<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vlad Posea</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">George Sharkov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adrian Baumann</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgios Chatzichristos</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Towards Unified European Cyber Incident and Crisis Management Ontology</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity Act</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cybersecurity taxonomy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">harm</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">incident response</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ontology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk Assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threat</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">53</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33-44</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ENISA highlighted the need for a common reporting taxonomy for cybersecurity incidents to be used by cybersecurity analysts across Europe. The analysis of the domain revealed a large number of taxonomies for different areas of the cybersecurity domain (types of attacks, vulnerabilities, sectors, harm), but those needed to be linked together in a model that allows a cybersecurity officer to report and track an incident fast and accurately. The taxonomy should also treat the cybersecurity domain not only from the technical point of view but also from the socio-economical aspect. This document describes the taxonomy, how we propose to use it, and the methodology used to develop it.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Alfredo M. Ronchi</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">TAS: Trust Assessment System</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">big data</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">border security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">human factors</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk Assessment</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">44</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">62-75</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The present article briefly introduces a general view on tomorrow’s border control system and EU inter-BCP real time information sharing, exploring and proposing new operational methods and solutions for border control procedures to increase the efficacy and efficiency of the whole security screening system at the same time reducing the efforts (costs/resources). The general description of the system logic and architecture introduces the core of the solution, the Trust Assessment System. A “black box” based on risk analysis and advanced machine learning algorithms aimed to assign a Traveller Trust Score to each single individual intending to cross the border. Main benefits are: improved checkpoint throughput, improved situational awareness and level of security, better traveller experience, optimisation of resources. The concept is that the traveller risk evaluation starts as soon as she/he applies for a visa, a passport or books a trip by whatever means of transport.</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">62</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iztok Prezelj</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive Security and Some Implemental Limits</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Asymmetric Threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counter-terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cross-sectoral approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">inter-organisational cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multidimensional security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk Assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threat assessment</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13-34</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The changing security environment has led to the development of com¬prehensive security approaches, strategies and policies. The ‘Holistic approach’ has become an academic and practical mantra. This paper argues, however, that comprehensive security approaches face serious obstacles to their practical implementation. The critical evaluation of several examples confirms that the implementation phase is a weakness of comprehensive approaches and that a truly comprehensive and holistic approach seems to be beyond the implemental capacities of our security systems. Multi-sectoral and multi-level comprehensive approaches become less comprehensive when implemented in practice or even cannot be implemented due to existing narrow perceptions of security or narrow and short-term interests. The trans-sectoral second-, third- and fourth-order effects of proposed security measures are hardly considered or not considered at all. There is no consensus on what exactly comprehensive means, while prioritisation of some areas in the national security policy leads to de-prioritisation of other areas and new vulnerabilities, inter-organisational and cross-sectoral cooperation faces serious limits, threat, risk and vulnerability assessments are not really comprehensive, etc. This paper finishes with recommendations on what to do about these serious limits on the implementation of comprehensive security.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Michel Rademaker</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National Security Strategy of the Netherlands: An Innovative Approach</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk Assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic plan­ning.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2009</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51-61</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The defence and security community is faced with deep uncertainty. Strategic planning can no longer be performed in the traditional way. External and internal security are closely interlinked and this means that security planning should be organised in a more interlinked manner too. This article describes how a national security strategy is being developed in the Netherlands in a strongly interagency-oriented way. Not threat driven but values and capabilities oriented. This is a very innovative and challenging process that is underway at the moment. Attention in this article is paid to the process and methodology to realise the strategy.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Svetoslav Andonov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Katerina Kostadinova</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Emil Simeonov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modern Information Technologies and General Public Protection in the Republic of Bulgaria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EDRIM</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Emergency Notification and Alert System for the Danube River Basin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">GIS</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">INMARSAT-C</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ISDN</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National Automated Radiation Monitoring System</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National Situation Center</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk Assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SAR</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">10</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43-55</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article presents the Information System used by the State Agency for Civil Protection of the Republic of Bulgaria (IS-CPRB). The IS-CPRB is designed for collecting, processing and distributing up-to-date analyses, assessments and information on chemical, biological and hydro-meteorological emergencies as well as emergencies related to radiation, traffic or fire, including natural disasters, technological incidents and traffic accidents. EDRIM (Electronic Discussion Group for Risk Management), the National Automated Radiation Monitoring System (RAMO) and the International Alert System for the Danube River are reviewed as useful support tools for the IS-CPRB. The agreement for developing another framework for regional cooperation—the Civil-Military Emergency Planning Council for Southeastern Europe—is presented in the annex.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>