<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philipp Fluri</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">From Civil-Military Relations to Resilience: The Fifth Wave of Strengthening Democracy through Research and Education</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civilian control</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democratic oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democratic resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PfP Consortium</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2025</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2025</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">24</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">73-90</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The good governance of military and security forces is essential for the effective defense of a nation or alliance and for fostering their democratic evolution. This article explores NATO and partner countries’ initiatives over the past three decades to enhance good governance, distinguishing five waves of focus: civil-military relations and democratic control of armed forces, defense institution building, security sector reform, building integrity and reducing corruption, and strengthening democratic resilience. The authors review the research and educational activities of the Partnership for Peace Consortium and other organizations in support of these initiatives, concluding with a proposal to establish a working group on democratic resilience within the Consortium.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">73</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Venelin Georgiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Main Issues and Risks Related to the Provision of Resources for Bulgaria’s Defence Capabilities Development Programme 2032</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence resources</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">development program</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></number><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state are paramount benefits for society, which should be guaranteed by adequate instruments. The defence capabilities are main part of these instruments and therefore their condition attracts the interest not only of experts, but of the whole society. The development of the desired defence capabilities depends on the provision of resources for the proposed programmes and plans. Proving the rationality of the latter requires posing the right questions and identifying the associated risks.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgi Tsvetkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence Policy of Republic of Bulgaria: Critical Analysis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Security and Defence Management</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence transformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">post-communist transition</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Procon</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><isbn><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">978-619-7254-06-8</style></isbn><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;&lt;img alt=&quot;&quot; src=&quot;https://procon.bg/sites/default/files/front_cover_defence_capabilities.jpg&quot; style=&quot;width: 200px; height: 289px; margin: 5px; float: left;&quot; /&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/node/21292&quot;&gt;Резюме на български&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The book is part of the &lt;a href=&quot;/node/5386&quot;&gt;Security and Defence Management series&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It is based on the author&amp;rsquo;s PhD thesis, looking at the transformation of Bulgaria&amp;rsquo;s defence policy in the period 1990-2010. Amended with reflections on key developments in the past decade, the author offers evaluation of the ability to foresee defence requirements and plan accordingly. The general conclusion is that it is not the uncertainty of the security environment that surprises us. In fact, the environment has been predictable to a is sufficient degree.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Based on the John Boyd OODA loop, we can conclude that the &amp;ldquo;noise in the system,&amp;rdquo; created at the stages &amp;ldquo;Observe&amp;rdquo; and &amp;ldquo;Orient,&amp;rdquo; is the main reason or justification not to proceed properly to &amp;ldquo;Decide&amp;rdquo; and &amp;ldquo;Act.&amp;rdquo; And this is not so much due to the unpredictable and dynamic environment, as to the inability or unwillingness to take adequate decisions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The book contains theoretical, historical and prognostic parts.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The theoretical part presents the modern understanding of defence policy and the relations between the state and the armed forces. Its goal is not only to review the theoretical foundations of defence policy making, but to reach valid and relevant definitions that can be applied in modern Bulgaria &amp;ndash; a country that has made several simultaneous &amp;ldquo;transitions&amp;rdquo; since 1990.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The historical part begins with an analysis of the Bulgarian People&amp;#39;s Army at the beginning of the transition, as the author believes that many of the challenges we face today are due to the specifics of state-military relations in the period before 1990. Another important contribution is the reliable reconstruction of the events characterizing the development of Bulgaria&amp;#39;s defence policy between 1990 and 2010, often burdened with emotional assessments and deliberate distortions of reality.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The third part contains the prospects for development, formulated based on a comparative analysis with the armed forces of a number of European countries and reflecting different combinations of two main factors &amp;ndash; the resource framework and degree of change. One main conclusion is that the will to change is perhaps the decisive factor for the successful defence policy making. Unlike most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, there is no such will in Bulgaria, and again we come to the conclusion of more &amp;ldquo;lost years&amp;rdquo; for the country&amp;rsquo;s defence.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The book is currently available in Bulgarian only, in the following formats:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Hardcover, ISBN 978-619-7254-07-5&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Online (pdf), ISBN 978-619-7254-06-8&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oleg Manko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yurii Mikhieiev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Based on the Analysis of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">media</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-20</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">There is no generally accepted definition of ‘Hybrid Warfare.’ Often, authors used the term depending on the particular context and the issue at stake. This article reviews the variety of views on the definition of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare,’ suggests an up-to-date interpretation of the concept, and identifies key characteristics of conflicts involving this type of warfare.
It has been found that an information-psychological element forms the basis of ‘hybrid warfare’ with the aim to influence primarily public consciousness, rather than the armed forces or State’s infrastructure. Moreover, it has been identified that the indicated threats are of ambiguous nature, and thus it is difficult to single out, detect and identify them in order to organize an appropriate response. The authors note that the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ has originated in the realm of special forces’ operations in geopolitical terms by integrating the experience of severe confrontations threatening international security, combating terrorism and extremism of state and non-state actors.
Along with the features of ‘hybrid warfare,’ the authors elaborate on its components and types, i.e. information warfare, cyber warfare, asymmetric warfare, task force hostilities, terrorist activities, urban guerrilla warfare, signs of humanitarian war, signs of ethnic conflict, trade war, etc. It has been proved that information operations’ planning is a significant component of the inter-agency approach to the decision-making under conditions of a new type of war – ‘hybrid’ war.
</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Valeri Ratchev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria’s 2014 Annual Defence Report: Plenty of Data, Low Political Impact</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence budget</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Minister of Defence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ministry of Defence</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">April 2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">28</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Annual Report on the Status of Defence and the Armed Forces is an important political act, which reveals to the public and its deputies in the Parliament the status, problems, and prospects of national defence and the Armed Forces. The 2014 Report reveals only a single problem that is obvious and clear to all - insufficient budget for rearmament. However, the report does not formulate the dilemmas the leadership of Defence faces and options for the future development of the armed forces. The lack of timely decisions will increasingly turn decision issues into dilemmas of the &quot;either-or&quot; type.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Phases and Challenges of Security Sector Reform in the Experience of Bulgaria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">accountability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civilian control</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Consortium.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">effectiveness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">efficiency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec reports</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PfP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transparency</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">85</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports 85 includes the main theses of a presentation at the “Oversight and Accountability of the Defense Sector” panel of the Annual Conference of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 22-23 June 2011. The report describes the Bulgarian experience along the three main phases of reform in the post-communist transition of the country: (1) Establishing key mechanisms for civilian control over the armed forces and protection of human rights in the early 1990s; (2) Building democratic defense institutions, starting in the late 1990s and continuing to be in the focus throughout the first decade of the new century; and (3) Transformation of the security sector as a whole – the current focus of reform efforts.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Improving Governance in the Management of Resources in the Security and Defence Sector</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">accountability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civilian control</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">effectiveness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">efficiency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Good governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec reports</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South Eastern Europe.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transparency</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports 41 includes the main theses of a presentation at the NATO-RACVIAC conference on “Better Management of Defence Resources, including Integrity Building in the Armed Forces,” Rakitje, Croatia, 14-16 September 2009. It sees resource management in security and defence as traditionally judged in view of effectiveness and efficiency. However, when the decisions are made by a few insiders and under the veil of secrecy, there is no guarantee that the interests of society will be protected. Further, there are no guarantees that the use of public resources will deliver anticipated effects in an efficient manner. In approaching this general problem, the paper outlines general principles of democratic governance of the security sector. It then focuses on the institutional perspective on democratic governance, underlining ways in which a defence minister can greatly contribute to improving governance in managing resources for security and defence. Finally, the paper lays out ideas on how the cooperation among countries in South Eastern Europe could contribute to strengthening the governance of security and defence sectors, and resource management in particular.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nilufer Narli</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Initiatives for Transparency-Building in Turkey:  International, Regional and Domestic Factors</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">accountability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil-military relations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Force planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">procurement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Turkish military</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">34-54</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Taking Turkey as a case study, this article addresses a specific question: What are the factors that support citizens' initiatives for transparency of defence resources planning and budgeting? It assumes that transparency-building is usefully analysed at three levels – the national or “domestic,” the regional and the international – and, therefore, differentiates relevant influencing factors at these levels. Hypothesised to be significant at the international level are shifts in the balance of power (e.g., the demise of the Soviet Union, ending of the Cold War), international treaties concerning armament (e.g., the Conventional Forces in Europe /CFE/ accord) and international documents on various security matters (e.g., the Vienna Document 1999), new global threats (e.g., terrorism, especially following the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001) and wars, real or likely (e.g., the recent fighting in Iraq). At the domestic level, the article considers several economic, political and socio-political factors as variables affecting citizens' demands for transparency of defence resources planning and budgeting. The following factors shape the transparency-building attitude: fiscal crises and poverty; perceived and real threats to national security; the activities of separatist or extremist movements; how the country’s political culture defines the position of the military vis-à-vis society and the political elite, plus the nature of civil-military relations; and the impact of reforms that change legal and political frameworks..</style></abstract></record></records></xml>