<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iztok Prezelj</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive Security and Some Implemental Limits</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Asymmetric Threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counter-terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cross-sectoral approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">inter-organisational cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multidimensional security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk Assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threat assessment</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13-34</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The changing security environment has led to the development of com¬prehensive security approaches, strategies and policies. The ‘Holistic approach’ has become an academic and practical mantra. This paper argues, however, that comprehensive security approaches face serious obstacles to their practical implementation. The critical evaluation of several examples confirms that the implementation phase is a weakness of comprehensive approaches and that a truly comprehensive and holistic approach seems to be beyond the implemental capacities of our security systems. Multi-sectoral and multi-level comprehensive approaches become less comprehensive when implemented in practice or even cannot be implemented due to existing narrow perceptions of security or narrow and short-term interests. The trans-sectoral second-, third- and fourth-order effects of proposed security measures are hardly considered or not considered at all. There is no consensus on what exactly comprehensive means, while prioritisation of some areas in the national security policy leads to de-prioritisation of other areas and new vulnerabilities, inter-organisational and cross-sectoral cooperation faces serious limits, threat, risk and vulnerability assessments are not really comprehensive, etc. This paper finishes with recommendations on what to do about these serious limits on the implementation of comprehensive security.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David López</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oscar Pastor</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive Approach to Security Risk Management in Critical Infrastructures and Supply Chains</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure Protection</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DRA</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DRM</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">dynamic risk assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">risk management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">supply chain protection.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">69-76</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The ability to assess and therefore react to risk exposure in critical infra¬structures and supply chains environments greatly contributes to reaching suitable protection levels and response mechanisms. Due to the unavoidable interdependen¬cies among those infrastructures, that allow disruptions to spread from one to an¬other and likely cause a great impact on society’s welfare state, risk management might be seen as a common and shared concern. The Comprehensive Risk Man¬agement approach tries to face this process by gathering information from a broad range of disciplines (physical and logical security, safety, environmental threats, etc.) while taking into account interdependencies of critical infrastructures and sup¬ply chains at different layers, going from critical infrastructure operators point of view, to sectoral, national and finally supranational levels. Besides, risk assessment and management processes rely on accurate and timely information to assist deci¬sion making, but this information (security holes, attacks or even disruptions suf¬fered by an infrastructure or supply chain)—due to its sensitiveness—does not eas¬ily flow between involved or interested parties. This paper provides an analysis of this situation and suggest future fields of action, supported by conclusions drawn from the FOCUS project.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">69</style></section></record></records></xml>