<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philipp Fluri</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leonid Polyakov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intelligence and Security Services Reform and Oversight in Ukraine – An Interim Report</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civilian oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DCAF</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EUAM</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">parliamentary oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SSU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state security reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verkhovna Rada</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">VR</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51-59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Though Ukraine was among the first successor states of the Soviet Union to create a legal framework for the activities of its intelligence and security community, said framework addressed inherited and unreformed structures. Subsequent reform plans have not led to the success desired by Ukraine’s international partners and, we must assume, a majority of the Ukrainian voters and taxpayers. Among the reform demands is also the credible subordination to parliamentary oversight, which, though stipulated by law, has effectively been neutralized by reference to subordination to the President in the same law. Who would want to be controlled by an ever-undecided parliament if a personalized oversight by the President and the expert committee of the National Security and Defence Council is the possible alternative? As a consequence, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) remains subject to much criticism – for the corruption of some of its representatives, for overlapping mandates with other security institutions, and for lack of control other than by itself and the changing presidents and their administrations.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maksym Bugriy</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine’s Security Sector Reform: Is Ukraine Taking Western Advice?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity theory</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cynefin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DCAF</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">72-91</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The ongoing Western support to Ukraine’s security sector reform requires the assessment of the reform success. This article considers whether Ukraine’s reform is achieving effectiveness, efficiency, and democratic governance objectives. The author uses a theoretical framework of complexity theory applied to the change management research in organizational studies. The application of this framework is appealing from the perspective of complex and chaotic organizational contexts, in which the security sector can stimulate the emergence of ‘strange attractors’ for system’s adaptability. The findings suggest that Ukraine is building a shared vision following up on chaotic-framed Security Sector Reform acceleration since 2014. The gap between increased confidence in the volunteers and the army and declining confidence in general government institutions, economic burden, and Western cohesion issues constitute the risks that Ukraine’s Europeanization faces.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">72</style></section></record></records></xml>