<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Dobias</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kyle Christensen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">William Freid</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gaming Intermediate Force Capabilities: Strategic Implications of Tactical Decisions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">kriegsspiel</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">matrix</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-kinetic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wargaming</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97-109</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reviews the development and tests of two Intermediate Force Capability (IFC) concept development hybrid wargames. The first wargame plays out a maritime Task Force’s ability to counter hybrid threats in the grey zone. The second wargame examines the ability of a NATO Task Group, deployed to a third country to train local security forces, to counter a hostile militia trained and supported by a neighboring country. IFCs offer a class of response between doing nothing and using lethal force in a situation that would be politically unpalatable. As such, the aim of the wargame series is to evaluate whether IFCs can make a difference to mission success against hybrid threats in the grey zone. This wargame series was particularly important because it used traditional game mechanics in a unique and innovative way to evaluate and assess IFC’s effects on strategic mission success. Specifically, the hybrid wargame series has demonstrated that IFCs have a high probability of filling the gap between doing nothing and using lethal force. IFCs have the potential to improve operational effectiveness by allowing for more restrained use of force to escalate/de-escalate a situation and increasing decision time and space for tactical decision-makers. Both counter-personnel and counter-materiel capabilities (including miniaturization) are needed to act effectively in the current hybrid threat environment.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Dobias</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kyle Christensen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The 'Grey Zone' and Hybrid Activities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A2/AD</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">anti-access</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">area denial</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">competition continuum</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conventional conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-kinetic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threshold</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41-54</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Military operations in the grey zone (defined here as the space between peace and war where states are currently involved in a competition continuum) present a unique challenge for military planners. Potential adversaries—well aware of NATO’s conventional lethal capabilities—have been using the space below the lethal threshold of conflict with impunity to further their objectives. To re-establish effective deterrence, it is imperative that NATO develops the ability to deny its adversaries the ability to act freely in this zone below conventional conflict. That requires imposing a cost on hostile actors acting below the lethal threshold of open conflict, across multiple domains, from the tactical through the operational to the strategic level. Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFC) are the kind of tools that provide effective means of response below the lethal threshold both tactically and operationally and can effectively shape the environment across domains up to the strategic level.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jim Derleth</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jeff Pickler</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Twenty-first Century Threats Require Twenty-first Century Deterrence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">irregular warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-23</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">During the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) after World War II, deterrence emerged as the primary U.S. security strategy. Historically, the USA focused on deterring conventional and nuclear threats. While this helped prevent a direct military conflict between the two superpowers, it did not end their political rivalry, simply pushing it into areas that decreased the risk of open military conflict. During the Cold War, both the USA and USSR used irregular tactics to try and achieve their strategic objectives in the grey zone, the area below the threshold for “use of force” or “armed attack” as described in the United Nations Charter. Technology limited the effectiveness of irregular tactics, not considered significant national security threats. Today, a globalized, interconnected, and ubiquitous information environment provides numerous opportunities for adversaries to achieve strategic objectives without crossing the strategic threshold that would have historically provoked a military response.
      An increase in irregular attacks shows that while deterrence has continued to prevent large-scale military conflict between the major powers, it has failed to prevent aggression in the grey zone. From the Baltics to the Caucuses, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated how irregular tactics can achieve strategic objectives without fear of an unacceptable counteraction. Trends in national power, interdependence, and technology suggest Russia and other adversaries will continue to increase their ability to exploit the grey zone vulnerabilities. A deterrence policy focused solely on conventional and nuclear forces is no longer sufficient. To deter irregular tactics, the United States must develop a 21st-century deterrence strategy. This need will only grow as Russia tries to offset its military failures in Ukraine. With Russian conventional forces weakened, Russia will increasingly rely on irregular tactics to attack its adversaries. This paper examines the declining relevance of traditional conventional and nuclear-focused deterrence strategies and argues that deterrence should be modified to remain relevant against 21st-century threats.
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