<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sanjay Goel</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How Improved Attribution in Cyber Warfare Can Help De-Escalate Cyber Arms Race</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">attribution</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">confidence-building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber arms race</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87-95</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cyber warfare is a critical component of nation-states’ military arsenals, and a cyber arms race has emerged in the absence of international agreements (norms and confidence-building measures) to limit the use of cyber warfare. One key impediment to building consensus on cyber norms and confidence-building measures is a lack of transparency in cyber weapons development and poor attribution of attack perpetrators. Recently, there has been an improvement in attribution capabilities based on better data collection and the profiling of known hackers and nation states by intelligence agencies, and this should give impetus to efforts to establish confidence-building measures and cyber norms. This article discusses the need for and challenges associated with attribution, recent advances that will lead to better attribution, and the collective responsibility of nation states in addressing these challenges. It suggests several initiatives to reduce chances of cyber conflict, as well as to prevent cyber conflicts from escalating, such as defining clear processes for attribution, creating neutral bodies for incident analysis, and limiting the scope of retaliation based on the confidence in attribution.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">William Chim</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia’s Digital Awakening</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-17</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been unprecedented in its embrace of modern technology for the execution of its foreign policy and intelligence operation. This article examines Russia&amp;rsquo;s relationship to the internet and computer technology, beginning with the early 1990s and detailing the growth of technology&amp;rsquo;s popularity with the Russian public and Russian government up through 2017. Particular attention is paid to the skill with which Russia&amp;rsquo;s illiberal political institutions and security services exploit the &amp;lsquo;wild west&amp;rsquo; nature of the internet and the manipulable nature of modern technology and media, as well as how and why the West and U.S. failed to anticipate Russia&amp;rsquo;s rise as a digital superpower and continue to fail to counter its dominance.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>