapons, particularly non-lethal directed energy, cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, and other effectors) beyond presence but below lethal thresholds&amp;mdash;help solve this problem. SAS-151 and Allied Command Transformation developed and conducted wargames and IFC Concept Development Workshops that demonstrated the ways in which IFC improve NATO&amp;rsquo;s ability to deter, counter, and defeat adversaries via: &lt;em&gt;Enhanced Engagement&lt;/em&gt;: If fielded and incorporated into tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), IFC can enable lethal engagements by isolating, stopping, or moving targets to positions of advantage, also, reversible (and in many cases unseen) effects allow for earlier employment, including potential autonomous/AI use of IFC where lethal capabilities would require human-inthe-loop; &lt;em&gt;Tempo/Initiative&lt;/em&gt;: Instead of adversaries dictating the time and place of engagements, IFC help NATO gain/maintain the initiative by suppressing, imposing delays, and making adversaries reactive (even inactive); &lt;em&gt;Active means across the Competition Continuum&lt;/em&gt;: NATO needs to develop, acquire, and effectively employ IFC across the continuum to win engagements, impose costs on the adversary, and win the narrative.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Predrag Tasevski</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Macedonian Path Towards Cybersecurity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">establishment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Macedonia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">MKD-CIRT</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategy</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109-119</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Information and communication technologies in Macedonia have experienced a phenomenal growth throughout the last decades, which has had a tremendous impact on governmental services&amp;rsquo; presence in the Internet, as well as on everyday life. Against this background, technologies-based growth introduces new risks and threats to the cyber domain in the country. To respond to those challenges the Macedonian government is pursing the establishment of a national authority to react to cyber attacks that occur, or a Computer Incident Response Team &amp;ndash; MKD-CIRT, and the adoption of a National Cybersecurity Strategy. However, it should be taken into account that such tasks are neither easy nor simple. There are several issues that should be considered, for instance: the improvement of the measures for protection of information systems and of the critical infrastructure; the legal and policy framework; the international approach; and the formation of a cybersecurity culture, to name but a few. Simultaneously, considering that Macedonia is a candidate for accession to the EU and NATO, it has to comply with their standards when performing the reforms in the cybersecurity field. The current article briefly introduces the country&amp;rsquo;s steps towards cybersecurity, provides an analysis of the legal, policy and institutional progress achieved, and suggests recommendations that should be considered to ensure safer, secure, trustworthy and resilient cyber space in the country.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sabina Baraković</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jasmina Baraković Husić</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">“We Have Problems for Solutions”: The State of Cybersecurity in Bosnia and Herzegovina</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bosnia and Herzegovina</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">131-154</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The Internet and information communication technologies (ICT) became the most important components in everyday life, given the fact that they have altered the behaviour patterns and in many aspects made our lives simpler. Upcoming Internet of Things (IoT) will additionally have a positive influence on our Quality of Life (QoL). However, even now, the society is extremely vulnerable to disturbances that may affect the functioning of the Internet and ICT systems, and thereby jeopardize the reliability and security of the information they contain. The situation tends to become even more complicated when IoT takes effect and cyber threats exceed the perimeter of information security and include physical security, existence and health. The world has shyly started to raise questions and perceive problems regarding the IoT, QoL and security issues that it will bring to the cyber space in order to find the appropriate solutions in time. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as any other modern country, needs to take place in these processes and newly opened research fields. Therefore, this paper gives an overview of Bosnia and Herzegovina&amp;rsquo;s existing cyber security infrastructure and capacities in terms of legislation, security management structure, corresponding cyber security units, as well as their cooperation and qualification level. Based on the elaborated, the cyber security is not among the priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, the country &amp;ldquo;offers&amp;rdquo; problems for adequate and generally accepted solutions in the cyber security domain and needs to work on its readiness to contribute to the safety of IoT and cyber space, and consequently improving citizens&amp;rsquo; QoL.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Uwe Nerlich</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Challenges in a 2035 Perspective: Roles for the EU as a Global Security Provider?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">energy security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU decision-making</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU missions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foresight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">maritime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">progressive framing</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">space</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threats</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-87</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Within the 2035 timeframe Europe and EU will need throughout to re¬spond to impacts from changing global environments, i.e. above all to adapt inter¬nal structures and to widen collective mission profiles (“progressive framing”). The European Security Strategy (ESS), the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) and the Re¬port on the Implementation of the ESS identified emerging key threats. Both strat¬egy and capability developments—for cyber, energy security, maritime security, space, CBRN, etc.—will require consistent effort and new approaches. The roles Europe could assume as a global security provider will determine Europe’s future. Plausible future EU missions are examined in this paper in a global context and in view of risks and challenges on a global scale.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77</style></section></record></records></xml>