<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vladimir Sklyar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cyber Security of Safety-Critical Infrastructures: A Case Study for Nuclear Facilities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information security standards</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NPP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">nuclear power plant</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stuxnet.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">98-107</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computers have become crucial to the operations of government and business. Critical infrastructure protection policy has evolved since the mid-1990’s. Since 11 September 2001, the critical link between cyberspace and physical space has been increasingly recognized. Presently, critical infrastructure sectors face various cyber threats. In particular, the electrical power infrastructure is the most critical infrastructure upon which other infrastructures depend. Cyber attacks on energy production and distribution systems could endanger public health and safety, damage the environment, and have serious financial implications, such as loss of production, generation, or distribution of public utilities; compromise proprietary information; or bring liability issues.  Government and private sector computer security is affected by various laws, but not all laws reflect newly emerging challenges. At the same, time poor systems management can be costly and disruptive. This paper presents an approach allowing to implement, manage and maintain cyber security program for Instrumentation and Control (I&amp;C) systems of Nuclear Power plants (NPP). It is based on existing standards’ requirements consideration of issues specific to the security of Field Programmable Gates Arrays (FPGA).</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eugene Brezhnev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Formalizing Power Grid Influence to Assess the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">formalization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">impact</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">influence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NPP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">nuclear power plant</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Power grid safety</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">risk assessment.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65-78</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">After the Fukushima nuclear accident the problem of safe interaction between a nuclear power plant and the power grid requires urgent attention. The Ukrainian power grid is the backbone for stable development of all dependent infrastructures. Nuclear power plants can be seen as elements interacting with the system for power distribution. There are five nuclear power plants (NPP) in Ukraine. The NPP safety depends on the reliability of its subsystems, components, etc., as well as on the safety levels of other power grid subsystems. There are various interdependencies among NPPs and the power grid, which impact the safety levels of both. The balance of these mutual influences is considered as a basis for the stability of any infrastructure. The change of influences could lead to violation of the balance, that in turn may lead to a change in the subsystem’s state. This paper presents an approach for formalization of different types of influences between dependent infrastructures. This approach supports the analysis of the behaviour of infrastructure subsystems and the prediction of their safety levels, considering the change of states. Two metrics are proposed to evaluate the influences: linguistic and numerical. The influence formalization enhances the understanding of risk proliferation and the assurance of NPP safety.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>