<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Giray Sadık</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aybike Yalçın İspir</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comparative Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Efforts of NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counter-terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SCO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shanghai Cooperation Organization</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">48</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">115-134</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left:19.85pt;&quot;&gt;The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are two important regional security organizations covering interrelated areas, yet they do not cooperate in the area of counter-terrorism. The comparative analysis of their counter-terrorism efforts can bring a fresh perspective beyond that of inter-block rivalry by adding a layer of complexity while evaluating the advantages of cooperation. In this article, the counter-terrorism efforts of NATO and the SCO are compared with regard to their founding principles, legal doctrines, organizational structures and military operations. It provides analysis of how these organizations created their legal doctrines, established their organizational structures and implemented practices in combating terrorism. Based on this comparison, it was discovered that both organizations transformed and adapted to better fight terrorism following the 9/11 terrorist attacks; however, due to the differences in their founding principles, NATO and the SCO tackled terrorism via different paths. Since terrorism is their common enemy, it can be asserted that collaboration between NATO and the SCO would benefit the counter-terrorism efforts of both organizations, as well as global efforts.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">115</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gregory Gleason</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kuralay Baizakova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COVID-19 in the Central Asian Region: National Responses and Regional Implications</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COVID-19</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic crisis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">101-114</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Soon after the first instance of COVID-19 in Central Asia was recorded in March 2020 in Kazakhstan, the government took immediate steps to introduce containment and mitigation measures. As cases of COVID-19 appeared soon after in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and later in Tajikistan, the governments swiftly responded, instituting emergency measures, empowering law enforcement and medical authorities to implement a broad range of counter-infection mitigation measures to protect public health. Cross-border travel restrictions were imposed. Lockdowns and sheltering-in-place restrictions were imposed in most major cities and curfews were enforced. Routine commercial air flights were cancelled or significantly reduced in international airports and many domestic airports. New levels of visa restrictions were implemented in all the Central Asian countries. The initial infection containment measures were highly successful in curtailing the early spread of Covid-19. But governments immediately confronted a broad range of social and economic difficulties brought on by Covid-19. The sudden interruption of typical earnings and livelihoods for many people, the disruption of commercial supply chains, the cratering of commodity prices, and, for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in particular, the loss of migrant labor opportunities and remittances, combined with other consequences of Covid-19 to produce a region-wide economic catastrophe. The pandemic called for immediate steps on the part of all the government of the region and focused attention on addressing the long-term social, economic, and even regional political implications.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">101</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cüneyt Gürer</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Presenting a Strategic Model to Understand Spillover Effects of ISIS Terrorism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign fighters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ISIS</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">spillover effects</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41-57</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Understanding the nature and the extent of the future threat from ISIS has been a key question for scholars, policy makers and security professionals since ISIS started losing significant grounds in Syria and Iraq. This article analyses ISIS terrorism and its possible spillover effects from a regional security perspective by presenting a strategic model to develop options for the policy makers. A strategic understanding, supported by a model that has been designed to capture all possible variables and their interaction which each other, is necessary to understand the future direction of the threat. Many scholars agree that the threat is not only about the organizational structure of ISIS but also its ideological aspect, therefore the model presented here connects the facts and the ideology with variables at three different levels: regional political level; ISIS and its organizational structure; and individual level variables. The model was designed to capture changes with relevant data thus providing a strategic data-driven understanding of the threat. 
Regional political developments and how ISIS reacts to those developments are the main concerns at the first two levels of analysis. Foreign fighters and other sympathizers are the most important subjects of the study at the individual level with the assumption that the future threat will diffuse through foreign fighters and self-radicalized lone actors.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Venelin Georgiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Challenges of Multinational Acquisition of Capabilities in Black Sea Format</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">BlackSeaFor</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">common threat perception</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperative procurement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">levels of ambition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Life cycle management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">27</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">174-182</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Countries in the Black Sea region already cooperate in the search of higher levels of security. The cooperation so far is at the level of coordinating some operational activities of Black Sea navies and regular training. In the search of efficiencies, the authors reason that this cooperation may be expanded to encompass cooperative procurement and maintenance of certain capabilities. Before embarking on such cooperative projects, participating countries need to overcome a number of policy, legal, managerial and technical challenges. The authors conclude that most promising would be cooperative initiatives at enhancing maritime surveillance, situational awareness, and consultations, command and control infrastructure, as well as the joint development, maintenance and use of training ranges and advanced simulation and training systems and joint acquisition and sharing of search and rescue capabilities. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgi Tsvetkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maritime Defence Investment Policy of the Republic of Bulgaria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">maritime sovereignty</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">naval capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">offset</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">rearmament</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">27</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">163-173</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Taking into consideration Bulgaria’s interests and intentions stipulated in the National Security Strategy, the Black Sea is seen as a main sphere of the country’s foreign, security and defence policies. So far, official documents do not seem to place a priority on modernising the Bulgarian Navy. The author, however, reasons that by 2020 Bulgaria should have small, but technologically advanced Navy, capable of defending the interests of Bulgaria and its Western allies in the Black Sea region. After examining available options and approximate costs, the paper suggests that the country embarks on a modernisation programme packaging the procurement of main platforms, thus getting negotiation leverage and seeking offsets through direct industrial investments. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>