<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yantsislav Yanakiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Governance Model of a Collaborative Networked Organization for Cybersecurity Research</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CNOs</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Collaborative Networked Organisations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance model</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Science and Technology</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">46</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">79-98</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article presents the results of the analysis of governance and management practices of Collaborative Network Organisations (CNOs) in the Science and Technology domain. The aim is to support the process of de-signing a governance model of a cybersecurity network by identifying best governance and management practices of existing collaborative networks. The results presented in the article are based on the analysis of governance models of three relevant organisations: (1) NATO Science and Technology Organization; (2) the Gigabit European Academic Network; and (3) the European Defence Agency’s Capability Technology Groups. The common ground is that they are regarded as CNOs with a high degree of centralisation of funding streams and a high degree of centralisation of the main business and governance decisions. The method of analysis includes a literature review and desktop research. The information sources used for the analysis are official legal documents about the CNO’s governance and management, especially for potential members and customers’ engagement; organisation and expected competence level and behaviour of CNOs’ members; the charters, decisions, reports issued and approved by the central or regional governance bodies of the organisations.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">79</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Velizar Shalamanov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organising for IT Effectiveness, Efficiency and Cyber Resilience in the Academic Sector: National and Regional Dimensions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">consolidation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">coordination</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance model</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">network governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional cooperation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">49-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article presents an architecture and analysis of the change management aspects of security in public administration, developed as part of a study of best practices in the management of IT organisations with emphasis on effectiveness, efficiency and cyber resilience. The analysis served as a basis for defining a model of academic support to cyber resilience. The implementation envisions use of the BEST environment (Basic/budget Environment for Simulation and Training), which was initially developed for the crisis management domain and later adapted to support organisational and human risks analysis in the cyber domain in research and training activities on cyber resilience. This environment is used for PESTEL analysis of the cyber environment to identify a model for resilience from organisational and human perspective and to support SWOT assessment of the possible implementation paths in order to select the most suitable among all qualified solutions and provide training of the personnel involved. Regional aspects of cyber resilience are addressed in the context of the NATO/EU framework, limited to the academic area. Finally, the article addresses organisational and human aspects and presents a concept of an Academic CERT Association at national level and the possibilities to use it as a model for a regional network.</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">49</style></section></record></records></xml>