<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Venelin Georgiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Productive and Counter-Productive Balance in Security</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">balance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resources</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vulnerabilities</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></number><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The research efforts in the field of security strengthens its relevance in conditions of crises, which are not lacking in modern times. Returning to fundamental questions such as why security is important and what makes it difficult to create an acceptable level of security allows, on the one hand, to reveal some erroneous theses, and on the other hand, to add perspectives in the search for rational answers. The material draws a parallel between two types of security balances, defined as productive and counter-productive. Based on the comparison, challenges to finding balanced solutions to security issues viewed as multifactorial functions are presented.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Venelin Georgiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Conceptual Model for Resilience in the field of Secuirty</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">assets</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">technologies</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">141</style></number><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;It is already understood that security cannot be guaranteed. Numerous examples of security incidents prove that, and direct both researchers and practioners to explore the opportunities for development of security systems that are resilient. A common feature of the resilient systems is that they preserve the functionality of core processes and their supporting assets under perturbations. This report presents the results of a study aiming to deliver a conceptual model of the system for resilience in the field of security, that is supported by theoretical arguments and applicable in practice.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Venelin Georgiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Main Issues and Risks Related to the Provision of Resources for Bulgaria’s Defence Capabilities Development Programme 2032</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence resources</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">development program</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></number><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state are paramount benefits for society, which should be guaranteed by adequate instruments. The defence capabilities are main part of these instruments and therefore their condition attracts the interest not only of experts, but of the whole society. The development of the desired defence capabilities depends on the provision of resources for the proposed programmes and plans. Proving the rationality of the latter requires posing the right questions and identifying the associated risks.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Research Topics</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interdisciplinary research</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multidisciplinary studies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">nonlinearity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">289-300</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article elaborates on four emerging research topics, considered of key importance for the understanding of and finding effective countermeasures to hybrid threats: (1) exploring the interlinked dynamics of a conflict developing in parallel in the physical world and on social networks; (2) analysing the expanding involvement of private actors who serve as proxies for an assertive state; (3) exploring the vulnerabilities of national security systems to hybrid influence and finding effective countermeasures; and (4) designing an architecture that allows to study the problem of hybrid threats holistically by providing interoperability among domain-specific or cross-domain models, or ‘use cases,’ and the respective data. All these require multi- and interdisciplinary research and consistent accumulation, verification and sharing of data, case studies and models.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andre Samberg</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Smart Solutions for Sustainable Emergency and Crisis Management</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CIP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civ-mil coordination</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure Protection</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disaster risk management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">honeypot</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">industrial catastrophes</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Natural Disasters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">TIEMS</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">volunteers</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">40</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-8</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This editorial article introduces the reader to vol. 43 of Information &amp; Security: An International Journal – containing papers presented at the 24th TIEMS Annual Conference in Kyiv, Ukraine. The volume is structured in four sections: Assessing Risks of Natural Disasters and Industrial Catastrophes; Disaster Risk and Resilience Management; Concepts and Solutions for Critical Infrastructure Protection; and Risks Related to Conflict and Contributions of the Military to Disaster Risk Management with a final section representing relevant education and training courses in Ukraine and TIEMS.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iosif Androulidakis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andriy Kovalenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Imeca-Based Technique for Security Assessment of Private Communications: Technology and Training</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">availability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">communication</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">confidentiality</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IMECA</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PBX</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threat</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99-120</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nowadays, almost everywhere, there are a huge number of privately owned telephone exchanges that serve the communication needs of a private or public entity making connections among internal telephones and linking them to other users in the public telephone network. Such communications cover most vital infrastructures, including hospitals, ministries, police, army, banks, public bodies/authorities, companies, industries and so on. The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness in regards to security and privacy threats present in private communications, helping both users and vendors safeguard their systems.
This article provides an introduction to private branch exchanges (PBXs) and private communications, and a review of relevant threats and vulnerabilities. Finally, one possible approach to assessment of private communications security is presented, along with appropriate taxonomies. Such approach relies on performing gap analysis and is based on the IMECA technique.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Venelin Georgiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Levels of Cybersecurity Training and Education</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">attribution theory</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">awareness based training</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">organizational culture</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">risk appetite</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">„balance of consequences“</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">March 2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">117</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The ambition of individuals and their organizations to achieve a desired level of cybersecurity may be subject to the application of different strategies. Known approaches to achieving cybersecurity involve the establishment of effective legal systems, innovative technical solutions, rational organizational structures, etc. The focus in discussions of cybersecurity remains on people and their training, which can lower the vulnerability to cyber attacks. Counting on such a strategy to build cybersecurity, it is important to properly understand that cybersecurity training can be constructed at several levels. Each of these levels has specific characteristics, such as the approach and methods used for training, and as a consequence is associated with different results in terms of the cybersecurity achieved.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Venelin Georgiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Two-Level Model for Describing the Risk Profile in Formulating Policy and Developing Security Capabilities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">context</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">risk management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">risk profile assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">scenario</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">June 2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The risk assessment/management concept is widely used in security research due to its universality, but also because of the active nature and sense of precautionary management, implemented on its basis. The security risk profile can be described and studied at different levels of security, which poses the question how researchers should choose the appropriate model for identifying, evaluating and developing strategies to mitigate the risk. The article raises the question whether the use risk profiles for the purposes of policy formulation, at one level of security, and capacity building at another, can introduce errors in decision making. As a possible tool to eliminate such errors the author proposes the use of a two-stage model for the description and study of the risk profile, which includes a contextual and a specific level of the discourse.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Veselin Monev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Enterprise IT security metrics: Classification, examples and characteristics (in Bulgarian)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">characteristics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">classification</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">company</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">expected annual lose</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">incident</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">matrix</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">measure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metric</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">metrics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vulnerabilities</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">March 2014</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">111</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The report addresses the key issues associated with measuring IT security for private companies. Several classifications of metrics are discussed focusing on the functions of different levels of security management. For the most part, this work examines the pros and cons of common metrics for measuring IT security and provides guidelines for creating own metrics. ‘Own metrics,’ adapted to the corporate environment, are those which security managers have to create and use for the purpose of effective management.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yoana Ivanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Policies for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberattack</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modeling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threat</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">US</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">December 2014</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">116</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In this paper is addressed in details the policy of the US regarding the issues of cyber security that are contained in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21). The tasks that should be solved for evaluation and planning of critical infrastructure protection are clearly defined. The following are specific examples of approaches and means to protect critical infrastructure from cyber attacks.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Velichka Milina</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity: A National Strategic Issue</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cybersecurity strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberspace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec reports</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">June 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">108</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The modern information and communication age brought a complex of interdependencies among infrastructures that are essential for society and led to an exponential growth of vulnerabilities and risks. Hence, security of cyberspace turned into one of the most important challenges of Twenty first century, while cybersecurity is already seen as a cross-cutting, strategic national issue that impacts all societal levels. National cybersecurity strategies are expected to provide answers to the novel challenges and to guarantee security of cyberspace. This report provides analysis available national cyber strategies that allows identification of good practices and remaining gaps. For Member States of the European Union it is important to synchronize their national strategies with the EU strategy for cybersecurity.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anatoliy Gorbenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olga Tarasyuk</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Alexander Romanovsky</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intrusion-Avoidance via System Diversity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">diversity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intrusion avoidance.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vulnerability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">154-158</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paper discusses a generic intrusion-avoidance architecture allowing the system architects to decrease the risk of intrusions. The architecture employs software diversity at various system levels and dynamically reconfigures the deployment environment to avoid intrusions. This solution reduces the so-called system’s days-of-risk which is a period of an increased security risk between the time when a vulnerability is publicly disclosed to the time when a patch is available to fix it. To select the less vulnerable system configuration we propose metrics estimating security risks by accounting a number of not-fixed vulnerabilities and their severity.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dana Procházková</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Overview of Fine Exact Methods of Safety Engineering</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">methods</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk engineering</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">safety engineering</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security engineering</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">techniques.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">tools</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">167-178</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The safety, security and risk engineering are systematic use of general findings, engineering knowledge and experiences for: ensuring safe object from internal hazards (risk engineering); from internal and external hazards (security engineering); and, in present, for optimising the protection of human lives, environment, property and economic affairs (safety engineering). Taking a comprehensive view, one needs to examine all potential conditions that could threaten the favourable operation of a given system in all stages of its life cycle, and identify the capabilities for overcoming them by prevention, preparedness, response and renovation. It uses tools, methods and techniques that indicate how we could lay out the problem in text; determine what we ought to solve; collect and create data sets so they might have a clear evidence to a given problem; select a method for data processing so outputs might be relevant to a given problem; and interpret the outputs in given conditions. Therefore, it uses a family of exact methods, tools and techniques; this paper presents a survey of fine exact methods and suggests their systemization.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dana Procházková</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Principles of Mitigating and Managing Human System Risks</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Disaster</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Human System</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">risk management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Safety Management.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21-36</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The security situation in a territory continuously evolves and, therefore, a new safety culture is formed that takes into account the actual knowledge and experience with interdependencies among public assets, including experience with extreme social crises. In dealing with disasters, historical development of human activities has included numerous preventive and mitigation measures applied according to legal rules, technical standards, norms and public instructions, response systems and ways of recovery. As a rule, these ensure protection against basic disasters and not to ‘calamities’ or random combinations of phenomena that may cause catastrophes. Problem solving the complex territory safety requires proactive, strategic risk management based on qualified data, methods, knowledge and good practices in their application. This paper summarizes the set of principles that ensures qualified decision-making for risk management, or ‘whole-of-life risk governance,’ directed at provision of human security and sustainable development. It addresses the key domains related to effective risk management.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gueorgui Stankov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk as a Factor in Decision-Making</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">AHP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multi-criteria decision-making</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">risk management</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">224-233</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Incorporating the problems of risk in the management of an organiza­tion is an important issue for any manager, especially for those in the security sec­tor. This article examines different approaches that enable taking into account the associated risks in decision-making. Considering a comprehensive understanding of risk, the transformation problems resolved in an organization and the types of fac­tors in decision-making, three different approaches are described. Based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) methodology, an integral criterion for selection of an alternative could be developed.
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