<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rosław Jeżewski</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cross-domain Coercion as Russia’s Endeavor to Weaken the Eastern Flank of NATO: A Latvian Case Study</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">corrupt government</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cross-domain coercion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Flank</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic footprint</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvian resistance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cross-domain coercion is tangible on NATO’s Eastern flank and characterized by the use of derogatory propaganda, fake news, financial assets in the Latvian banking system, Russian-based organized crime, and various military elements. This study on cross-domain coercion, however, concentrates also on the cohesion of the Latvian population, existing gaps within society, and its susceptibility to being exploited by Russia. To acquire data for this study, the author conducted interviews with representatives of the Eastern flank countries and performed an extensive literature review. To determine the root causes of vertical division in the society, the “5 WHYs” method was used. This research has proved that the presence of a Russian minority and the Russian-based organized crime minority can be a good base to create unrest and that Russia is able to influence the internal policy of a country when the Russian economic footprint exceeds 12 % of GDP. The demographics and the cohesion (including vertical and horizontal divisions) of the society are factors determining the resistance of Latvia. The triumph of the populist parties during the October 2018 parliamentary elections reflect the trend that the nation is tired of the corrupt and ineffective government rather than that it is drifting towards Russia. In a broader scope, it is expected that cross-domain coercion will increase and Russia will test the cohesion of NATO.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Velizar Shalamanov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pavel Anastasov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgi Tsvetkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence and Defense at the Eastern Flank of NATO and the EU: Readiness and Interoperability in the Context of Forward Presence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Balkans</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea region</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Flank</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">readiness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-42</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reflects the discussions during a September 2018 conference in Sofia, sponsored by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Its focus is on the defense and deterrence posture of NATO and the European Union in Eastern Europe. Special attention is given to the development of the Bucharest Initiative (B9) and its influence on the Western Balkans and Black Sea Region. The authors propose a Program for Readiness and Interoperability, oriented to the C4ISR area. This is based on the defense posture and in the context of the developments in NATO and the European Union for improved readiness and interoperability with partners that, together with enhanced cooperation in education and training for the de¬fined B9+ region, will act as instruments to implement this cooperation and improve the deterrence and defense capability on the Eastern Flank of NATO and the EU, while at the same time strengthening resilience to hybrid threats.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record></records></xml>