<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John Nelson</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Developing a NATO Intermediate Force Capabilities Concept</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Concept Development &amp; Experimentation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Electronic Warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Non-Lethal Directed Energy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67-84</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;NATO faces a military problem: adversaries are undertaking acts of aggression that deliberately stay below the lethal force threshold or that ensure a lethal response from NATO incurring costs&amp;mdash;undesired escalation, risks of collateral damage including civilian casualties, negative narratives, and other adverse strategic or political outcomes&amp;mdash;to the Alliance. Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC)&amp;mdash;active means (non-lethal weapons, particularly non-lethal directed energy, cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, and other effectors) beyond presence but below lethal thresholds&amp;mdash;help solve this problem. SAS-151 and Allied Command Transformation developed and conducted wargames and IFC Concept Development Workshops that demonstrated the ways in which IFC improve NATO&amp;rsquo;s ability to deter, counter, and defeat adversaries via: &lt;em&gt;Enhanced Engagement&lt;/em&gt;: If fielded and incorporated into tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), IFC can enable lethal engagements by isolating, stopping, or moving targets to positions of advantage, also, reversible (and in many cases unseen) effects allow for earlier employment, including potential autonomous/AI use of IFC where lethal capabilities would require human-inthe-loop; &lt;em&gt;Tempo/Initiative&lt;/em&gt;: Instead of adversaries dictating the time and place of engagements, IFC help NATO gain/maintain the initiative by suppressing, imposing delays, and making adversaries reactive (even inactive); &lt;em&gt;Active means across the Competition Continuum&lt;/em&gt;: NATO needs to develop, acquire, and effectively employ IFC across the continuum to win engagements, impose costs on the adversary, and win the narrative.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Suzanne Waldman</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sean Havel</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Launching Narrative into the Information Battlefield</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">narrative</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic communication</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">111-122</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">It has long been understood that competition in the narrative battlefield impacts outcomes on the physical battlefield. The impact of narrative only increases in our era of gray zone narrative warfare conducted via social media. Valid norms constrain democratic militaries from developing forms of narrative competencies that autocratic states have available for use – namely, those involving fictionalization, misattribution, and other forms of deception. To compete in the narrative battlefield, democratic militaries should enhance their capability for disseminating truthful, close-to-real-time, extended stories of military activities with real-world, value-based stakes, crafted using age-old formulas of characterization and plot to appeal to wide as well as targeted audiences.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">111</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oleg Manko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yurii Mikhieiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Based on the Analysis of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">media</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-20</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">There is no generally accepted definition of ‘Hybrid Warfare.’ Often, authors used the term depending on the particular context and the issue at stake. This article reviews the variety of views on the definition of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare,’ suggests an up-to-date interpretation of the concept, and identifies key characteristics of conflicts involving this type of warfare.
It has been found that an information-psychological element forms the basis of ‘hybrid warfare’ with the aim to influence primarily public consciousness, rather than the armed forces or State’s infrastructure. Moreover, it has been identified that the indicated threats are of ambiguous nature, and thus it is difficult to single out, detect and identify them in order to organize an appropriate response. The authors note that the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ has originated in the realm of special forces’ operations in geopolitical terms by integrating the experience of severe confrontations threatening international security, combating terrorism and extremism of state and non-state actors.
Along with the features of ‘hybrid warfare,’ the authors elaborate on its components and types, i.e. information warfare, cyber warfare, asymmetric warfare, task force hostilities, terrorist activities, urban guerrilla warfare, signs of humanitarian war, signs of ethnic conflict, trade war, etc. It has been proved that information operations’ planning is a significant component of the inter-agency approach to the decision-making under conditions of a new type of war – ‘hybrid’ war.
</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ruslan Hryshchuk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Katerina Molodetska-Hrynhchuk</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Methodological Foundation of State’s Information Security in Social Networking Services in Conditions of Hybrid War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information security of the state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">social networking service</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61-79</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">At the present stage of the development of information technologies, social networking services have become a leading means of mass communication with a significant impact on all spheres of public activity. Thanks to its popularity and communication benefits, social networking services are used by leading nations to achieve their own geopolitical goals. Through information operations in social networking services, one can spread manifestations of hostility on national, religious, or ethnic grounds, and thus increase the level of social tension, dissatisfaction with the existing system of governance, etc. That may have further consequences in real social and political life, with the subsequent transition to chaotic social dynamic. Therefore, the provision of state information security in social networking services in the conditions of globalization of the information space and hybridization of military conflicts remains one of the most pressing problems not only for Ukraine, but globally. 

This article analyses the peculiarities of the use of social networking services during the hybrid war with the Russian Federation. It was established that the counterpart party carried out information operations using social bots, informational and information-psychological influence on the actors of virtual communities. In addition to these actions, operations involved actors with the task to enhance the impact of negatory material and destructive propaganda. The authors then elaborate methodological principles of providing information security of the state in social networking services by implementing procedures for detection, assessment and countering threats in the information space. Effectiveness of the proposed methodological principles is achieved by developing timely measures to identify and assess threats, using the natural peculiarities of the interaction of actors in social networking services for the synthesis of controlling influence and artificially managed transition to a definite stable state of information security of the state.</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">William Chim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia’s Digital Awakening</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-17</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been unprecedented in its embrace of modern technology for the execution of its foreign policy and intelligence operation. This article examines Russia&amp;rsquo;s relationship to the internet and computer technology, beginning with the early 1990s and detailing the growth of technology&amp;rsquo;s popularity with the Russian public and Russian government up through 2017. Particular attention is paid to the skill with which Russia&amp;rsquo;s illiberal political institutions and security services exploit the &amp;lsquo;wild west&amp;rsquo; nature of the internet and the manipulable nature of modern technology and media, as well as how and why the West and U.S. failed to anticipate Russia&amp;rsquo;s rise as a digital superpower and continue to fail to counter its dominance.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yuriy Danyk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tamara Maliarchuk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chad Briggs</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid War: High-tech, Information and Cyber Conflicts</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">innovative warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-24</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the advanced technological, information and cyber components of hybrid war and the introduction of suggested countermeasures to counter information and cyber threats and attacks. The main hypothesis of the authors is that revolutionary development and rapid implementation of technologies in innovative ways in all spheres of life facilitate and shape the basis for the transformation of theoretical and practical paradigms of war and conflict. The focus of the article is on the hybrid nature of modern conflict.
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