<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lyubomir Monov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maksim Karev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How to Counter Hybrid Threats?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Decision Support</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Decision-making process</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threat</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">national interest</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">net context</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">113-126</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article introduces the network context and reveals some aspects of the hybrid threats, the decision-making process to counter hybrid threats and three possible options to handle that issue.
In order to discover possible hybrid actions, we need a methodology that considers national interests with major trends and threats with weaknesses and impacts. The implementation of such methodology will provide enough data and information to support decisions, accounting for all instruments of power in an integrated strategic approach.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">113</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Irina Tsertsvadze</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Britain</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Game Theory</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">national interest</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security and defense policy</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">73-86</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article analyzes Britain’s position towards the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union from 1998 to 2016. It considers the reasoning for Britain’s position toward CSDP through posing the research question: Why did Britain backed the launch of the CSDP and then not consistently support all its developments? Using a case study approach, it concentrates on the main developments of the CSDP, which are: launch of the CSDP (1998–1999); development of the operational headquarters (2010–2011); role of Britain in the Libyan crisis, which is not related to the institutional developments, but still is very important as the first real chance for the CSDP to be tested after its launch. 
   Through Putnam’s Two-Level Game Theory, the article seeks to support the twin hypotheses that domestic affairs influence Britain’s decisions towards CSDP, and that developments within the European Union impact on Britain’s position towards CSDP through the interplay with domestic factors.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></section></record></records></xml>