<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sergiy Dotsenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yuriy Ponochovnyi</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oleg Illiashenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybernetic Approach to Developing Resilient Systems: Concept, Models and Application</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">online verification</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience control system</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">safety</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-90</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The paper contains the results of the development and implementation of a cybernetic approach to the creation of resilient systems. The architecture of a resilient system contains redundant components compared to a traditional feedback control system. This is primarily due to the need to implement additional channels in the control system to respond to changes in requirements, environment, or unspecified faults and failures. The general structure of a resilient system is based on the principle of dividing control channels for functional and non-functional characteristics. This allows to react to changes in the information component of the environment during attacks on the system to ensure its cybersecurity. The case for a space resilient system with online verification is described. Three scenarios of the system behavior to assure resilience are suggested and the first scenario is explored by the use of Markov model. That allows offering options for improving availability function and other indicators of resilient systems.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sergiy Dotsenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oleg Illiashenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sergii Kamenskyi</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Integrated Security Management System for Enterprises in Industry 4.0</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">control system</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">enterprise management system</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">industry 4.0</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrated security management system</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">safety</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">standards</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">294-304</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper presents results from the analysis of methodologies and standards aiming to meet the requirements to security management of enterprises implementing Industry 4.0 principles. Key standards such as ISO/IEC 7498, 15408, 18045, 20000, 27000 have been analysed to suggest an approach to the development of integrated security and safety management system structure considering threats of intrusion into physical, information and signal spaces. This system, based on the cybernetic principles of control, is part of the enterprise management system. Security subsystems check and control according to individual and general objectives for physical, information and signal spaces and respective requirements-based models. On that basis the paper presents results and recommendations for enhancing and implementing integrated security management systems. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">294</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dana Procházková</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The EU Civil Protection Upgrading Needs</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil protection</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">critical infrastruc¬ture</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">daily human needs</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">protection in emergencies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">safety</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">88-108</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil protection has two pillars. The first one supports the humans´ daily lives and the other ensures the protection of humans at emergency and critical situations. Both consist of systems aiming to provide human security, welfare and critical infrastructure protection. This paper describes the three types of civil protection systems existing in the EU Member States and summarizes the results of original research. The results demonstrate a need for individual public assets’ protection. The paper includes suggestions on domains for future research to fulfil identified requirements.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">88</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dana Procházková</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Natural Disasters’ Management and Detection of Priority Problems for Future Research</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Disaster Management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Human System</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Natural Disasters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">safety</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127-144 </style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Natural disasters threaten human society from time immemorial. They are caused by processes in the Earth core and Earth surface, or in the atmosphere, and by processes in the vicinity of the Planet. Various phenomena in the human system occur as a result of its own development or under the impact of other processes. This research was targeted at natural disasters such as avalanches, hot wet summer days, drought, dams rupture, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, rocks tumbling down, forest fires, wind storms, tornadoes, excessive rain or snow falls, and gas erosions from the core. It identifies deficits at natural disaster management from the viewpoint of the safe community concept that has been promoted by the EU since 2004.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eugene Brezhnev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Approach for Assessing Risk of Common Cause Failures in Critical Infrastructures</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">common cause failures</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">coupling factors</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multiple failures</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">safety</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">199-210</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper presents the technique for the critical infrastructure (CI) risk assessment based on Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), modified for multiple failures’ criticality assessment. The multiple failures (MFs) are significant contributors to risk in critical infrastructure. In spite of the low frequency of multiple failures’ occurrence, the severity of their consequences could lead directly to the CI’s accident and malfunctions. The influences of multiple failures should be taken into consideration as early as possible at the design stage. The paper presents classification of MFs, their root causes and coupling factors that stipulate the common susceptibility of systems to shared cause. The common cause failures (CCFs) are a subset of the dependant multiple failures. The qualitative procedure developed in the paper considers the consequences’ severity of CCFs on different I&amp;C system levels. The total severity of CCFs is presented as a sum of severities for each level. The results of FMECA for single independent failures are taken as initial data to perform FMECA for MFs</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oleg Ivanchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vyacheslav Kharchenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aleksandr Skatkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Management of Critical Infrastructures Based on Technical Megastate</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">centralized management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical infrastructures</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">decentral¬ized management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">megastate</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">safety</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37-51</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The provision for effective operation of critical infrastructures (CI) is approached by taking into account priorities for their safety and reliability. This paper substantiates practical aspects of introducing CI management based on technical megastate. It presents relevant mathematical models based on the principles of analysis and assessment of infrastructure systems safety.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>