<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abdul Basir Yosufi</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">counterinsurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">insurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ISIS</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">sectarian conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">US intervention</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91-110</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This research paper examines the extent to which both the United States (US) intervention in 2003 and sectarian conflict in Iraq and the region contributed to the rise and consolidation of the Islamic State (IS). It is argued that the US intervention contributed to the rise of IS by creating a strategic cause for mobilization of insurgency while insufficient counterinsurgency resources and doctrine, and the lack of a post-war plan enabled the insurgency to consolidate. Although the US adapted its strategy and deployed additional resources as part of the “surge,” which succeeded in weakening of the insurgents significantly, the premature withdrawal of US troops allowed for a revival of the insurgency which eventually evolved into IS. The sectarian conflict in Iraq and the region further contributed to the rise and consolidation of IS by helping in prolif-eration of the group’s underlying ideology, increasing funding opportunities for the insurgents and driving the Sunni communities to support the Islamic State
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John J. Le Beau</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Renaissance of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency:Examining Twenty-First Century Insurgencies and Government Responses</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al-Qaeda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ayman al-Zawahiri</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">counterinsurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">insurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islam</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamist</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jihadist</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Osama bin Laden</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Saudi Arabia.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">unconventional warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2008</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">154-166</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Insurgency and counterinsurgency as types of warfare are currently subject to considerable attention due to the nature of the high-profile struggles underway in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is prudent to note that neither insurgency nor the strategy and tactics required to combat it represent new phenomena. A large body of experience and literature from the twentieth century and earlier exists that addresses both sides of the insurgent struggle. Some characteristics of insurgencies are largely immutable, since insurgency is ultimately a form of warfare that is adopted when a combatant has limited resources and limited choices for how to fight against a more powerful adversary. Today as in the past, these characteristics include employment of small-unit attacks, ambushes, assassinations, propaganda activity, and the development of covert infrastructure. Nevertheless, the primary insurgencies active in the twenty-first century are marked by important differences from earlier struggles, particularly in the areas of motivation and inspiration. Rather than being quintessentially political and interested in local or national grievances, many contemporary insurgencies are at their core linked to a particular interpretation of Islam. Thus, these insurgencies represent a war of religion, not of politics, economics, or ethnicity. Islamist insurgencies are likely to be uncompromising and averse to negotiation, absolutist and pan-national in their goals, and willing to justify the mass slaughter of non-combatants who do not share their religious vision.
Counterinsurgent strategies that take into account the religious world-view of their opponents are better equipped for success than counterinsurgent efforts that ignore or minimize the radical Islamist dimensions of the struggle. Saudi Arabia offers an example of a counterinsurgency campaign that has been tailored to deal with an Islamist challenge. Modern communications and technology may link disparate Islamist insurgencies to some degree, and might eventually provide a means of coordination and information sharing. In fact, this may already be occurring. Contests with Islamist insurgencies around the globe are likely to continue for a protracted period.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>