<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Peter Dobias</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kyle Christensen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">William Freid</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gaming Intermediate Force Capabilities: Strategic Implications of Tactical Decisions</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">kriegsspiel</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">matrix</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-kinetic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wargaming</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97-109</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reviews the development and tests of two Intermediate Force Capability (IFC) concept development hybrid wargames. The first wargame plays out a maritime Task Force’s ability to counter hybrid threats in the grey zone. The second wargame examines the ability of a NATO Task Group, deployed to a third country to train local security forces, to counter a hostile militia trained and supported by a neighboring country. IFCs offer a class of response between doing nothing and using lethal force in a situation that would be politically unpalatable. As such, the aim of the wargame series is to evaluate whether IFCs can make a difference to mission success against hybrid threats in the grey zone. This wargame series was particularly important because it used traditional game mechanics in a unique and innovative way to evaluate and assess IFC’s effects on strategic mission success. Specifically, the hybrid wargame series has demonstrated that IFCs have a high probability of filling the gap between doing nothing and using lethal force. IFCs have the potential to improve operational effectiveness by allowing for more restrained use of force to escalate/de-escalate a situation and increasing decision time and space for tactical decision-makers. Both counter-personnel and counter-materiel capabilities (including miniaturization) are needed to act effectively in the current hybrid threat environment.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marko A. Hofmann</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tobias LEHMANN</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On Simulation-based Wargaming: Comparison of Two Different Methodological Approaches</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Assumption-based Planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intuition-based Decision-making</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Operational Wargaming</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">simulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tactical Wargaming</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wargaming</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2007</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">64-72</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Wargaming has been neglected within the German Forces for almost fifty years. Only within the last two years, two so-called &amp;ldquo;Leitfaden&amp;rdquo; (codes of best practice) have been developed. The first one, elaborated by members of the General Staff Academy, is intended for operational wargaming and fully rests on the tradi&amp;shy;tional analytical comparison of different Courses of Action (CoA). Own and enemy CoAs are played against each other on the foundation of a game between two staff groups. Within this paradigm, simulations are used as evaluation tools. The rea&amp;shy;soning is based on the premise that simulation systems are valid representations of reality. A successful simulation run is considered a corroboration of a particular course of action. The second &amp;ldquo;Leitfaden,&amp;rdquo; developed at the University of the Fed&amp;shy;eral Armed Forces, is intended for so-called &amp;ldquo;tactical wargaming.&amp;rdquo; The two central concepts of this approach are intuition-based decision-making and assumption-based planning. The core rationale of this method is that all military planning and decision making is liable to what is called the &amp;ldquo;fog of war.&amp;rdquo; The irresolvable unpre&amp;shy;dictability of future developments in all military operations is considered an insur&amp;shy;mountable obstacle to all analytical approaches. This approach rests on the claim that pattern recognition and mental simulation of these patterns are the most valu&amp;shy;able cognitive functions of expert decision makers. Within this paradigm, simula&amp;shy;tions are used to support creativity, enhance imagination and trigger self-critical thinking. Simulation systems of complex systems are not necessarily regarded to be valid. This article discusses the pros and cons of the two approaches (&amp;ldquo;Leitfaden&amp;rdquo;) from both theoretical and practical perspective.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record></records></xml>