<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John Nelson</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Developing a NATO Intermediate Force Capabilities Concept</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Concept Development &amp; Experimentation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Electronic Warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Non-Lethal Directed Energy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67-84</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;NATO faces a military problem: adversaries are undertaking acts of aggression that deliberately stay below the lethal force threshold or that ensure a lethal response from NATO incurring costs&amp;mdash;undesired escalation, risks of collateral damage including civilian casualties, negative narratives, and other adverse strategic or political outcomes&amp;mdash;to the Alliance. Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC)&amp;mdash;active means (non-lethal weapons, particularly non-lethal directed energy, cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, and other effectors) beyond presence but below lethal thresholds&amp;mdash;help solve this problem. SAS-151 and Allied Command Transformation developed and conducted wargames and IFC Concept Development Workshops that demonstrated the ways in which IFC improve NATO&amp;rsquo;s ability to deter, counter, and defeat adversaries via: &lt;em&gt;Enhanced Engagement&lt;/em&gt;: If fielded and incorporated into tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), IFC can enable lethal engagements by isolating, stopping, or moving targets to positions of advantage, also, reversible (and in many cases unseen) effects allow for earlier employment, including potential autonomous/AI use of IFC where lethal capabilities would require human-inthe-loop; &lt;em&gt;Tempo/Initiative&lt;/em&gt;: Instead of adversaries dictating the time and place of engagements, IFC help NATO gain/maintain the initiative by suppressing, imposing delays, and making adversaries reactive (even inactive); &lt;em&gt;Active means across the Competition Continuum&lt;/em&gt;: NATO needs to develop, acquire, and effectively employ IFC across the continuum to win engagements, impose costs on the adversary, and win the narrative.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Dobias</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kyle Christensen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The 'Grey Zone' and Hybrid Activities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A2/AD</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">anti-access</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">area denial</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">competition continuum</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conventional conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-kinetic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threshold</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41-54</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Military operations in the grey zone (defined here as the space between peace and war where states are currently involved in a competition continuum) present a unique challenge for military planners. Potential adversaries—well aware of NATO’s conventional lethal capabilities—have been using the space below the lethal threshold of conflict with impunity to further their objectives. To re-establish effective deterrence, it is imperative that NATO develops the ability to deny its adversaries the ability to act freely in this zone below conventional conflict. That requires imposing a cost on hostile actors acting below the lethal threshold of open conflict, across multiple domains, from the tactical through the operational to the strategic level. Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC) are the kind of tools that provide effective means of response below the lethal threshold both tactically and operationally and can effectively shape the environment across domains up to the strategic level.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Krista Romita Grocholski</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Scott Savitz</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How to Assess the Impact of Non-Lethal Weapons</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">gray zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">impact</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">85-95</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Assessing the tactical, operational, and strategic impact of non-lethal weapons is challenging, requiring different evaluative approaches from those used for lethal weapons. This article describes how a RAND team used a structure called a “logic model” to characterize what these systems and operations are intended to achieve and how they do so. The team then identified a set of metrics that collectively measured each element of the logic model. Additionally, the RAND team developed a diverse set of vignettes in which non-lethal capabilities were used and then qualitatively evaluated each metric in the context of each vignette using a set of standard criteria: how well the metric measured the corresponding element, how easily and quickly the value of the metric could be measured, and how consistently different individuals would likely assess the value of the metric in a particular situation. Based on this work, the logic model can be used to better characterize and communicate the impact of non-lethal weapons and actions at the tactical and operational levels and link these to strategic goals. Operators, planners, and commanders can also select specific metrics to measure the impact of these weapons and actions in real-world operations and wargames, enabling them to make better decisions on when and how to use them to achieve their goals.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">85</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Dobias</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare and the Need for Intermediate Force Capabilities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">human effects</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-9</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;NATO is faced with adversaries undertaking acts of aggression that deliberately stay below the lethal force threshold or aim to trigger a lethal response from NATO and incur costs to the Alliance such as undesired escalation, risks of collateral damage, including civilian casualties, or negative narratives. Ex&lt;span style=&quot;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;&quot;&gt;a&lt;/span&gt;mples of these activities range from dangerous aerial and maritime approaches, fomenting unrest and using refugees as a weapon, and even use of force short of lethal to intimidate opponents. Currently, the NATO responses are often limited to two extremes of mere presence or applying lethal force, thus ceding the initiative to the adversary. This issue contains a set of articles exploring intermediate force capabilities (e.g., non-lethal weapons, cyber, information operations, electromagnetic warfare, and strategic capabilities such as stability policing and use of special operation forces) and how they can address current NATO dilemma when operating below the threshold of lethal force.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shannon Foley</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Caitlin Jackson</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Susan Aros</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anne Marie Baylouny</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO and Intermediate Force Capabilities: Why Human Effects Matter</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">agent-based</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">gray zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modeling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">123-134</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On February 24, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the international order changed as sharply and abruptly as it did on the morning of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article V for the first time in NATO’s history. As a result of Russia’s invasion, NATO’s demand for deterrence capabilities—with the hope that Article V is never again necessary to exercise—is more urgent now than at any time in the 21st century. Because lethality is absolutely necessary but not sufficient, NATO must develop and maintain capabilities that complement lethal force with intermediate force options to complete the deterrence equation across the entire competition continuum.
   Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFCs) can deliver immediate value to NATO countries, providing leaders and policymakers with Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) options that can deter enemy actions, as necessary, below the level of lethal combat operations. IFCs, a term introduced into the U.S. Department of Defense in 2020 to define capabilities that bridge the gap between presence and lethal effects, encompass NLWs as well as other additional capabilities and technologies that have utility below the level of armed conflict.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">123</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Susan LeVine</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nonlethal Weapons and Intermediate Force: A Necessary Complement to Lethality</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">gray zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">infantry</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">land domain</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">maritime domain</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mobility</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Protection of Civilians</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">stability policing</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">stabilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">urban operations</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article updates a previous publication, “Beyond Bean Bags and Rubber Bullets: Intermediate Force Capabilities Across the Competition Continuum,” highlighting the relevance of non-lethal weapons as intermediate force capabilities to the U.S. 2022 National Defense Strategy and NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Intermediate force capabilities can strengthen deterrence, providing active or defensive measures to counter aggression below the level of armed conflict, enable military operations among civilian populations in urban environments, and support establishing post-conflict safe and secure environments for transition to host nation governance.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55</style></section></record></records></xml>