<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inna V. Stetsenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maksym Demydenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Signature-based Intrusion Detection Hardware-Software Complex</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SQL injection</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">web attack</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221-231</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nowadays hackers are able to find many software vulnerabilities, which can be exploited for malicious purposes such as to destroy the operating system, to steal users’ private data, to demand a ransom not to affect the data and retain their validity. The majority of attacks use an Internet connection; therefore, the efforts should be directed to the way in which data packets are transmitted. The hardware-software complex, which is the main subject of the presented research, serves as a firewall for the devices on one subnetwork with access to the Internet, simultaneously analysing and filtering both downstream and upstream traffic at packet level, resolving scumware and securing the perimeter of each device in the subnet. The concept and the architecture of the developed hardware-software complex are described. The implemented complex will not allow malicious traffic to pass through, providing protection of all endpoint devices in a subnetwork. The experimental results of malware detected are presented, and the security related metrics are evaluated.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">221</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Research Topics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interdisciplinary research</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multidisciplinary studies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">nonlinearity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">289-300</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article elaborates on four emerging research topics, considered of key importance for the understanding of and finding effective countermeasures to hybrid threats: (1) exploring the interlinked dynamics of a conflict developing in parallel in the physical world and on social networks; (2) analysing the expanding involvement of private actors who serve as proxies for an assertive state; (3) exploring the vulnerabilities of national security systems to hybrid influence and finding effective countermeasures; and (4) designing an architecture that allows to study the problem of hybrid threats holistically by providing interoperability among domain-specific or cross-domain models, or ‘use cases,’ and the respective data. All these require multi- and interdisciplinary research and consistent accumulation, verification and sharing of data, case studies and models.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iosif Androulidakis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andriy Kovalenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Imeca-Based Technique for Security Assessment of Private Communications: Technology and Training</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">availability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">communication</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">confidentiality</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IMECA</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PBX</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threat</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99-120</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nowadays, almost everywhere, there are a huge number of privately owned telephone exchanges that serve the communication needs of a private or public entity making connections among internal telephones and linking them to other users in the public telephone network. Such communications cover most vital infrastructures, including hospitals, ministries, police, army, banks, public bodies/authorities, companies, industries and so on. The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness in regards to security and privacy threats present in private communications, helping both users and vendors safeguard their systems.
This article provides an introduction to private branch exchanges (PBXs) and private communications, and a review of relevant threats and vulnerabilities. Finally, one possible approach to assessment of private communications security is presented, along with appropriate taxonomies. Such approach relies on performing gap analysis and is based on the IMECA technique.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Velichka Milina</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity: A National Strategic Issue</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cybersecurity strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberspace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec reports</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">June 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">108</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The modern information and communication age brought a complex of interdependencies among infrastructures that are essential for society and led to an exponential growth of vulnerabilities and risks. Hence, security of cyberspace turned into one of the most important challenges of Twenty first century, while cybersecurity is already seen as a cross-cutting, strategic national issue that impacts all societal levels. National cybersecurity strategies are expected to provide answers to the novel challenges and to guarantee security of cyberspace. This report provides analysis available national cyber strategies that allows identification of good practices and remaining gaps. For Member States of the European Union it is important to synchronize their national strategies with the EU strategy for cybersecurity.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Michael Dimitrov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why the Organization Needs Information Security Policy and Programme</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">adaptability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information security policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information security programme</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resources</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threat</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">December 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This report outlines the reasons why each organization needs to adopt an information security policy and an information security programme, emphasising the competitive advantages based on improved adaptation capabilities. First, it examines the concept of information security. On that basis, the author represents possible formulation of organizational objectives. The examination of organizational activities in a competitive context allows to formulate specific ways in which information becomes of utmost significance. The report includes examples demonstrating the need to establish an information security policy and an information security programme, including description of threats and vulnerabilities that, unless adequately managed, could decrease the organizational capabilities to achieve their goals.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vladimir Sklyar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cyber Security of Safety-Critical Infrastructures: A Case Study for Nuclear Facilities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information security standards</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NPP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">nuclear power plant</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stuxnet.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">98-107</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computers have become crucial to the operations of government and business. Critical infrastructure protection policy has evolved since the mid-1990’s. Since 11 September 2001, the critical link between cyberspace and physical space has been increasingly recognized. Presently, critical infrastructure sectors face various cyber threats. In particular, the electrical power infrastructure is the most critical infrastructure upon which other infrastructures depend. Cyber attacks on energy production and distribution systems could endanger public health and safety, damage the environment, and have serious financial implications, such as loss of production, generation, or distribution of public utilities; compromise proprietary information; or bring liability issues.  Government and private sector computer security is affected by various laws, but not all laws reflect newly emerging challenges. At the same, time poor systems management can be costly and disruptive. This paper presents an approach allowing to implement, manage and maintain cyber security program for Instrumentation and Control (I&amp;C) systems of Nuclear Power plants (NPP). It is based on existing standards’ requirements consideration of issues specific to the security of Field Programmable Gates Arrays (FPGA).</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anatoliy Gorbenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olga Tarasyuk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Alexander Romanovsky</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intrusion-Avoidance via System Diversity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">diversity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intrusion avoidance.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">154-158</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paper discusses a generic intrusion-avoidance architecture allowing the system architects to decrease the risk of intrusions. The architecture employs software diversity at various system levels and dynamically reconfigures the deployment environment to avoid intrusions. This solution reduces the so-called system’s days-of-risk which is a period of an increased security risk between the time when a vulnerability is publicly disclosed to the time when a patch is available to fix it. To select the less vulnerable system configuration we propose metrics estimating security risks by accounting a number of not-fixed vulnerabilities and their severity.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kateryna Netkachova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Model and Implementation of Safety Case Cores</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ASCE plug-in</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">OTS component assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Safety case core</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">web service</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">286-295</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paper introduces a general concept of Safety Case Core, which is an extension of the Safety Case methodology. The definition of the safety case core is provided, the scope, principles and structure of a core are outlined, and a general set-theoretical model is presented. An approach to tracking and managing vulnerability information, assessing security and reliability characteristics of ready-made software components is discussed. To demonstrate the practical relevance and applicability of the proposed approach, a safety case core for assessing off-the-shelf components is developed. The database schema of the developed safety case core, modelled using the entity-relationship diagram, is presented; the important design and implementation details and techniques are outlined. The integration of the core with ASCE software tool as a plug-in and implementation as a web service for off-the-shelf component assessment are presented.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>