<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jim Derleth</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jeff Pickler</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Twenty-first Century Threats Require Twenty-first Century Deterrence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">irregular warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-23</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">During the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) after World War II, deterrence emerged as the primary U.S. security strategy. Historically, the USA focused on deterring conventional and nuclear threats. While this helped prevent a direct military conflict between the two superpowers, it did not end their political rivalry, simply pushing it into areas that decreased the risk of open military conflict. During the Cold War, both the USA and USSR used irregular tactics to try and achieve their strategic objectives in the grey zone, the area below the threshold for “use of force” or “armed attack” as described in the United Nations Charter. Technology limited the effectiveness of irregular tactics, not considered significant national security threats. Today, a globalized, interconnected, and ubiquitous information environment provides numerous opportunities for adversaries to achieve strategic objectives without crossing the strategic threshold that would have historically provoked a military response.
      An increase in irregular attacks shows that while deterrence has continued to prevent large-scale military conflict between the major powers, it has failed to prevent aggression in the grey zone. From the Baltics to the Caucuses, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated how irregular tactics can achieve strategic objectives without fear of an unacceptable counteraction. Trends in national power, interdependence, and technology suggest Russia and other adversaries will continue to increase their ability to exploit the grey zone vulnerabilities. A deterrence policy focused solely on conventional and nuclear forces is no longer sufficient. To deter irregular tactics, the United States must develop a 21st-century deterrence strategy. This need will only grow as Russia tries to offset its military failures in Ukraine. With Russian conventional forces weakened, Russia will increasingly rely on irregular tactics to attack its adversaries. This paper examines the declining relevance of traditional conventional and nuclear-focused deterrence strategies and argues that deterrence should be modified to remain relevant against 21st-century threats.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Predrag Tasevski</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Macedonian Path Towards Cybersecurity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">establishment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Macedonia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">MKD-CIRT</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategy</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">32</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109-119</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Information and communication technologies in Macedonia have experienced a phenomenal growth throughout the last decades, which has had a tremendous impact on governmental services&amp;rsquo; presence in the Internet, as well as on everyday life. Against this background, technologies-based growth introduces new risks and threats to the cyber domain in the country. To respond to those challenges the Macedonian government is pursing the establishment of a national authority to react to cyber attacks that occur, or a Computer Incident Response Team &amp;ndash; MKD-CIRT, and the adoption of a National Cybersecurity Strategy. However, it should be taken into account that such tasks are neither easy nor simple. There are several issues that should be considered, for instance: the improvement of the measures for protection of information systems and of the critical infrastructure; the legal and policy framework; the international approach; and the formation of a cybersecurity culture, to name but a few. Simultaneously, considering that Macedonia is a candidate for accession to the EU and NATO, it has to comply with their standards when performing the reforms in the cybersecurity field. The current article briefly introduces the country&amp;rsquo;s steps towards cybersecurity, provides an analysis of the legal, policy and institutional progress achieved, and suggests recommendations that should be considered to ensure safer, secure, trustworthy and resilient cyber space in the country.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boris Bogdanov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgi Gocev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Neno Hristov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Possibilities for improving the draft law ‘On the management  of the system for protecting national security’ (in Bulgarian)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democratic control</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">national security system</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">December 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Faculty members of the “G.S. Rakovski” Defence and Staff College in Sofia present their personal views on the possibilities to improve the draft of the law on ‘On the management of the system for protecting national security’ adopted by the Council of Ministers with Ordnance № 980 of 26 November 2012. Their recommendations relate to increasing the scope of the law, clarifying terminology, enhancing the elaboration on the governmental security council, as well as the overall decision making process, and the texts on crisis management.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Michel Rademaker</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National Security Strategy of the Netherlands: An Innovative Approach</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk Assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic plan­ning.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51-61</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The defence and security community is faced with deep uncertainty. Strategic planning can no longer be performed in the traditional way. External and internal security are closely interlinked and this means that security planning should be organised in a more interlinked manner too. This article describes how a national security strategy is being developed in the Netherlands in a strongly interagency-oriented way. Not threat driven but values and capabilities oriented. This is a very innovative and challenging process that is underway at the moment. Attention in this article is paid to the process and methodology to realise the strategy.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>