<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shannon Foley</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Caitlin Jackson</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Susan Aros</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anne Marie Baylouny</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO and Intermediate Force Capabilities: Why Human Effects Matter</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">agent-based</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">gray zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modeling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">123-134</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On February 24, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the international order changed as sharply and abruptly as it did on the morning of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article V for the first time in NATO’s history. As a result of Russia’s invasion, NATO’s demand for deterrence capabilities—with the hope that Article V is never again necessary to exercise—is more urgent now than at any time in the 21st century. Because lethality is absolutely necessary but not sufficient, NATO must develop and maintain capabilities that complement lethal force with intermediate force options to complete the deterrence equation across the entire competition continuum.
   Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFCs) can deliver immediate value to NATO countries, providing leaders and policymakers with Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) options that can deter enemy actions, as necessary, below the level of lethal combat operations. IFCs, a term introduced into the U.S. Department of Defense in 2020 to define capabilities that bridge the gap between presence and lethal effects, encompass NLWs as well as other additional capabilities and technologies that have utility below the level of armed conflict.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">123</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">George Sharkov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christina Todorova</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgi Koykov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ivan Nikolov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Towards a Robust and Scalable Cyber Range Federation for Sectoral Cyber/Hybrid Exercising: The Red Ranger and ECHO Collaborative Experience</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber range</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">exercising</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">federated</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">training</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">287-302</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cyber exercising is essential to crisis management preparation and maintaining a robust cybersecurity posture. To prepare for growing hybrid threats, complex cyber-hybrid scenarios with practical cooperation at the technical, operational, and higher decision-making levels are increasingly being used, leveraging the power of cyber ranges. Alas, owing to a lack of suitable simulation infrastructure and the ability to adapt cyber ranges to varied situations, such complex scenarios often remain inaccessible. The federation of cyber ranges is one potential response to this challenge, providing a solution for the individual cyber range limitations in terms of resources to replicate complex cybersecurity-relevant realities. 
The current contribution describes the authors’ experience designing the Red Ranger, a Composite Cyber Range. We detail the design and development to facilitate the agility required to support a working multi-faceted federation with the ECHO Cyber Range to allow for an “exercise-as-a-service” model to provide adequate and accessible cyber-hybrid mechanisms for crisis response training and preparation.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">287</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ivan Gaidarski</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pavlin Kutinchev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transformation of UML Design Models of Information Security System into Agent-based Simulation Models</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">agent</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">architecture</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conceptual</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">model</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">system</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65-77 </style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The development of complex systems involves multiple participants (stakeholders) who have their own perspectives, knowledge, experience, and responsibilities that determine their requirements to the system. It is important to coordinate stakeholders and unify their requirements. We propose a method that takes into account the perspectives of all stakeholders. The framework for defining of system’s problem area defines the boundaries within which the system is developed. The reference methodology for system development is based on the IEEE 1471 and 42010 standards. We use a few viewpoints: Information Security, Risk Analysis, Communication, Technological, and Information Processing. The analysis of the different perspectives allows us to construct models describing the features of the developed system. After analyzing the Information Security viewpoint, a generalized conceptual model of the system is created. The analysis of Information Processing leads to a data model. Technological point of view includes different technological approaches for the development of systems, such as object-oriented approach with UML Language for constructing the design model and agent-based modeling approach for creating a simulation model of the system. We present how the object-oriented design model described with UML can be transformed into an agent-based simulation model.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Klaus Niemeyer</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Conflict Analysis Project (ECAP)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armaments planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">confidence building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict modelling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">inter-national cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military threat</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO defense planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">nuclear armament</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">soft deterrence</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">49</style></volume><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left:19.85pt;&quot;&gt;With this report I am describing a US-German project that was worked on from 1983-1992 and which, from today&amp;rsquo;s point of view, seems to be worth revisiting in its essential points. The general goal of the project was to provide analytical support to decisions on the conventional defense capability of the NATO armed forces in Central Europe and the political-strategic debate on deploying medium-range nuclear missiles. An important aspect was the consideration of the paradoxical situation of a possible use of tactical-nuclear battlefield weapons with the associated escalation risks and the hoped-for deterrent effect in the strategic area. One of the foundations was the analytical use of quantitative simulation models and methods that were already relatively mature at the time for the reproducible calculation of a conventionally conducted attack of the Warsaw Pact with a likely focus on Central Europe. The main results were the type of cooperation and the structure of the analyses, the evidence of the usefulness of simulation models and, last but not least, the development of common goals, especially in phases of great upheaval such as the end of the Soviet system.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nebojsa Nikolic</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Conceptual Modelling in Simulation of Military Logistics Processes – Field Maintenance Modelling</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Home Journal of Defence &amp; Security Technologies</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Conceptual model</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Logistics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maintenance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">100-110</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Conceptual modelling is one of the most challenging parts in simulation modelling where more knowledge fields meet each other. The main goal of the paper is to present the process of creating a conceptual model as an important step in simulation model development. The starting point is a description of a real entity given by subject matter expert, and output is one consistent, algorithm-like, conceptual model. As a real entity here is used a process of field maintenance of main weapon system in a brigade-size military unit in combat operations. The point of the paper is to emphasize the translation of the conceptual description of the real process given from the subject matter expert, towards a formalized conceptual model that is understandable to the simulation modeller and computer programmer.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">6</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>47</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Velizar Shalamanov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgi Penchev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Methodology for Organizational Design of Cyber Research Networks</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DIGILIENCE 2019</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Enterprise Architecture</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modeling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">network analysis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2-4 October</style></date></pub-dates></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia, Bulgaria</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The paper presents possible approaches for building a new network organization in the area of cybersecurity. The study is focused on selection of activities, processes and structures needed for the network governance and management. The study considers links between Enterprise Architecture approach, COBIT framework and network analysis with the task to elaborate a standard and comprehensive framework for analysis of IT related areas of organizational governance and management. Examples of NATO and EU initiatives for network organization design and implementation are explored with specific focus on ECHO project. Accreditation procedure based on participant&amp;rsquo;s self-assessment is presented.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This paper is included in the program of &lt;a href=&quot;https://digilience.org&quot;&gt;DIGILIENCE 2019&lt;/a&gt; and will be published in the post-conference volume.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yvan Gauthier</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jay Adamsson</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Decision Support Tools for Domestic Security Operations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CBRNE</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civil assistance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Decision Support</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">domestic operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">major security events</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modelling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Natural Disasters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">pandemics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">wiki.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">27</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">123-137</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper documents the production of a compendium of modelling and simulation (M&amp;S) tools useful for decision support to organizations engaged in domestic defence and security operations. The compendium was created on GCPEDIA, a wiki application accessible to all federal government departments and agencies in Canada. It includes tools for predicting the consequences of natural and man-made disasters, planning major event security, assessing infrastructure criticality, planning surveillance missions, and analyzing other issues relevant to domestic operations. Given the wide accessibility of the compendium within the Government of Canada, a large community of practice can use, update, and expand on the information collected</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marko A. Hofmann</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tobias LEHMANN</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On Simulation-based Wargaming: Comparison of Two Different Methodological Approaches</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Assumption-based Planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intuition-based Decision-making</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Operational Wargaming</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tactical Wargaming</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wargaming</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">64-72</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Wargaming has been neglected within the German Forces for almost fifty years. Only within the last two years, two so-called &amp;ldquo;Leitfaden&amp;rdquo; (codes of best practice) have been developed. The first one, elaborated by members of the General Staff Academy, is intended for operational wargaming and fully rests on the tradi&amp;shy;tional analytical comparison of different Courses of Action (CoA). Own and enemy CoAs are played against each other on the foundation of a game between two staff groups. Within this paradigm, simulations are used as evaluation tools. The rea&amp;shy;soning is based on the premise that simulation systems are valid representations of reality. A successful simulation run is considered a corroboration of a particular course of action. The second &amp;ldquo;Leitfaden,&amp;rdquo; developed at the University of the Fed&amp;shy;eral Armed Forces, is intended for so-called &amp;ldquo;tactical wargaming.&amp;rdquo; The two central concepts of this approach are intuition-based decision-making and assumption-based planning. The core rationale of this method is that all military planning and decision making is liable to what is called the &amp;ldquo;fog of war.&amp;rdquo; The irresolvable unpre&amp;shy;dictability of future developments in all military operations is considered an insur&amp;shy;mountable obstacle to all analytical approaches. This approach rests on the claim that pattern recognition and mental simulation of these patterns are the most valu&amp;shy;able cognitive functions of expert decision makers. Within this paradigm, simula&amp;shy;tions are used to support creativity, enhance imagination and trigger self-critical thinking. Simulation systems of complex systems are not necessarily regarded to be valid. This article discusses the pros and cons of the two approaches (&amp;ldquo;Leitfaden&amp;rdquo;) from both theoretical and practical perspective.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David Perme</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mark Whelan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">William P. Loftus</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Achieving Interoperability of Command and Control Systems  Using Translation Gateways</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">C4I</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">context translation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">proxy server</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">software architectures</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97-104</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Over the last several decades, the military has greatly benefited from the increased knowledge and capabilities provided by using computerized command and control systems. As this use has expanded exponentially, so has the need to integrate these systems. The cost of establishing collaboration between these systems is typically high, and is complicated by differing organizational readiness levels, willingness, and technical ability to affect collaboration. The opportunity to enable interoperability, therefore, has great value, provided it can address these factors and more. In this paper, the authors present an approach to achieving interoperability through the use of a translation gateway. Translation is the conversion of one data format or protocol to another while retaining the meaning and context of the original. The key factors in translation include the data itself, the format of the data, the medium of transmission, and the context of the data that turns it into useful information. A gateway must be able to deal with all of these factors. The data, format, and medium translation challenges are relatively straightforward, discrete, and solvable transformations. The context translation challenge is more complex and involves the application of subject matter knowledge and expertise. A successful architectural approach utilizes the layered methodology. Gestalt has identified four key layers that contribute to a successful translation gateway. They are, a system-neutral data interchange format, an external systems interface layer, a translation layer and an intelligence layer.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Klaus Niemeyer</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modeling and Simulation in Defense</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">acquisition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Decision-making.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Evolution of modelling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modelling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Operational planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Training and Exercises</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">12</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19-42</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modelling and simulation are essential tools in defence planning, development and acquisition of systems, training and exercises, and operational planning throughout NATO and nations. In the article a contribution to a theoretical approach to the technology is provided, with discussion of definitions and characteristics, such as purpose of a model, reduction of complexity, and representation of real entities or systems. On the other hand, the defence applications are different in many aspects, e.g. objectives, time horizon, scenarios, data requirements, or reaction requirements, which leads to different utility of the model categories. Specific issues in modelling of the defence system are discussed, such as the military hierarchical structure, functional areas, operational phases, planning situations, and the decision cycle.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">019</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eugene Nickolov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Contemporary Trends in the Development of Information Security and Computer Virology</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal </style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Biometric</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Computer Virology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dynamic Programming</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mobile Communications</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modeling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Satellite Communications</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Steganometric.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">60-72</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article presents an analysis of the latest trends in information security and computer virology. The basic components of the information security are introduced, including data security, computer security, communication security, network security, mobile security, manipulations security, biometric security, and steganometric security. The main factors exerting influence on these components, as well as their relationships are shown. A formal record for the information security as a function of specific arguments is developed. The fundamental procedures of the information security are represented, including Monitoring, Blocking, Removing, Protection and Verification. 
The analysis continues with the computer virology topic. In the beginning, the fundamental work principles of the computer viruses are examined: Reproduction, Transportation, Malicious Thinking and Good-natured Thinking. Then the main steps in the computer viruses investigation are analyzed: Isolation, Decomposition, Formal Description, Modeling, Decision-making and Program Realization. Next, methods for computer viruses detection are examined, such as Signature analysis, Integrity Check, Monitoring and Restriction. After that the basic steps during the computer viruses removal as Localization, Identification, Removing, Deactivation and Verification are shown. 
In the conclusion, the role and the importance of the information security and the computer virology for the development of the contemporary society in conditions of growing communication mobility and globality are pointed out.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paul Graziani</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Software Becomes Mission-Critical to Success and Cost-Effective Space Missions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COTS software</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">satellite</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">space surveillance network</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">space-based communications</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1999</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43-55</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Many organizations can no longer afford to develop mission-specific software in-house. Commercial satellite software that can be used for multiple missions is playing a growing, cost-saving role in enabling not only successful but economical space activities. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software that is stable, accurate, and well-supported is key in all phases of a satellite's life—from pre-launch analyses to ground support through to graveyarding The paper shows the benefit of using COTS software in the big international projects, related to construction of reusable, generic software &quot;building blocks&quot; based on legacy software. In theory, new missions could then select among these building blocks to build systems in an object-oriented manner</style></abstract></record></records></xml>