<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Simon Lunn</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ensuring Democratic Control of Armed Forces – The Enduring Challenges</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">accountability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democratic control</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">parliamentary control</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transparency</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-52</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Armed forces constitute the foundation for the defense and security of their societies. They protect against external threats and, when required, provide coercive power. As a corporate body, they play a prominent role in the ordering of the nation’s affairs, in the development of national security policy, and in the allocation of national resources. Their role is guided by a single principle: their subordination to democratically elected political leadership. This democratic control ensures they serve the societies they protect. 
This article identifies the key elements needed to ensure effective democratic control. It examines the role of the executive in the organization and employment of the armed forces and the legislature in providing oversight and accountability. The tensions in defining competence and responsibility where the political and military worlds and perspectives intersect are alleviated in the process of fusion, collision, or reconciliation at all levels, from policy to operations. Democratic control must reflect societal developments as in the influence of information technology or the impressive “genderization” of defense and security. Two decades of transition in Europe have shown that democratic control is a process in which each country adapts the basic principles to its own circumstances.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><num-vols><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-52</style></num-vols></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jozef Stieranka</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Martina Binderová</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transformation of the State Security in the Slovak Republic from 1989 to 1992</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">counterintelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democratic control</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Slovakia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transformation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer-Fall 2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87-103</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article describes the main steps of the post-communist transition of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, first to the purposes of democratization of the federal formation and then to the establishment of the respective capacity of the Slovak Republic. The authors pay particular attention to the introduction of norms and practices of parliamentary oversight of the security services in this early phase of the transformation process.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">87</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence and Security Sector Reform and Parliamentary Oversight</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civil society</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">November 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In the notes for a speech to the 84th Rose-Roth seminar of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on “Afghanistan, Regional Security and the Future of International Cooperation,” conducted in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 13-15 November 2013, the author outlines two reasons for failings of security sector reform efforts – inability to properly contextualize security sector reform initiatives and invalid assumptions regarding the power and shadow influence of some security organizations. He then identifies three features of successful reform designs, valid for every context: provide for political legitimacy of security and defence organizations and reform initiatives; emphasise integrity at least as much as effectiveness; involve civil society organizations.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Gill</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Should the Intelligence Agencies ‘Show More Leg’ or Have They Just Been Stripped Naked?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">data mining</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">human rights</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">privacy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">profiling</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">surveillance</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">November 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">30</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-28</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Newspapers started publishing US National Security Agency (NSA) files in June 2013, as a result of Edward Snowden’s declaration that he wanted to start a debate on the current drive for ‘total surveillance.’ Official comments in the UK have been tight-lipped and have barely got beyond the refrain that everything NSA’s sister agency, UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) does is legal and requires no further discussion. This article considers the major issues that have been raised concerning privacy, surveillance and the adequacy or otherwise of political control and oversight over intelligence agencies, particularly in the UK</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Programme for management of the Institute of Information and Communication Technologies of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">balanced scorecard</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">budgeting</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">innovation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec reports</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">R&amp;D management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SWOT analysis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">TRL</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">vision</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">„Programme for Managing and Development of the Institute of Information and Communication Technologies of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences”.  This management programme was prepared for the procedure for appointment of director of the Institute of Information and Communication Technologies (IICT) of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, established through merger of three academic institutes. It is based on a SWOT analysis. The report presents the fundament of a balanced scorecard for assessing the results and the performance of a modern research and technology organisation.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>