<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bozhidar Ivanov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Contemporary Challenges for Bulgaria in the Changing Black Sea Security Environment</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A2/AD</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-35</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The author presents the results of a study on the evolving security environment in the Black sea region. The focus is on Russia’s Black Sea security policy and the ways in which it combines kinetic and non-kinetic instruments in its hybrid strategy. The militarization of Crimea, in particular, led to the positioning of assertive Russia as the dominant military power in the Black Sea, with all the consequent negative repercussions for littoral and other states in the region. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Dobias</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kyle Christensen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">William Freid</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gaming Intermediate Force Capabilities: Strategic Implications of Tactical Decisions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">kriegsspiel</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">matrix</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-kinetic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wargaming</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97-109</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reviews the development and tests of two Intermediate Force Capability (IFC) concept development hybrid wargames. The first wargame plays out a maritime Task Force’s ability to counter hybrid threats in the grey zone. The second wargame examines the ability of a NATO Task Group, deployed to a third country to train local security forces, to counter a hostile militia trained and supported by a neighboring country. IFCs offer a class of response between doing nothing and using lethal force in a situation that would be politically unpalatable. As such, the aim of the wargame series is to evaluate whether IFCs can make a difference to mission success against hybrid threats in the grey zone. This wargame series was particularly important because it used traditional game mechanics in a unique and innovative way to evaluate and assess IFC’s effects on strategic mission success. Specifically, the hybrid wargame series has demonstrated that IFCs have a high probability of filling the gap between doing nothing and using lethal force. IFCs have the potential to improve operational effectiveness by allowing for more restrained use of force to escalate/de-escalate a situation and increasing decision time and space for tactical decision-makers. Both counter-personnel and counter-materiel capabilities (including miniaturization) are needed to act effectively in the current hybrid threat environment.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Dobias</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kyle Christensen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The 'Grey Zone' and Hybrid Activities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A2/AD</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">anti-access</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">area denial</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">competition continuum</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conventional conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-kinetic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threshold</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41-54</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Military operations in the grey zone (defined here as the space between peace and war where states are currently involved in a competition continuum) present a unique challenge for military planners. Potential adversaries—well aware of NATO’s conventional lethal capabilities—have been using the space below the lethal threshold of conflict with impunity to further their objectives. To re-establish effective deterrence, it is imperative that NATO develops the ability to deny its adversaries the ability to act freely in this zone below conventional conflict. That requires imposing a cost on hostile actors acting below the lethal threshold of open conflict, across multiple domains, from the tactical through the operational to the strategic level. Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC) are the kind of tools that provide effective means of response below the lethal threshold both tactically and operationally and can effectively shape the environment across domains up to the strategic level.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Alfredo M. Ronchi</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Human Factor, Resilience, and Cyber/Hybrid Influence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">artificial intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberwarfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">machine learning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">soft concerns</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221-239</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The aim of this article is to depict some of the impacts of the ongoing digital transition on security, considering human factors, resilience, cyber and hybrid threats. After a short description of literature and related works, the article focuses on the term “security” to better clarify the meaning, then introduces the process of digital transition and related aspects including “datafication” and potential harms to cybersecurity and the potential resilience breaches due to the concentration of tasks based on digital technology including production chains and digital manufacturing.
Recently, the digital transformation has had a considerable impact on cybersecurity due to the boost generated by the pandemic and the increasing number of “digitally divided” citizens forced to “go digital” and related need to foster a culture of cybersecurity since the primary schools. This section includes an overview of different approaches to the “securitisation” of cyberspace. Back to security in a broad sense freedom of expression is the first aspect considered, including hate, fake news and propaganda, influence on opinion dynamics potentially applicable to the social and political sectors, as a kind of technological extension the combined use of big data and machine learning to activate nudging as a silent weapon, the risks directly connected to the concentration in few countries of online platforms directly connected with the last topic that is the emerging Internet of behaviour that thanks to the incredible amount of users’ data can monitor ad address citizens’ behaviours.
The list of impacts included will simply provide an idea about some of the potential threats, but they are not limited to this set.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jim Derleth</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jeff Pickler</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Twenty-first Century Threats Require Twenty-first Century Deterrence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">irregular warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-23</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">During the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) after World War II, deterrence emerged as the primary U.S. security strategy. Historically, the USA focused on deterring conventional and nuclear threats. While this helped prevent a direct military conflict between the two superpowers, it did not end their political rivalry, simply pushing it into areas that decreased the risk of open military conflict. During the Cold War, both the USA and USSR used irregular tactics to try and achieve their strategic objectives in the grey zone, the area below the threshold for “use of force” or “armed attack” as described in the United Nations Charter. Technology limited the effectiveness of irregular tactics, not considered significant national security threats. Today, a globalized, interconnected, and ubiquitous information environment provides numerous opportunities for adversaries to achieve strategic objectives without crossing the strategic threshold that would have historically provoked a military response.
      An increase in irregular attacks shows that while deterrence has continued to prevent large-scale military conflict between the major powers, it has failed to prevent aggression in the grey zone. From the Baltics to the Caucuses, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated how irregular tactics can achieve strategic objectives without fear of an unacceptable counteraction. Trends in national power, interdependence, and technology suggest Russia and other adversaries will continue to increase their ability to exploit the grey zone vulnerabilities. A deterrence policy focused solely on conventional and nuclear forces is no longer sufficient. To deter irregular tactics, the United States must develop a 21st-century deterrence strategy. This need will only grow as Russia tries to offset its military failures in Ukraine. With Russian conventional forces weakened, Russia will increasingly rely on irregular tactics to attack its adversaries. This paper examines the declining relevance of traditional conventional and nuclear-focused deterrence strategies and argues that deterrence should be modified to remain relevant against 21st-century threats.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philipp Fluri</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Concept of Resilience: Security Implications and Implementation Challenges</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">concept</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disaster risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">maturity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peacebuilding</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">police force</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">postconflict reconstruction</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sendai Framework</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">stabilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">theory</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-12</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aiming for a more effective and efficient response to diverse and multidimensional threats, an increasing number of defense and security organizations, the United Nations, NATO, and the EU embrace the concept of resilience in their security strategies and policies. This article provides a brief overview of the concept, a sample of definitions used in policy documents, and the types of problems they seek to resolve. Then we introduce the reader to the 15 articles published in the Summer and Fall 2020 issues of Connections that present the evolution of the concept of resilience and its implementation by and within political, defense, and law enforcement organizations, as well as its anticipated contribution to cybersecurity, disaster preparedness, peacebuilding, post-conflict restoration and countering hybrid threats.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ralitsa Kovacheva</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Threats in Bulgarian Media</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid attacks</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">media</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">politics</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">333-348</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article presents the results of a recent study aimed at revealing how the term “hybrid threats” (or its synonyms “hybrid attacks,” “hybrid war,” etc.) is used in Bulgarian public discourse. 688 articles published by 188 media outlets were registered and processed by the method of content analysis. The results show that the term “hybrid threats” is mostly mentioned and not discussed in substance; it is often unclear what exactly the speakers mean by using the term “hybrid threats”; specific narratives are constructed, where the term “hybrid threats” is completely removed from its meaning by definition and loaded with different connotations.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">333</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nikolai Stoianov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">George Sharkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Integrative  Approach to Understand Vulnerabilities and Enhance the Security of  Cyber-Bio-Cognitive-Physical Systems</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, ECCWS 2019</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">bio-integrated systems</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cyber-physical system</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Decision-making</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">System of systems</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4 -5 July 2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ECCWS</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Coimbra, Portugal</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019-July</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">492-500</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Rapid technological advances provide numerous benefits to our ways of work and leisure, banking and transportation, delivery of products and health assistance. The increased interconnectedness among devices, people, networks, and systems, however, introduces a level of complexity surpassing the experience accumulated so far. While the security of communications, network and information systems can be considered a well-established discipline, the study of security of cyber-physical systems is fairly recent. Furthermore, the dependencies of live organisms, including humans, with integrated sensors and electronics, of perceptions and cognition, and variety of drones on influences from cyberspace have been subject of only few, mostly incidental studies. The interdependencies among cyber, physical, biological systems, and humans in situation assessment and decision-making roles create new potential vectors of attack by malicious actors. If exploited, they will lead to cross impact among domains that are usually studied separately. Authors from three Bulgarian institutions, combining research and policy-making experience, embarked on the task to elaborate a comprehensive cybersecurity research agenda. This paper presents their concept for an integrative approach to the exploration of &amp;lsquo;systems of systems.&amp;rsquo; The study is structured along five domains: communications and information systems and networks; cyber-physical system; bio-integrated systems; cognitive processes, i.e. the processes of shaping perceptions, assessing a certain situation and options and making decisions; and drones, remotely controlled or autonomous, the latter case being particularly reliant on advances in artificial intelligence. This paper outlines the problem of vulnerability of each of the five domains to influences from cyber space. Then it presents some advances in cross-domain understanding of vulnerabilities, supported by examples of cybersecurity studies, and provides the outlines of a corresponding, interdisciplinary research agenda, built around the concept of systems of systems. The authors conclude by predicting that the field of cybersecurity will be subject to considerable growth in coming years, requiring multi-and inter-disciplinary competencies and scientific support. &amp;copy; 2019, Curran Associates Inc. All rights reserved.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stefan Hadjitodorov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Martin Sokolov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Blending New-generation Warfare and Soft Power: Hybrid Dimensions of Russia-Bulgaria Relations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">soft power</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-20</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In order to effectively counter hybrid warfare, it is necessary to understand it. However, certain aspects of hybrid warfare are often confused with traditional soft power. This article aims to highlight the differences between the two by analyzing the relationship between Bulgaria and Russia. The latter enjoys considerable opportunities to exercise soft power, but often must accompany them with hybrid means. Yet, labeling everything as hybrid warfare becomes detrimental to the topic itself. Moreover, it runs the risk of ascribing greater power to the Kremlin which may not truly be the case. The aim of the authors is to expose the threats, opportunities, and limits of Russian influence in Bulgaria and the possible outcomes.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Emil Eftimov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Building a Potential to Counteract Hybrid Threats through Cooperation and Regional Security</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international military cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mediterranean Dialogue</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13-20</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The main goal of this article is to present and discuss the opportunities to deepen cooperation between the Alliance and partners in countering hybrid threats. The focus is put on the eastern and southern NATO flanks, where the most advanced partner formats like Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialog (MD) have been developed. The first conclusion is that NATO partnership programs and the various initiatives in the interest of the partners are aimed at achieving stability in the periphery of the Alliance by increasing partners’ resilience to various types of threats. In addition, the author argues that success in countering hybrid threats in the current security environment is impossible without parallel and coordinated action of NATO in coordination with other international organizations, especially the European Union.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Orlin NIKOLOV</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Building Societal Resilience against Hybrid Threats</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre of Excellence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil-Military Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disaster response</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interagency cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Protection of Civilians</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk reduction. Technical architecture</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Societal Resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91-109</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article addresses the efforts of NATO to improve societal resilience in the fight against hybrid threats. It examines hybrid threats as a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyber warfare. From another point of view, the article sees over establishing a safe and secure environment for protection of civilians, as well as how to improve resilience through civil preparedness and tailored NATO support to national authorities. NATO requires a concept to be developed that operationalizes the NATO Policy with emphasis on its implementation through the planning and conduct of operations, training, education and exercises, lessons learned, as well as defence related capacity building activities. The article tackles the question of using the Centres of Excellence as an education and training network in building resilience in society against threats, including hybrid threats and protection of civilians.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kiril Avramov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">By Another Way of Deception: The Use of Conspiracy Theories as a Foreign Policy Tool in the Arsenal of the Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conspiracy theories</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">deception</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">151-161</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article provides analysis of the spread, specifics, usage and ‘mechanics’ of proliferation of the so-called ‘conspiracy theories’—an informational aspect of the hybrid warfare—as an offensive disinformation dissemination weapon for pressuring political decision-makers in selected countries at critical junctures.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyara Zhekova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Communication between the Defence Sector and the Civil Society of Bulgaria as a Way to Build Capacity for Countering Hybrid Threats</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civil society</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence Sector</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The choice of the topic for this article has been provoked first and foremost by the growing significance of the problem. If we look further into the essence of the matter, we should analyse a number of normative and state documents and publications, as well as various close-ups of the relations between the state and the civil society at both national and international levels. The author does realize the gravity of such study and due to the limitations imposed by the circumstances she will focus on the processes of management of information and communication between the defence sector and the civil society in Bulgaria in view of the White Book on Defence and Armed Forces and the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria.
</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyara Zhekova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Communication between the Defence Sector and the Civil Society of Bulgaria as a Way to Build Capacity for Countering Hybrid Threats</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civil society</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence Sector</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51-59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The choice of the topic for this article has been provoked by the growing significance of the hybrid threats. To understand the impact of hybrid threats, one should analyse a number of normative and state documents and publications, as well as various aspects of the relations between the state and the civil society at both national and international levels. In this article, the author focuses on the processes of management of information and communication between the defence sector and the civil society in Bulgaria in view of the White Book on Defence and Armed Forces and the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria and their contribution to the national capacity to counter hybrid threats.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gergana Mitalova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive Institutional Approach to Developing Capabilities to Counter Hybrid Threats: Legal and Doctrinal Limitations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capability development</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">collaboration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">doctrinal limitations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">legal constraints</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127-135</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">There are few legal instruments addressing the issue of hybrid conflict and threats. Predominantly, they are laid down in international humanitarian law and are overlooked in the states’ legal systems. Nowadays, a fully new comprehensive institutional approach to the development of capabilities to counter hybrid threats is needed – an approach at multiple levels, multinational and interdisciplinary, intertwining the achievements known so far with up-to-date innovations.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yantsislav Yanakiev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Petko Dimov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Daniel Bachvarov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Conceptualizing the Role of Societal Resilience in Countering Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil-Military Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disaster response</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interagency cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk reduction</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Social Resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Societal Resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-89</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">No single tool is available to counter the diversity and complexity of hybrid threats, examined by the authors as a as a military strategy that blends conventional war-fare, irregular warfare, and cyber warfare. The concept of hybrid warfare is used to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battlespace requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response. Reflecting on recent NATO policies and documents, this article looks into the importance of strengthening societal resilience, understood as the ability of a state, organization or society to absorb and recover from a shock.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Teodora Georgieva</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Plamen Petkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Expert Framework for Measuring the Institutional Capabilities to Counter Hybrid Threats: Empirical Data Analysis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">data analysis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">empirical analysis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">expert assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutional capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">national security functions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">national security system</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">237-254</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This article presents results of the analysis of the institutional capabilities to counter hybrid threats. The results are based on assessments made by Bulgarian experts and provide a perspective on the development of institutional capabilities to execute national security system&amp;rsquo;s functions. The analysis leads to a conclusion that the country is capable to effectively counteract the potential hybrid threats, provided that the identification of the threats happens at an early stage and the strategy of counteracting is built on a realistic assessment of existing institutional capabilities, possibilities for their flexible use, and offsetting their deficits.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lychezar Milushev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stoycho Panev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Threats, Challenges and Possibilities for Building Institutional Capabilities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">challenges</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrated security system</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">143-148</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article identifies threats to the national security that have occurred in recent years. Some of the threats go beyond the traditional concepts and can be used for hybrid warfare. The authors seek an answer to the question what are the challenges, posed by the hybrid threats, and to identify possibilities for building institutional capabilities for countering such threats. The emphasis is placed on comprehensiveness, resilience, inter-agency and international operation.

</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Carol Atkinson</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare and Societal Resilience: Implications for Democratic Governance</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democratic governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">surveillance</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63-76</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This article examines the changing nature of warfare and the implications for democratic governance. The first section describes &amp;ldquo;hybrid warfare&amp;rdquo; &amp;ndash; the central concept used by NATO to characterize modern war. It looks at the evolution of the concept, how it is defined, and some disputes over its ability to accurately capture the essence of modern war. In NATO, the concept of &amp;ldquo;hybrid warfare&amp;rdquo; is used to analyze and characterize Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea; however, the Russian military thinks a bit differently about modern warfare and does not use the term to characterize its own actions. Thus, in the second section, the article examines the difference in Russian military thinking from that of the West. One of the main differences is the role and nature of cyber operations. Cyber operations, especially influence campaigns that include propaganda, disinformation, and &amp;ldquo;winning hearts and minds,&amp;rdquo; are key &amp;lsquo;irregular&amp;rsquo; components of hybrid warfare that seek decision through influencing the beliefs, values, and collective identity of the opponent&amp;rsquo;s population. Finally, in its third section, the article argues that the ability of any democratic country to counter hybrid threats, in large part, depends on the willingness of its citizens to support government policies that ultimately undermine the basic freedoms that define what it means to be a democratic country. The author suggests that democratic governance is being undermined by the policies that democratic countries, with the support of their citizens, institute in order to combat hybrid threats, particularly cyber threats.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Research Topics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interdisciplinary research</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multidisciplinary studies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">nonlinearity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">289-300</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article elaborates on four emerging research topics, considered of key importance for the understanding of and finding effective countermeasures to hybrid threats: (1) exploring the interlinked dynamics of a conflict developing in parallel in the physical world and on social networks; (2) analysing the expanding involvement of private actors who serve as proxies for an assertive state; (3) exploring the vulnerabilities of national security systems to hybrid influence and finding effective countermeasures; and (4) designing an architecture that allows to study the problem of hybrid threats holistically by providing interoperability among domain-specific or cross-domain models, or ‘use cases,’ and the respective data. All these require multi- and interdisciplinary research and consistent accumulation, verification and sharing of data, case studies and models.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dobrin Mahlyanov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internet of Things – A New Attack Vector for Hybrid Threats</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">attacks against IoT.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internet of Things</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IoT</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Security in IoT</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">175-182</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The means of conducting hybrid warfare are rapidly changing. IoT is a recent sphere of activity, opening new opportunities for hybrid influence. Consisting of three main building blocks, IoT inherits all security problem specific to each one of them and introduces some new ones. This article describes in brief the main issues concerning security in IoT and ways of using it for creating hybrid threats. All of the described problems can be used for escalation in different areas. The article presents also a simple definition of what is a (relatively) secure IoT system and an original concept for reducing vulnerabilities in the IoT environment.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marcin Kozieł</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO’s Defense Institution Building in the Age of Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capacity building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DIB</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39-51</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building (DIB) plays a crucial role in NATO’s “Projecting Stability” agenda by assisting Partners in developing their defense and security sectors, thereby increasing not only their security, but also that of the Euro-Atlantic region. At the same time, the current security environment is defined by complex and diffuse threats coming from both state and non-state actors, where the adversary aims at incapacitating the state. For this reason, increasing the resilience of the defense and security institutions against the hybrid threats in particular is key – a reality which should inform adaptation of the NATO’s DIB instruments. 
This article discusses a number of key implications of the hybrid warfare for NATO’s DIB policies and processes, emphasizing that capacity building should aim to help the state institutions increase their ability to recognize and respond to hybrid warfare and, if necessary, to sustain the functioning of the state and its institutions under hybrid warfare conditions.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yantsislav Yanakiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Promoting Interagency and International  Cooperation in Countering Hybrid Threats</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil-Military Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interagency cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Societal Resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-10</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The editorial article summarises the achievements of the International conference titled &amp;ldquo;Interagency and International Cooperation in Countering Hybrid Threats.&amp;rdquo; The articles in this volume cover a broad range of issues related to NATO, EU and national experiences in the research and practical activities in countering hybrid warfare.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chris Deliso</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Security Risks Relating to the Migrant Crisis and Interagency Cooperation: The Case of Macedonia and Bulgaria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">illegal migration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interagency cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">psychological warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21-27</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The migrant crisis in the Balkans from 2015-2016 is examined as an example of a hybrid-warfare scenario in contemporary Europe that demonstrates how institutionally-driven security responses that can be applied to successfully counter hybrid threats. Analyzing the experience of Macedonia and Bulgaria, the author identifies five types of security threats that were witnessed along the Balkan route during the migrant crisis. Migrant flows can be infiltrated by potential terrorist for the purposes of simple transit and/or attack scenarios. Organized crime, e.g. by combining human trafficking with other illegal activities, is the second security risk. Thirdly, hostile intelligence penetration of migrant inflows was a very serious hybrid threat, given the opacity of the phenomenon, i.e., the inability to distinguish ‘who is who’ and what their intentions are. Fourth, the presence of pro-migrant activist and anarchist groups with a track record of violent behavior was a persistent threat as it could be multiplied by participation of large numbers of migrants in concentrated efforts against state borders. Finally, the security situation was affected by the important, and yet often forgotten, psychological warfare. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></section></record></records></xml>