<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Declaration of the Russian State as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Pros, Cons, and Realities</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">aggression</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">genocide</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state sponsor of terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, ignited discussions about ways to curb Russia’s ambitions in reshaping the post-WWII world order. This article critically examines the ongoing dialogue surrounding the potential designation of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. We will delve into both the arguments in favor and against this move while also exploring the current political outcomes of this contentious debate. Previously, we conducted a comparative analysis of the criteria for including countries in the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and the activities of the Russian Federation. This article outlines the potential repercussions of such a designation, including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items, and various financial and other restrictions. Sanctions penalizing countries and individuals for engaging in trade with designated states are of particular significance. The Russian Federation has already been recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/ regime in Ukraine and the EU; hence, the main emphasis will be on the United States. This is due to the fact that resolutions from other states are often symbolic gestures with limited consequences, whereas inclusion in the U.S. Department of State’s list can have a profound impact on Russia.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Olena Davlikanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Designation of the Russian Federation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: Meeting the “Club of Villains” Criteria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">aggression</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">full-scale invasion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state sponsor of terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist state</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-46</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article analyzes the primary reasons for designating the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The issue gained prominence with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022—the largest and deadliest armed conflict in Europe since World War II—challenging the unity of the Collective West and the global security system. The vision of a peaceful and prosperous European space from Lisbon to Vladivostok has been permanently shattered.
To achieve its geopolitical objectives, Russia has been involved in numerous armed conflicts since 1991, such as in Georgia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and now Ukraine, orchestrated operations on the soil of other states, and supported terrorist organizations. Aspiring to be a superpower in the aftermath of the USSR, Russia has utilized hybrid warfare instruments for decades to undermine democracies globally and maintain influence over former Soviet republics. Some of its actions can be classified as terrorism, support for terrorism, ethnocide, or genocide.
This article explores the criteria for including countries in the US list of state sponsors of terrorism and compares them with the activities of the Russian Federation. It provides evidence that Russia qualifies for inclusion in the list, although the US still hesitates to designate it as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/regime.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lukáš Vilím</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Social Media – Hate Speech – Hate Crime</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">criminal activity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">extremism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hate speech</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">prevention</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security system</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">social network</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57-73</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the issue of hate speech on social media from the perspective of the security system of the Czech Republic and its tools designed to provide internal security and the necessary legislative amendments to allow law enforcement agencies to address this issue effectively. In the current approach to cyberspace, social networks are becoming a vehicle for the persistent spreading of hate-based ideologies, and this needs to be prevented.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">57</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ivan A. Babin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anton Chablin</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aleksei Kazantsev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mohammed A. Khesham</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yuri V. Vasiliyev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frederic Labarre</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Countering Radicalism in the North Caucasus</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Caucasus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civil society</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mass media</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">radicalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">religion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61-76</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 19.85pt; text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;This article is an abridged version of the proceedings of the PfP Consortium&amp;rsquo;s Conflict Studies Working Group (CSWG) workshop which took place in Berlin, 7-9 November 2016. The workshop, entitled &amp;ldquo;Countering Radical Islamism in the North Caucasus&amp;rdquo; welcomed representatives of Germany, Poland, Romania, Russia, including of course the North Caucasus. It was organized by the PfP Consortium at the behest of Ivan A. Babin, director of the Center for Scientific and Social Innovation (Stavropol, Russia) and Baron Udo von Massenbach, president of the German-American Business Association. Carmen Rijnoveanu presided the conference.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 19.85pt; text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;The workshop&amp;rsquo;s aim was to highlight the gravity of Islamic radicalization in the North Caucasus, and treat it as a symptom of wider geopolitical and social upheavals worldwide. In putting the accent on the scope of the challenge, our Russian guests were also stressing that the successful defeat of movements like DAESH requires East-West cooperation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left: 19.85pt; text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;This cooperation should help open dialogue between the great powers in our Ukraine and Syria-fueled &amp;ldquo;Cold War.&amp;rdquo; Urgency and cooperation are some of the themes that motivate each presentation in the workshop. This paper has collected presentations that were representative of its intent. They are presented here translated and edited, with the understanding that the opinions they represent are those of the authors only, and in no way reflect that of any government or organization. Each piece is identified by its proponent, and all the pieces are interspersed with short commentaries designed to bring unity to the whole document.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James Howcroft</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Future of Terrorism: The Practitioners’ View</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counterterrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">War or Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-81</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;text-align: justify;&quot;&gt;In this essay, the author&amp;mdash;an experienced intelligence officer and currently lead for the counter-terrorism program at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies&amp;mdash;reviews the future developments of international terrorism in three main areas: motivations; tactics, weapons and technology, and targets.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chris Deliso</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Security Risks Relating to the Migrant Crisis and Interagency Cooperation: The Case of Macedonia and Bulgaria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">illegal migration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">interagency cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">psychological warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21-27</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The migrant crisis in the Balkans from 2015-2016 is examined as an example of a hybrid-warfare scenario in contemporary Europe that demonstrates how institutionally-driven security responses that can be applied to successfully counter hybrid threats. Analyzing the experience of Macedonia and Bulgaria, the author identifies five types of security threats that were witnessed along the Balkan route during the migrant crisis. Migrant flows can be infiltrated by potential terrorist for the purposes of simple transit and/or attack scenarios. Organized crime, e.g. by combining human trafficking with other illegal activities, is the second security risk. Thirdly, hostile intelligence penetration of migrant inflows was a very serious hybrid threat, given the opacity of the phenomenon, i.e., the inability to distinguish ‘who is who’ and what their intentions are. Fourth, the presence of pro-migrant activist and anarchist groups with a track record of violent behavior was a persistent threat as it could be multiplied by participation of large numbers of migrants in concentrated efforts against state borders. Finally, the security situation was affected by the important, and yet often forgotten, psychological warfare. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Manni Crone</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State’s Incursion into North Africa and Sahel: A Threat to al-Qaeda?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Boko Haram</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamic State</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libya</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">North Africa</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sahel</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sinai Province</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63-76</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article examines Islamic State’s expansion into North Africa and Sahel and the subsequent rivalry between Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb − the regional Al Qaeda group. Although IS managed to establish a province in Libya from 2014 through 2016, its presence in North Africa and Sahel (Libya, Sinai, Nigeria) is fragile. AQIM in contrast has a longstanding presence in the region, which appears to be much more consolidated. The rivalry between IS and AQ in this region has incited AQ splinter-groups to unite around AQIM, and in 2016 these groups stepped up their attacks on Western targets.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">63</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sebastian von Münchow</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lena Hantschke</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Parliamentary Attempts to Investigate Berlin’s Vehicular Ramming Attack</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counterterrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Germany migration</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">law enforcement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">parliamentary oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-39</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On December 19th, 2016 Germany saw the first major Islamist terror attack on its soil. A Tunisian asylum seeker crashed a hijacked truck into one of the main Berlin’s Christmas markets. The assault resulted in 12 casualties. In the aftermath, several attempts were made by German parliaments on Länder-level, as well as on federal level, to investigate how the terrorist was able to use 14 different identities, how he carried out the plot, how he escaped and where security authorities failed to prevent the attack.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cüneyt Gürer</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Presenting a Strategic Model to Understand Spillover Effects of ISIS Terrorism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign fighters</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ISIS</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">spillover effects</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41-57</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Understanding the nature and the extent of the future threat from ISIS has been a key question for scholars, policy makers and security professionals since ISIS started losing significant grounds in Syria and Iraq. This article analyses ISIS terrorism and its possible spillover effects from a regional security perspective by presenting a strategic model to develop options for the policy makers. A strategic understanding, supported by a model that has been designed to capture all possible variables and their interaction which each other, is necessary to understand the future direction of the threat. Many scholars agree that the threat is not only about the organizational structure of ISIS but also its ideological aspect, therefore the model presented here connects the facts and the ideology with variables at three different levels: regional political level; ISIS and its organizational structure; and individual level variables. The model was designed to capture changes with relevant data thus providing a strategic data-driven understanding of the threat. 
Regional political developments and how ISIS reacts to those developments are the main concerns at the first two levels of analysis. Foreign fighters and other sympathizers are the most important subjects of the study at the individual level with the assumption that the future threat will diffuse through foreign fighters and self-radicalized lone actors.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nazia Hussain</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Louise Shelley</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Karachi: Organized Crime in a Key Megacity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Karachi</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">megacities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-15</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Crime and terror groups are key non-state actors in Karachi and employ crime and violence to achieve political and economic gains. They have a different relationship with the state than crime groups in Italy where the state has more resources to share with the crime groups. Instead, much more complex relationships exist between the state and the non-state actors in this difficult environment where crime and terror groups have become a part of diffuse governance of the city, including provision of housing and water. 
Our analysis differs from others who suggest that crime and terror groups have stepped into a power void. We suggest that the political parties rather than the crime and terror groups are at the forefront of violent and criminalized politics. Therefore, violent non-state actors are not the ultimate arbiters of the political order. Crime and terror groups remain vulnerable as they may lose the state’s support and without this they face difficulty surviving in this highly competitive environment.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sam Mullins</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism and Organized Crime</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">convergence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counter-terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crime-terror nexus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">law-enforcement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65-82</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article begins with an assessment of the similarities and differences between terrorists and criminals, including profiles, methods, systems of organization and motives. Notably, the article identifies seven categories of crimes committed by terrorists: 1) Inherent/violent, 2) Preparation/facilitation, 3) Funding, 4) Specialized terrorism offenses, 5) Vigilantism/public relations, 6) Miscellaneous/Spontaneous/Unrelated Offences, and 7) Previous criminal records. Next, the crime-terror nexus is discussed and four types of relationships between terrorists and criminals are identified: 1) Interaction, 2) Appropriation, 3) Assimilation, and 4) Transformation. The article concludes with a discussion of the concept of convergence between terrorism and organized crime, and implications for counter-terrorism and law-enforcement.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vase Rusumanov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Use of the Internet by Terrorist Organizations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">communication</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber attacks</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberterrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internet</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">propaganda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist organizations</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">34</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">137-150</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Human life progress has successfully defined multiple epochs’ evolution with specific peculiarities. Today we live in the modern digital era, numerous computer devices, services and networks are actually significant. At the same time, these new science and technology achievements are rated both as good and bad for their users. The digital progress is however visible and of utility for terrorist organizations. This article focuses on selected illustrations of Internet technologies used by terrorist organizations. Special discussion emphases are given to uses towards (i) terrorist organizations radicalization of young people; (ii) spreading propaganda; (iii) internal communication, training, planning, coordination and committing terrorist acts.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">137</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Matteo E. Bonfanti</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Francesca Capone</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fostering a Comprehensive Security Approach: An Exploratory Case Study of CBRN Crisis Management Frameworks in Eleven European Countries</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CBRN</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">comparative legal analysis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">first responders</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">law enforcement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">preparedness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">response</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55-80</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Response to CBRN threats and events has gained momentum at the national, regional and also international level. Within the European Union, since the adoption of the EU Action Plan in 2009 Member States have been called to focus on this issue and develop appropriate response strategies. The increasing risk of CBRN events, including terrorist attacks, triggers the need to adopt an integrated approach, at the regional as well as at the national level. Tackling terrorist access to CBRN agents is currently considered a top priority for the European Union, but what is the framework and which are the instruments developed to prevent and respond to this kind of emergency? Is the EU sufficiently equipped to deal with the devastating effects of a CBRN event? Are the Member States up to this task? The present paper investigates the strengths and weaknesses of the existing tools. It does so relying on the results of a two-year research project funded by the EU, which, inter alia, analysed in a comparative way the normative framework of Italy and ten other EU Member States. The goal of this contribution is twofold. In the first place it will provide the reader with an overview of the key issues surfaced in the course of the comparative analysis against the backdrop of the EU legal and institutional frameworks and, secondly, it will point at the possible ways forward to harmonise and better regulate the response to the kind of events at stake and enhance the concept of security in Europe. The comparative analysis has shed light on several crucial issues that stress the urge to foster and implement an integrated response to CBRN events or threats. As emerged from the information collected and elaborated in this contribution, some important aspects (i.e. the coherence and soundness of the normative framework dealing with CBRN crises and emergency management; the effectiveness of the communication strategies and the need to improve and promote multi-agency training) still need to be duly addressed in order to fill the gaps identified.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antonia Todorova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Turkish Security Discourses and Policies: The Kurdish Question</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ISIL</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kurdish question</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PKK</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security discourse</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Turkey</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">108-121</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A multidimensional problem with lengthy history, the so-called “Kurdish Question” has been one of the most important domestic security challenges that Turkey has had to face since the early 1980s. In this paper, the Kurdish issue is put in the broader framework of Turkey’s security concept and foreign policy, along with explanation of the specifics and dynamics in Turkish politics. The relations between the Kurdish groups in the Middle East region were taken in consideration, as well as the emergence of the jihadist group of ISIL. A special focus on security perceptions and results of EvoCS project is presented at the beginning.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Artur Gruszczak</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Networked Security Governance: Reflections on the E.U.’s Counterterrorism Approach</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Journal of Global Change and Governance</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Networks</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2008</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">I</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">One of the objectives of the European Union has been to secure its territory and provide its citizens with
personal safety. In the global war on terror the challenge of global threats must be met as effectively as
possible. The E.U. had been developing its counterterrorist policy within an intergovernmental formula. In
the aftermath of Sepember 11 it had to look for new supranational arrangements. The politics of insecurity
strengthened by the effects of terrorist attacks on the European soil (Madrid 2004 and London 2005)
inspired the E.U.’s institutions as well as the member states to establish a networked form of security
governance based on information sharing, border control and virtual fencing as well as digital
identification and management of identity through biometrics.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-23</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John J. Le Beau</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Renaissance of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency:Examining Twenty-First Century Insurgencies and Government Responses</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Al-Qaeda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ayman al-Zawahiri</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">counterinsurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">insurgency</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islam</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Islamist</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jihadist</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Osama bin Laden</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Saudi Arabia.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">unconventional warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2008</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">154-166</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Insurgency and counterinsurgency as types of warfare are currently subject to considerable attention due to the nature of the high-profile struggles underway in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is prudent to note that neither insurgency nor the strategy and tactics required to combat it represent new phenomena. A large body of experience and literature from the twentieth century and earlier exists that addresses both sides of the insurgent struggle. Some characteristics of insurgencies are largely immutable, since insurgency is ultimately a form of warfare that is adopted when a combatant has limited resources and limited choices for how to fight against a more powerful adversary. Today as in the past, these characteristics include employment of small-unit attacks, ambushes, assassinations, propaganda activity, and the development of covert infrastructure. Nevertheless, the primary insurgencies active in the twenty-first century are marked by important differences from earlier struggles, particularly in the areas of motivation and inspiration. Rather than being quintessentially political and interested in local or national grievances, many contemporary insurgencies are at their core linked to a particular interpretation of Islam. Thus, these insurgencies represent a war of religion, not of politics, economics, or ethnicity. Islamist insurgencies are likely to be uncompromising and averse to negotiation, absolutist and pan-national in their goals, and willing to justify the mass slaughter of non-combatants who do not share their religious vision.
Counterinsurgent strategies that take into account the religious world-view of their opponents are better equipped for success than counterinsurgent efforts that ignore or minimize the radical Islamist dimensions of the struggle. Saudi Arabia offers an example of a counterinsurgency campaign that has been tailored to deal with an Islamist challenge. Modern communications and technology may link disparate Islamist insurgencies to some degree, and might eventually provide a means of coordination and information sharing. In fact, this may already be occurring. Contests with Islamist insurgencies around the globe are likely to continue for a protracted period.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maura Conway</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorist ‘Use’ of the Internet and Fighting Back</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counter-terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Internet</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorist Financing</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorist Networking</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorist Recruitment</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9-30</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Internet is a powerful political instrument, which is increasingly employed by terrorists to forward their goals. The five most prominent contemporary terrorist uses of the Net are information provision, financing, networking, recruitment, and information gathering. This article describes and explains each of these uses and is illustrated with examples of each. The final section of the paper describes the responses of government, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and others to the terrorism-Internet nexus.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Valeri Ratchev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Growing Threat: Homeland Security Issues of Bulgaria</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">homeland security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Human Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Societal Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Terrorism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61-74</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article presents the main problems in adapting security establishments of democratic countries to the challenges of spreading terrorism in a globalized world. The focus is on problems facing post-communist countries. The author argues that, both during the early stages of democratization and in the ongoing security sector reform, the emphasis is on democratic civilian control and too little attention is paid to operational effectiveness. Furthermore, all democratic countries face the problem of achieving effectiveness of the security organizations while preserving and protecting democratic values. The concept of homeland security, among others, may be used to strengthen international and interagency cooperation in dealing with the security challenges of the Twenty First century.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>